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Abstract 
Since Kant first articulated the lantinomy of taste', a major 
problem posed for aesthetic educators has been how to reconcile the 
educational demand for the objectivity of appreciative acts with the 
need for personal response which appears to be built into the aesth- 
etic language game. 
In the first part of this thesis, after examining the undesir- 
able polarization between current 'objectivist' and 'radical subje- 
ctivist' responses to the problem, I set out to explore an alterna- 
tive answer which is to be found in the 'experiential' aesthetics 
of Roger Scruton. Here, an attempt is made to accomodate a public 
language account of aesthetic discourse with an empiricist philos- 
ophy of mind in which our ability to 'see the point' of aesthetic 
judgments is held to be related in fundamental ways to extra-ling- 
uistic experiences such as aspect-perceptions, mental images and em- 
otions. 
First, I look at Scruton's account of how aesthetic terms enter 
'pa-ronymouslyl into aesthetic discourse, relating this to Kant's view 
of the work of art as a 'presence' rather than an 'instance'. Next, 
I examine Scruton's argument for the autonomy of the aesthetic obj- 
ect qua object of the imagination, and I discuss the problems that 
he meets in considering representationg expressionaid symbolism in 
art in the context of this argument. Against the prevailing lanalyt- 
ic' view of the imagination, I argueg with Scruton, that the act of 
constituting the work in our imagination is not an expendable extra 
to the realization of the meaning of the work - an argument. which I 
attempt to reinforce by appeal to Kant's description of the laesthet- 
ic ideal and to Husserl's distinction between meaning as 'empty int- 
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ention' and its realization in aspect, image and emotion. This is 
followed by an exposition of what I argue is a systematic ambigui- 
ty between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic significances of aesth- 
etic terms. 
In the second part of the thesis, I examine how the education- 
al demand for objectivity may be met by the above account, in terms 
of a theory of 'psychological' objectivity derived from Kant and re- 
flected in Scruton. The pedagogical implications of this are exam- 
ined next, especially as regards the 'expressive' power of teach- 
ing to comminicate non-propositional acquaintance with the Temerg- 
ent' aesthetic object, and the need for thedevelopment of a 'feel- 
ing' for aesthetic judgment against a background of the'aesthetic 
form of life. Finally, in line with my attempt throughout the thes- 
is to treat the arts as a unity, I argueg against current trends, 
for a unified 'arts faculty' in which the teaching of literature is 
brought within the fold of the other arts. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Introduction - Aesthetic education 
and the 'antinomy of taste'. 
My main concern in this thesis will be to explore that aspect of 
aesthetic education that is described, often very loosely, as the 
appreciation of literature, music, painting etc. More precisely, I 
hope to clarify the contribution made to the development of 
appreciation by the encouragement and cultivation of pupils' personal 
responses. In attempting to give an adequate account of 'apprec- 
iation', especially as regards its educability, the main problem to be 
confronted is this: 'appreciation' is characteristically understood in 
both an objective and a subjective sense, as in Kant's celebrated 
formulation of the ' antin*omy of tastell . Thus, on the one hard , it 
would seem that the legitimacy of our appreciative judgments (see 
foot-note) must depend on our attention being directed wholly tow2rds 
what we can discover in the work of art - or rather, following the 
widely accepted view of contemporary aestheeticians2, towards the 
'aesthetic object' that is intimated by the work's material presencc, 
but whose emergence into the light of day depends upon 'educated' acts 
of perception. On the other hand, it is also generally accepted that 
an ability to appreciate presupposes that we discover within our- 
selves, first-person responses to the work, for it is these that 'give 
point' to our judgments. As David Best points out, in giving express- 
ion to this generally accepted view of the subjective/objective pol- 
arity of 'appreciation': 
While an artistic judgment expresses a personal attitude to a 
Footnote: Throughout this thesis, I shall be using the tern, s 
'aesthetic judgment' and 'judgment of Iaste' to refer ind-iocrim- 
inately both to the type of descriptive judgment that is directed 
towards 'emergent-' ', of the case of 'the features of the worp , arL , as in _ 
music is sad', arid to ev3luative JAgments such as 'the music is 
beautiful'. Whether or not 'Ehe 'judgment of t--2ste' and 'aesthetic 
judgment' are themselves inter change able is a further matte-r which it 
will be the main purpose of this chapter to explore. 
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personal experience, there are reasons for it3 
- reasons deriving from what is held to be objectively there, in the 
work of art, and hence open to correction. Yet insofar as one is also 
reporting a personal response, there IS an obvious sense in which 
such reports are incorrigible: a pupil's judgment that 'the music is 
sad' may be corrected, but not his claim to be moved to tears by it - 
hence the antinomy. 
Now if, as a result of 'aesthetic education', the pupils' 
personal responses normally lined up with what they correctly judged 
the 
to be there, in the work (assuming for the sake oftargument that such 
objectivity could, at least in principle, be established with a large 
measure of agreement through the efforts of knowledgeable and ex- 
perienced art lovers - --i view that is widely held in contemporary 
aesthetics by writers such as Osborne, Sibley and Best), then the 
subjective/objective antinomy would present us with no mc. -L-e of a 
problem than it does in the case of our ordinary perception -.,, f 'Lhe 
'everyday' world. In the cas- of such 'everyday' percepticm our 
educated judgments normally co4Lncide effortlessly with what we 'see 
for ourselves' and, where they don't, then this is for the most part 
clearly explicable in terms of irrelevant associations, absence of 
'standard' viewing conditions, misunderstandings, colour-blindness and 
the like. 
A main reason for the relative absence of the 'antinomy' in our 
'everyday' perception however, is that- our personal involvement in 
what we see, though present, is minimal. We 'read off' features of 
the familiar environment around us in a quasi-automatic way as a 
result o. ' long-formed habits - hence the very 'ordinariness' of that 
environment. By contrast, as virtually all aestheticiRns seem to 
agree, in aestnetic appreciatiun a personal response is at a premium 
insofar as, without it, the anythi ng-bu t-or di nary appearance of the 
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1 4-1- aesthetic object' will fail to materialize, however much we may posit 
its presence at an intellectual level. 
At the same time and as a result of this requirement however, it 
is only too evident that within the ae-3thetic realm, people's 
responses to works of art do not. always v., ork in harmnny with their 
'edu*cated' judgments about the same worksq whether as regards how they 
'see' the work, the pleasure that they take in it or the value that 
they attach to it, and this, despite all the efforts of aesthetic 
educators! We may know at an 'educated' level, for example, that the 
Braque painting at which vie are gazing 'ought' to strike us as a 
beautiful and harmonious composition in its own right, and yet the 
harder vie gaze, the more insistently does it appear to us as nothing 
f 
more than a ve. ry distorted guitar. In the same -Vlqay, ds David Best 
points out: 
One may recognize that a work expresses sadness while having 
quite a different response to it4 
- or even, one must add, no response at all, as when a work- 'loaves us 
cold' despite our 'educated' identification of its qualitie. s. _r-I such 
cases, we judge the work to be 'sad' but don't feel it to be sc. 
This state of affairs has led Margolis to question the trad- 
itional Kantian identification of 'aesthetic judgment' with the 
'judgment of taste' (the source of the lantinomy'), on the grounds 
that: 
When we think of taste merely in terms of our responses to thiings 
- we are not interested characteristically in judgments, but in 
reports or manifestations, of taste. 5 
He is thus led on to suggest the radical possibility that few other 
aestheticians, as far as I know, have dared face up to - namely that: 
There may be no more tLhan a contingent relationship, thereforeq 
between aesthetic judgments and the attitudes and responses that 
we assoclate with our a, tual tastes. 6 
This would,. of course, resolve the lantinomy' at a stroke, but at what. 
a price! There is no derying of course that such a contingency is 
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present on those occasions when (a) a persCanal response to a "ork is 
so idiosyncratic as to be entirely unilluminating about that v., ork, as 
when someone bursts into laughter every time he hears Brahms' Traqic 
Overture, or (b) when a reasonably objective appraisal of a work is 
made without any accompanying personal response, as in the case cited 
by Margolis of: 
A tired drama critic who can, without responding, notice what is 
"charming" or "lovely" or "stirring" or "horrible'17 
- but these are hard'Ly typical examples of 'appreciation'. However, 
if the relationship between our objective and subjective responses 
were seen to be a purely contingent one on every occasion that. we 
engaged in the appreciation of art, even when they were in full 
accord, then it seems doubtful that the concept ol 'appreciation' 
I 
could ever survive such a fragmented view of itself. What sense, for 
example, on Margolis' view could the poor PUPILI make of the following 
rubric, typical of its kind, taken from an '0' Level English A 
Literature examination? 
Candidates will be expected to demonstrat. - their knowledge of the 
selected reading by close reference to the texts ... and to show 
evidence of a personal response... Liveliness of res 9 onse and 
sincerity of interest are the paramount considerations. 
Would he not have to write two quite separate answers, and who is to 
say which one would be more impirtant? 
Few aestheticians I think, would be prepared to accept Margolis' 
drastic remedy, so deeply is the notion of a non-contingent personal 
response embedded in even the most 'objectivist' account of aesthetic 
judgment. David Best, for example, one of whose aims in his recent 
book Feelin g and Reason in the Arts is to treat the educational 
development of 'a ppreciation' on analogy with a Kuhnian view of 
science, is nonetheless C2tegoric that: 
Per-sOnal involvement is impl 4, cd in the arts, nihereas in the 
sciences it is more normal to accept conclus, ons reached by 
others... an artistic Judgment com'mits one much more personally. 
in that the making of it implies on,:,! s ovin first-hand experiencc 
0 
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of the work. 9 
Rather than admit, then, the threatening possibility that the 
subjective and objective aspects of lappreciat4Lon' work quite inde- 
pendently of each other, most aestheticians operate, quite underst-and- 
ably, on the assumption that the right kind of education will bring 
them into line, as in Best's commitment to the view that: 
It is an aim of education to encourage studen'LS' likes and dis- 
likes to coincide as far as possible with their evaluative 
judgments. 10 
Nonetheless, the burden remains on such lobjectivists' to show just 
how the two aspects are connected in a non-contingent way -a burden 
that, as we shall see, they do not always seem to be too well aware 
of. If they can't show this, then it is difficult to see how they can 
continue to insist upon the presence of a personal response except as 
perhaps a desirable but ultimately an optional extra to the objective 
requirements of judgment. 
The immediate problem that the above-mentioned education(a). enter- 
prise raises, however, is this: which, of the subjective and objective 
aspects of 'appreciation', is to be brought into line with which? 
Over this que"stion aestheticians and aesthetic educators alike are 
deeply divided, especially as regards (a) their differing views as to 
what constitutes the 'aesthetic object', and (b) their disagreement as 
to which is of - more educational value, the pursuit of objectivity or 
fullness of personal response -a matter clearly affected by their 
views- on what is to count as a vp . ersonal response! and how it is 
related, if at all, to aesthetic judgment. 
In general, disagreements both as to what constitutes an 
'aesthetic object' and what constitutes a 'personal responseIg centre 
on how far, if at all, the viewer Is/. -, -.. --Ade-. LIs/listener's powers of 
imagination, aspect-perception and emotional susceptibility have a 
constitutive' (as opposed to a merely 'L I reproductive') role to play in 
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the production and 'quickening' of the fully-fledged 'aeStLhetic 
object'. Is the 'aesthetic object' to be thought of as a self- %J 
suf ficient entity awaiting only our 'educated' contemplation, or is it 
rather in a state of varying degrees of incompleteness, necessitating 
'fulfilling' acts on the part of its audience? How one answers this 
question will clearly have an enormous effect on how one conceives of 
'aesthetic education'. 
As one might expect, subjective and objective interpretations of 
! appreciation' compete with each other in attempting to establish in 
which direction aesthetic education should go. Most influential of 
the former is what one might call the 'radical subjectivist' view 
(rare among contemporary aestheticians but often to be found in 'pro- 
gressive' classrooms and deeply rooted in popular wisdom), where the 
'aesthetic object' is taken to be constituted wholly by each pupil's 
individual. responses - his feelings, trains of imagery, likes and 
dislikes, el,., c. "Read only the poems that appeal to you in a person- 
ally meaningful way, " advise, such a teacher as the pupils leaf their 
way through an anthology. "Concentrate on whatever images, feelings 
and thoughts come into your mind as you listen to the music" - and so 
on. 
Now, at a pedagogical "Level, much of this is admirable. It makes 
the pupils feel involved and is, in fact, how many of the best primary 
teachers start chi-Ldren off oii a love of the arts. Furthermore, as 
Sibley points out, any approach to aesthetic education must start off 
rom: 
(the) natural potentialities and tendencies people havell 
.r 
-I or aesthetic 'learning', like any other form of learning, must 
depend initially upon unlearned starting points without which the 
subsequent appearance of the learning would be inexplicab'Le. Here, it 
is a fact of the utmost significance both for the 'personal' and 
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'juU-gimentall aspects of 'appreciation' that very young children, long 
before they acquire any concept of the 'aesthetic', display all manner. 
of behaviouv which, although apparently unlearned, seems to caicry 
within it the seeds of both aesthetic creativity and appreciation. 
Little children who, for example, spill their blackcurrant puree, are 
fascinated by the patterns that they can make in it with their 
fingers; in the early stages of learning to talk, they play endlessly 
with the sounds of words and, before long, make up stories of their 
own rather than just repeating what they have heard; having learned to 
walk they often discover for themselves the pleasure of dance-like 
movements and so on. Equally, one finds an abundance of agreement in 
pleasurable reactions to bright colour, rhythms and musical sounds 
that could not all be explained away as the product oF unconscious 
t4 imita on or other learning of some sort. As Wittgenstein says of 
such in general, including the ones above that have a proto- 
aesthetic u-horacter: 
The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is a 
reaction; only from this can the more complicated forim- grow. 
La-nguage -I want to say - is a refinement; lin the beginning was 
the deed'. 12 
Commenting on this remark, Norman Malcolm reports Wittgenstein as 
saying: 
Not morely is much of the first language of 2 chi"Ld grafted onto 
instinctive behaviour - but the whole of the developed, complex, 
employment of language by adult speakers emoodies something 
resembling instinct. 13 
If this account of language learning in general is correct also in 
respect of aesthetic discourse, particularly as regards the residual 
presence of such 'instinctive' reactions in even the most 'educated' 
acts of appreciation in later lifeg then the pedagogical approach of 
the 'subjectivist' teacher is clearly o-. i the right lines. In their 
first or 'instinctive' reactions is to be found the origin of all 
those judgments, aesthetic or otherwise, which no 'book of rules' can 
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teach pupils how to make. However, insofar as the 'radical subject- 
ivist's' account of 'appreciation' totally subsumes 'aestheti, -- 
judgment' under the 'incorrigible' interpretation of the 'judgment of 
taste' (i. e., 'beauty is in the eye of the beholder'). then it cuts 
the ground from under its own feet -as regards the possibility that 
'appreciation' could ever be educated. indeed, the 'radical subject- 
ivist' not only admits as much but proclaims it, as exemplified by 
David Best's reductio ad absurdum example of the dance teacher who is 
quoted as saying: 
'Dance is such a subjective matter that there is nothing that can 
or should be said about it. 114 
Such teachers resolve the antinomy only at the price of abandoning the 
"aesthetic object' altogether and, along with it, any possibility of 
'aesthetic education' - for insofar as everyone, on their account, is 
automatically the leading authority on their own tastes, there could 
be no reason for anyone to bother with learning anything at all, and 
thus nothing for teachers to teach. The fact that many such teachers 
nonetheless 'carry on teaching', may merely illustrate how easy it is 
to live with an antinomy of which one is not aware. However, although 
ignorance may be bliss, it can scarcely justify one's setting oneself 
up as a teacher. 
The 'objectivist' on the other hand - representing a position 
that is very much in the ascendant in contemporary aesthetics - can 
escape all such charges. For him, the 'aesthetic object' exists, at 
least potentially, quite independently of whether or not we can 'see' 
it as individuals - an entity 'there' to be contemplated, gradually 
revealing itself for what it is, despite our dilsagreements which can 
always be explained away, at least in principley by our limited powers 
of detachment and receptivity. Harold Osburne, for example, is firm 
in his conviction that: 
Aesthetic interest Ileads to oultward-turning 
forms )f activity atid 
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inclines us typically to absorption in an object present -ed for 
perception, not an inward dwelling upon our own moods and 
emotions. 15 
Claiming to speak for a broad consensus of opinion, he asserts that 
the latter (i. e. the 'constitutive') view: 
runs directly counter to the more rigorous aesthetic under- 
standing of today. Nowadays every competent instructor would 
recommend his students to concentrate attention firmly on the 
object,. 16 
Here, then, it is the 'aesthetic object' that calls the tune and 
'personal response' that must dance attendance. 
The drive behind such 'objectivism' may be seen to come from two V 
main sources: (a) the need to provide a descriptive basis upcn which 
the legitimacy of the prescriptions of 'aesthetic education' (and art 
criticism generally) may rest; (b) the delegitimization by 'analytic' 
philosophy of old-fashioned views of 'experience' as consisting of 
4- men-a! states which somehow accompany judgments, for as Wittgenstein 
says; 
One J-s tempted to imagine that which gives the sentence life as 
som---thing in an occu'L. 'L- sphere. accompanying the sentence. But 
whatever accompanied it would for us just be another sign. 17 
The question which such 'objectivism' must face, however, is: where 
does this leave the notion of 'personal response'? - for Osborne, like 
Best, still pays court to the principle that: 
In aesthetic appreciation each man must see for himself-18 
To answer this question, we must note that even for the most ob- 
jective of aestheticians (with 'Ehe possible. exception of David Best), 
the autonomy of the laesthptic object' is not quite as clear-cut as 
might at first appear. Although an 'object', presumably like the 
'objects' of any other form of knowledge it still, as Osborne point3 
out! 
needs competent observers in order to achieve actualization and 19 to e. rn, --rge from the dim shades OT potentiality 
a 'potentiality' that, in the case of the major works of art, 
13 
Osborne is further willing to conuede may contain: 
a large, perhaps a very large, number of possible and legitimate 
actualizations. 20 
What is meant by 'actualization' here, partiCUlarly as regards 
its limitation to a class of 'educated' observers? We must be very 
careful to distinguish between the 'subjectivist's' view that the 
spectator's imagination and emotions have a constitutive role to play 
in the 'actualization' of the work and, on the other hand, the view of 
an austere, lo utw ard -turning I contemplative act that* is here being 
advanced by the 'objectivist' and which has its origins in the 
writings of Sibley, who may perhaps be described as the 'fattier' of 
contemporary 'objectivist' aesthetics. For Sibley, the 'aesthetic 
object' has an objective existence in the sense only that its presence 
is Ultifflately dependent upon a primary object that is: 
, sible, audible, or otherwise discernible without any exercise I taste or sensibility. 21 
I In spite of this dependence, however, an exercise of taste' is still 
necessary. Without such an exercise there is no way that the pupil 
will ever come to 'see' the 'aesthetic object' however hard he looks 
and however acute his ordinary perceptual powers. in a vein similar 
to Moore's dismissal of 'naturalistic' attempts to define 'the good' 
ir, -Ithics, Sibley argues that: 
there are no non-aesthetic features which serve in any c-ircum- 
stances as logically sufficient conditions for applying aesthetic 
terms. Aesthetic or taste concepts are not in this respect 
condition-governed at all. 22 
This is because if they were, then even though the pupil would still 
have to learn the distinctive rules of the aesthetic language game, 
the -act of aesthetic perception (once such ruleG were mastered) would 
be indistinguishable from the quasi. -autematic 'reading off' of 
features that chc--racterizes Ieverydayl acts of pe)-c., --ption. 
For 
example, hearing a chord as a minor third would be indistinguishable 
from hearing it as 'sad'. 
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Sibley is not here denying the obvious fact that our aesthetic 
vocabulary is intimately related in many ways to our grasp of non- 
aesthetic terms - e. g., as when our claim that 'the music is sad' must 
presuppose our understanding of the non-aesthetic concept of Isad- 
ness'. Indeed, pointing out a special configuration of non-aesthetic 
features in a work of art is one way that the teacher has of assisting 
the pupil to 'see' the 'emergent' aesthetic configuration. Nonethe- 
less, no combination of non-aesthetic features could ever entail or 
explain the presence of aesthetic ones in such a way as to compel the 
pupil of normal eye-sight and intelligence to actually see them. That 
is Sibley's point. For if such a pupil were able to see the 
'aesthetic objec't' merely by following a conceptual rule (e. g., 'if 
the music is in a minor key then it is sad'), then the 'exercise of 
taste' would no longer have a place in the aesthetic language-game, 
and if that were the case, then the 'aesthetic object' itself would be 
redundant. Once the pupil had mastered the 'rule', it would be quite 
possible for him to appraise the. 'aesthetic' features of a work merely 
on the basis of an accurate second-hand description of its non- 
aesthetic features. 
Instead of merely rule-following then, the pupil must 'exercise 
taste' in the sense that to unde2stand the aesthetic language game, he 
must see lor himself what, the 'person of taste' sees. He must, in 
other words, achieve what Osborne called an lactual.; A-zatior, ' of the 
'besthetic object' about which, strictlý speaking, we can say nothing 
non-aesthetically at all. How then, is the pupil to pick this up? 
Self-evidently not from any 'book of rules' but rather from being in 
the company of knowledgeable and experienced art lovers (and how could 
you teach an arts subject if you didn't belong to this 'company'? ) who 
have thef-iiselves had direct acquaintance with the 'aesthetic object' 
and are therefore in a position to pass on their appreciation of it. 
15 
Such teachers strive by various means to get their pupils to see 
what they themselves have seen. During the course of their teaching 
they may well appeal, in a general kind of way, to a background kncw- 
ledge of conventions, cultural traditions etc. In the end, however, 
when all the various types of information, explanation and argument 
have been run through, if the pupil still can't see it, then the 
teacher can only tell (but not compel) the pupil to see what he sees. 
"Look again, " he commands or appeals, for there is nothing else thatt 
he can do. For the 'objectivist' teacher such an injunction is pre- 
scriptive rather than stipulative because the facts of the matter are 
seen to justify it- they are there in the object, even when he is the 
only one to see them. How, then, will such a teacher know whether the 
I 
pupil really has seen what he, the teacher, has seen as opposed to 
merely simulating the desired response? Self-evidently not through 
,., jhat the pupil says alone, however reasonable, but also through all of 
those aspects of his demeanour which suggest qenuineness, such as tone 
IC ol voice, facial expressions, subsequent behaviour etc. 
At this point, something by way of clarification needs to be said 
about the 'unconditioned' nature of such responses. Insofar as 
'appreciation' is understood as combining the 'judgment of . taste' 
(b,, sed on our personal response to the object) with 'aesthetic judg-- 
ment' (based or) claims about the object), then it would seem that 
appreciative responses are in fact 'unconditioned' in two senses. (a) 
In the sense just discussed, it is a feature of 'taste' not to be 
engenderable by appeal to any rule but only through 'seeing for our- 
selves'. This feature it shares with all sensuous awareness and the 
'bodily' (as opposed to the intentional) awareness of emotions -in 
general, in the sense that no one else can do our b3eing or feeling 
f or us. (b) insofar as a teacher's injunctions are seeking to 
communicate not only an experience but a judgment about the object, 
16 
then appreciative acts may be seen to share the 'unconditioned. ' nature 
of all judgments - namely that, as Wittgenstein has so often pointed 
oUt23, no 'book of rules' can teach the pupil how to judge, but only a 
Ifeel-ing' that he is going on in the 'same' way. Thus, insofar as one 
wants to keep the I-experientiall and 'judgmental' aspects of lappreec- 
iation' in harness (as an 'objectivist' like Sibley clearly must), 
then an adequate response to the injunction that the pupil 'hear the 
sadness in the music' must involve not only an unconditioned 'exercise 
of taste' (feeling the sadness) which is as unique to the aesthetic 
language game as e. g. seeing a colour is to the language game of p. -Ir- 
ception, but also a further unconditioned judgmental feeling as to the 
correctness of the claim that Lhe music must be felt as sad. In other 
words, two different kinds of 'feeling' seem to be operating here. 
It would seem, however, that in Sibley's account the two are run 
together, presumably because, insofar as 'aesthetic qualities' are 
held to have an ultimate resting-place in the object, then in theory 
there should be no conflict between one's experience of a work when 
one 'exercises taste' and how one judges the work to be. In other 
words, for Sibley, experiencing the objective sadness in the music and 
judging it to be sad are given 
41-n 
one and the same breath. However, 
this particular 'objectivisL' vjoy of resolving the lantinomy' depends 
upon two very questionable assumptions, namely: (a) the posited 
'objective' existence of the work- of art to which the 'exercise of 
fastel is held to give us special, acces*s (though this objectivity is 
much 'weaker' in Sibley's account than that of other lobjectivists' 
like Osborne and Best) - from which fol1ows (b) a view of 'aesthetic 
perception' as coming as close as possible (or what Kant would call 
lasymptoticaily, 24) to ordinary perception without actually being 
fully rUle-governed - i. e., an essentially minimal view of whatever is 
'personal' in taste. 
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We may see the latter assumption at work in Sibley's concern to 
emphasize that there is nothing 'esoteric' about 'aesthetic per- 
ception, even though it cannot literally be equated with ordinary 
perception: 
We do after all say that we observe or notice (aesthetic 
qualities)... They are not rarities- some ranges of them are in 
regular use in everyday discourse. 
B 
In a way, of course, this is correct. Most people don't just perceive 
a 'neutral' world of objects but rather a world 'co'Loured' by all 
manner of affective aspects, including aesthetic ones. That the 
building where the pupil goes to school is perceived by him as 'ugly 
and oppressive' is just as much a part of his 'everyday' perception as 
that it is a 'building'. However, in the case of many if not most 
such 'perceptions', it is generally assumed that there is a degree of 
2ers, onal involvement. The new headmaster, for example, may well find 
the -, ---ame building 'grand and inspiring'. For Sibley, however, insofar 
as such 'perceptions' would be constituted by the individual's own 
it! -R-ges and feelings (which is what we mean by their being a personal 
response), then they would clearly be quite out oF keep. J. -ng with what 
he calls 'observing' and 'noticing'. On his account, then, either the 
building is 'oppressive' or it isn't, and only the building can. deter- 
mine that. 
But if everything that is 'personal' in aesthetic response is to 
be excluded, then what sense are we to attach to Sibley's requirement, 
in common with all the other 'objectivists, that the pupil must 'see 
for himself'? In the end, it can only mean, in a trivially true 
sense, that we must 'exercise taste' for ourselves because no one else 
Led out, can do our seeinq or feelinq forus. As has already been point 
this 
-is equally necessarily 
i-rue of all perceptual acts - and also of 
other acts of judgment, since no one else can make our own judgments 
for us either, however much they may t-C-,, e it upon themselves to try to 
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do just that. What is required for aesthetic responses, 'Lhen, in 
Sibley's case, as a result of this hard and fast distinction between 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic features, is something like an 'aesthetic 
sense, (reminiscent ol Moore's 'moral intuition') that is to be dis- 
tinguished from our other senses only by the nature of its objects, 
Apart from the dubious nature of such a posited 'sense' with its 
presumed special access to an objective world, the main limitation of 
Sibley's account may be seen to lie in the essentially minimal view 
taken of our personal contribution to appreciative acts. On this 
view, the pupil is required to exercise neither his imagination nor 
feelings, but only to look at the object in a certain way, i. e., the 
way that other 'aesthetically educated' people look at it. That the 
pupil might in any way make an active contribution towards completing 
what is richly intimated in the work, through constitutive acts of his 
own imagination, is therefore ruled out of court. 
Still, at least Sibley is consistent in that he disavows any 
interest in the concept of 'taste' as a personal response in anything 
other than its minimal sense26. Not so, other lobjectivists' like 
Osborne and Best, however, who would appear to throw all such caution 
to the winds insofar as they (a) insist upon a high degree of personal 
involvement, while at the sam. - time (b) offering a much 'stronger' 
account of the objectivity Of 'appreciation' to the point where it 
almost seems to be achieved by the attentive exercise of our ordinary 
perceptual powers. Thus Osborne rejects Sibley's sharp distinction 
between the 'aesthetic' an Id the 'non-aesthetic', insisting throughout 
his influential work The Art of Appreciation in such terms as the 
following, that: 
An 'aesthetic object' as I use the term is a sub-class of 'per- 
ceptual' or 'phenomenal' objects27 
with the consequence that 'appreciation' is conceived of as essent- 
ially an act that: 
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I 
inclines us typically to absorption in an object presented foz, 
perception. 28 
Yet in the i-, ame breath, throughout the hook, very considerable con- 
cessions would appear to be made to a far more constitutive view of 
'appreciation', as when he says that: 
What Ingarden calls 'areas of indeterminacy' in the work can be 
filled out, plenished or made concrete in a variety of ways, all 
of which are valid. 29 
Elsewhere, he insists that for successful 'appreciation': 
Breadth and vigour of imagination are vitally necessary30 
while with regard to the influence of the work's represen'Uat-ion3l 
content on its formal qualities, he goes on to say that: 
New dimensions of imaginative identification and empathy give 
fullness and body to the actualization of the art work. 'l 
I 
Even now, however, both in the case of our imagining arid feeling the 
work, we are left in no doubt by Osborne as to their essential 
'dire Ote dness' towards the object, as in his following caveat which 
clearly limits imagining to a purely 'reprodUCtive' role, in seeming 
contrast to his earlier remarks about 'breadth' and 'vigoL:, ": 
1nTagination must be held in leash and restricted to that symp- 
athetic identification which facilitates the apprehension of what 
is there to be apprehended. 32 
Such quotations as the above illustrate how difficult it is to 
criticize Osborne's stance on 'appreciation', because he is always 
shifting his ground. Thus at times he appears to be ta! ýing over the 
'subjectivist' position (i. e., the 'constitutive' view) -while at the 
same time emasculating it and in the end, as we shall see, denying it 
any legitimacy within the framework of his 'objectivist' argument. 
While Osborne himself chooses to side-step the philosophical 
implications of his 'objectivity' thesis, professing no particular 
4 
view on this e. q. as bt7-. tween 'realism' cAnd 'phenomenology, 
33 
, David 
Best on the other hand goes almost so far as to offer a 'realist' 
account of the 'aesthetic object' (although he explicitly d-isclaims 
20. 
that he is a 'realist'): 
An artistic judgment, in precisely the same way as a scientific 
judgment, can be justified or refutt-ed only by reference to what 
is externally observable. From the point of view of objectivi-ty 
in the sense of accountability to reality, the two kinds of 
assessment are the same... If I make an artistic Judgment it is 
incumbent upon me, if challenged, to substantiate it by citing 
not my subjective feelings about it, but objective features o, 
the work of art itself. 34 
Yet he too, like Osborne, insists in the same breath that: 
In many cases, it would be a mark of one's failure fully to 
appreciate a work if one were not emotionally involved... Fully to 
appreciate the arts one needs both detached critical appraisal 
and the educated emotional capacity to involve oneself in a 
personally meaningful way. 35 
I have dwelt on the writings of Osborne and Best at length in 
order to bring out a contradiction of which neither of them seems 
fully aware - for how can such personal involvement as at times they 
espouse be justified as even desirable for appreciative acts, let 
alone necessary in any way, when at the same time they hold that 
aesthetic features are wholly in the work, regardless of whether 
part. -icular individuals see them or not? On their account, must not 
any personal response (in the sense of a constitutive mental state 
composed of images, aspect-perceptions and emotions experienced in 
response to the work of art) be as irrelevant to aesthetic appraisal 
as it would be to scientific verification? What seems to have 
happened is that writers like Osborne and Best have unhesitatingly 
accepted the traditional view that a personal response musIC be part of 
the aesthetic lanquage game without ever asking themselves why this 
should be so. As a consequence, the requirement that pupils are to 
experience the vuork personally in anything more than Sibley's mi-nimal 
sense of 'seeing for themselves' would appear to be nothing more than 
an arbitrary rule, lacking in any rationale - fo r, seen jr, the--P-r true 
'objective' colours, Osborne and Best can ra more offer a 'iome for the 
concept of 'personal response' than the 'radical subjeclCivist' can 
offer a home for the concept of the I. -esthetic object'. 
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If Best's and Osborne's account of the subjective aspect of 
lappreciation' now starts to look decidedly shaky, what then of the 
posited autonomous existence of the work of art itself? Like Sibley, 
both these writers certainly appear to view the objectivity of aesth- 
eti. c judgments as dependent upon inter-subjective agreement. However, 
whereas Sibley, especially in his later writings, seems content to 
accept a modicum of agreement as perhaps all thOst we can hope for 
within the aesthetic realm, as when he says: 
A realm of objectivity might be made possible by some limited 
(not widespread) actual agreement including some settled and 
virtually indisputable cases36 
- Osborne and Best by contrast, behind their seemingly undogmatic 
acceptance of the inevitable influence of cultural and personal 
factors on our aesthetic judgments, appear to assume that, in 
principle, aesthetic disagreement will tend to disappear ('asymptot- 
ically') in the course of time, as our capacity for pure, disinter- 
ested contemplation of the object improves. Thus Osborne, after con- 
ceding that the 'actualization' of the work: 
depends also upon historical, social and environmental condit- 
ions37 
-then goes on to assert, like any nineteenth century 'positivist' 
attempting to free science from the irrelevant dogmas of religion, 
that: 
We pride ourselves that we can now direct our attention to those 
formal qualities which are universal and necessary to art in all 
styles and 9 eriods, not being d istracted by the variable and in- 
essential. - 
Best, similarly, attempts to accommodate the facts of aesthetic 
disagreement and cultural differences to his 'scientific' model, by 
arguing along Kuhnian lines that: 
In the sciences... there may be situations where disagreement may 
f3Ctc,. 
--'L it persist although both par'A.. ies have tie same I that does 
not necessarily imply that further fruitful debate is in 
principle impossible ... Both a conviction thrit it 
is possible 
in principle to resolve problems and conflicts, and the persist- 
ence in practice of problems and conflicts are es6ential for the 
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continued progress and even existence of any area of inqL, jry. z9 
However, for the scientific analogy to work, Bei'Nt has to show that 
aesthetic diGagreement, like disagreements within the scientific coni- 
munity, must presuppose that there is one correct answer, however far 
away we may be from A. But, as compared with science, it would seem 
self-evident that the aesthetic form of life is far too mixed up with 
cultural and personal factors ever to hope for more than Sibley's 
cautious modicum of agreement - which, of course, is why the antinomy 
is so persistent. 
Of course it is not being denied that the intelligibil-Ity of 
appreciative discourse must depend on a measure of agreement as to 
what we are talking about, for without this we could not even make 
sense of our aesthetic appraisals to ourselves, let alone to others. 
As has already been pointed out, if such appraisals were not open to 
correction of' some kind, then any notion of 'aesthetic education' 
would be impossible. Nonetheless, although there is therefore some 
substance to Best's remark that a pupil who thinks that lth! ý- 'Mona Lisa 
is an &xtremely poor painting': 
simply has no understanding of what. constitutes a good painting40 
- the fact remains that such aesthetic 'ignorance' can never be like 
the case of e. g. a pupil denying that the earth goes round the sun, 
for if it were, then, as we have already seen, the pupil who did 
understand what constituted a 'good painting' would find no point in 
seeing the Mona Lisa at all, except in the 'minimal' verificatory 
sense of checking up for himself that-it was indeed an instance of 
what the rules defined as a 'good painting'. As such, there would, of 
course, be degrees of 'good p2inting' to be assessed, but such 
'degrees' would still be understood only in relation to a 3pecif4Lable 
prototype or ideal which, like the 'perfect specimen' aimed at in a 
rose show, need only exist in the judges' specifications. Seen thus, 
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thc rale of the art critic and appreciator would be like that of a 
'quality controller' checking off that each instance came up. to 
sCratch but, hav- Jng done this, taking no further interest in it as an 
object for aesthetic contemplation. 
What also needs to be questioned about such 'objectivist' posit- 
ions, however, is not just the dubious pursuit of an extreme form of 
objectivif--. y, but the detached, observational attitude that goes with 
i t. Certainly, such an attitude (sometimes called the 'aesthetic 
attitude') has an important role to play in 'appreciation' since art, 
although oft-en very like life, is not the same as life and much of its 
value lies precisely in its unique ability to distance powerful 
themes, thereby enabling the pupil, to contemplate as well as to em- 
palhically 'liýel them. Such 'disinterestedness', as RC-Ay Elliott has 
pointed Out4l, involves a special kind of 'objectivity' that is pre- 
dicated i. -) the first instance of the pupil's whole attitude rather 
than of judgment alone -a stance that requires considerable per- 
sonal integrity on the part of the pupil in order to rise above his 
immediate preoccupations. However, there is no obvious reason why 
such personal objectivity of response has to take a calm and detached 
form on every occasion, for sometimes, when we have made ourselves 
most 'open' to the work, we find that our response may in fa. --t be at 
its most excited and dynamic - but not less 'object. -Ji-ve' I or being so. 
It would seem that in reality, then, 'personal objectivity' covers a 
wide family of cases, ranging from the most calm to the most excited. 
Insofar therefore as such a personal element is held to be a necessary 
feature of aesthetic response in general, then it is impossible to see 
how the 'objectivist's' attempt to limi '. - it to the one paradigm can 
be 
anything other Lhan st4, -pulativeg 
despite Osborne's Cad hominem assert- 
ion that: 
Too many writers... have testified to the serenity and detachment 
of aesthetic con-temp'lation for this to be an accid. --ntal feature 
24. 
... even when the object of contemplation has dynamic or dramatic- 
ally emotional characteristics. 42 
But yýb one wonders, does Osborne in the end even bother to seek such 
support when, as we have seen, his own stance on 'objectivity' effect- 
ively makes all personal response, even of this detached kind, 
redundant? 
In commenting on the 'standard' objectivist view, as expressed by 
writers like Bouwsma43, Osborne and Best, that in the aesthetic 
language-game, emotions are to be understood as qualities in the work, 
like colours, quite independently of whatever we may actually happen 
to be feeling, Hepburn points out that: 
One is not always content to say: 'This music has the emotional 
quality of exuberance, but I am not in any way moved by it'... 1t 
is a loss of Impact that we are lamenting. 44 
In other words, in a sense of 'experience' which is far more important 
than Sibley's 'minimal' sense, it is being claimed that no amount of 
an leducaitecd' capacity to judge that 'the music is exuberant' can ever 
be a substitute or compensation for experiencing that exuberance in, 
--utively as a mental rather than merely for ourselves - i. e., constit 
state. 
To correctly identify the exuberance without at the same time 
-, ved feeling it, is inadequate insofar as the work of art may be conce 
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of, not just as an object held up for contemplation, but also as an 
entity functioning to evoke within the pupil a type of personal re- 
sponse in virtue of which the work becomes 'alive' to him. This is 
the function of the work of art that Kant describes in terms ol its 
geist - that animating spirit within it which is said to be recognized 
by the work's evocation of the 'aesthetic idea' within us, the 'aesth- 
etic ideal itself being a 'representation of the imagination' which, 
like a pebble thrown into a pool, generates a wealth of further ifnages 
and thoughts in us, brought into being by the free play ol our imagin- 
ation and undorstanding: 
25 
We say ol certain products ol which we expect that they should at 
least in part appear as beautiful art, that they are without 
spirit (qeist), although we find nothing to blame in them on th-- 
score of taste. A poem may be very neat and elegant, but without 
spirit ... Spirit, in an aesthetical sense, is the name given to the animating principle of the mind. But that by means of which 
this principle animates the soul... is what puts the mental powers 
(i. e. imagination and understanding) into... play. 45 
Seen thus, the 'aesthetic object', though undeniably an object 
which is 'there' to guide the pupil's responses, can never yield 
itself fully to an act of detached contemplation. Rather, it re- 
quires, in order to be 'brought to life', that the pupi-1 'lend' it (to 
bcrrow Sartre's term) not only his understanding but his imagination 
and emotional susceptibility. As Sartre says of literature (see 
footnote), though I would, argue that it is as true of the emotional 
qualities of music and painting: 
On the one hand, the literary object has no other substance than 
the reader's subjectivity: Raskolnikov's waiting is mY- waiting 
which I lend him ... That is what animates him ... But on the other hand, the words are there like traps to arouse our feelings and 
reflect them towards us ... The imagination of thespe(tator has not 
only a regulating function but a constitutive one. 46 
The view that the 'aesthetic object' only yields itself in its 
fullness to the person who can imaginatively 'enter into' it - or, 
which amounts to the same, who can recreate it within himself as a 
sp. --cial type of 'imaginary object' - has long been recognized as 
ch. racteristic of the aesthetic form of life, although the 'romantic' 
excesses to which this view has sometimes led have understandably made 
it appear exceedingly suspect to contemporary 'objectivists'. Thus 
Longinus long ago pointed out the importance of such an 'inner eye' in 
Footnote: On the same page from which the latter part of the following 
quotation is taken, Sartre says of Kant that he: 
forgets that the imagination of the spectator has not only a reg- 
ulating function, but a constitutive one. 
ritique f But this simply ignores the crucial paragraph 419 -., f The C. - 
Judgment from which I have just quoLed, in which Ka,. t clearly con- 
ceives of the 'aesthetic idea' as constituted in the spectator's 
j maginati on. Thus Sartre himself may be seen, in this sect-Lon of What 
is Literaxture?, as advancing ideas very close to those of Kant's. 
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relation to literature: 
A most effective way of attaining weight, grandeur and a vivid 
sense of actuality is afforded by ... image-maki. ng... when inspir- 
ation and emotion make you appear actually to see tihat you 
descr. ibe and bring it before the eyes of your hearers47 
-a comment, incidentally, that applies as much to the teacher's 
attempts to communicate his experience of the work, as it does to the 
work itself. Ruby Meager, similarly, underlines the necessity of this 
4 'animating' type of exper. 1-ence when she refers to: 
a power in the (aesthetic) object to invade our experience, 
rather than a- feature of the object to be noted duly by a refined 
exercise of detection. 48 
If this view of the 'aesthetic object' is correct, then it would 
seem that acts of 'appreciati. on' do i-ndeed need to meet subjective as 
well as objeftive conditions - the former requiring a personal 'quick- 
ening' of the 'aesthetic object', while the latter are there to set 
limits on vuhat may count as a legitimate response. As Sartre says of 
these two conditions: 
It i. s the joi. nt effort of author and reader which brings upon the 
scene that concrete and imagi, nary ODjecl. whic-n is the ., jor!, - of the 
mind. There i-s no art except for and -by otherslý9 
- and the same may be said of those 'emergent' aspects of the visual 
arts and music insofar as they are brought into being by the oper- 
ations of our 'perceptual imagination', as when we 'see' the sadness 
in the blues of a Picasso painting, or 'hear' the sadness in '41-he minor 
chords that introduce a symphony. 
From this point of view, we may regard the antinomy between 
aesthetic judgment and taste, or the objective and subjective di- 
mensions of 'appreciation', as reflecting a continuing process of 
interaction and 'Cherefore open to modification on both sides. If the 
personal response were not as corrigible 2S the judgment2l one then, 
as ive have sean, it would be ineducable; and if the judgment -lacked a 
basis in feeling (the 'feeling of rightness'), then it would be mere 
mechanical rule-followi, ng. Furthermore, such interaction must be re- 
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garded as necessarily open-ended, for only if the antinomy ceased to 
exist would such interaction also cease to exist. 
One of the most recent works to fall within this broad 'subject- 
ivist' traditinn is Roger Scruton's Art and Imagination (1974) - the 
main focus of the first half of my thesis. For Scruton, it is as 
artificial to divide our aesthetic judgments from our appreciative 
responses as it is, in the field of ethics, to divide moral judgments 
from our moral feelings and attitudes50. However, although Scruton 
therefore differs vitally and essentially from the currentIly dominant 
'objectivists' in his interpretation of and emphasis on 'experience', 
he also differs from the 'radical subjectivist' in being just as con- 
cerned a3 Best and Osborne to avoid all self-indulgent fantasizing and 
gratuitous aspect-perception. 
For Scruton: 
That there is some connection between the meaning of our utter- 
ances and our mental States is undeni able; but in the case of 
aesthetic experience the connection proves hard to describe. 
It certainly does, for it is a central part of Scruton's programme to 
reconcile a traditional empiricist view of 'mind' with its 'facul., Iy' 
psychology and introspective. methodology, with a 'public language' 
argument whose original purpose was to demolish the very position that 
he is so anxious to defend within the aesthetic form of life. The key 
to Scruton's position 'lies in his account of the contribution made to 
aesthetic experience by our ii-ilagination - for in opposition to th%- 
Ibnalytic' view that its manifestations *are at best expendable, and at 
worst an impossibly 'occult' accompaniment to our meanings, it is 
Scruton's contention that: 
All our ways of referring to images seem to suggest an element of 
experienc. -- over and above the constitutive thought. 52 
-Ný 
Most importantly of all, however, the mental images, aspect 
perceptions and affective states in which Scruton sees the 'aesthetic 
object' as coming to rest, are vievied by him as themselves an import- 
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ant Furm of understandiýR. According to Scruton, without such exper- 
iences the pupil, however much he may have mastered the appropriate 
conventions -. 4nd cultural background, could not be said to have really 
_grasped 
the point of e. g. calling the IMUSIC 'exuberant', since: 
The man who does not understand aesthetic description is the man 
who has no familiarity with the experiences that it is being used 
to express53 
- rather in the way -that Wagner's fearless Siegfried was unable to 
grasp what 'fear' is really like. Though such 'experiential' under- 
standing can add nothing to the meaning of our aesthetic utterances, 
in virtue of being a type of 'knowledge by acquaintance', what it is 
held to possess is: 
a dimension of 'fullness', and in this sense, recognit-Ion cannot 
be expl6ined sj-mply as a case of realizing that a certain pro- 
position i. s true. 54 
How far Scruton succeeds in establishing both the communicability 
and the necessity of such personal response remains to be seen. All 
that I would point out at this stage, because it has important implic- 
ations for the justification of aesthetic education is that insofar as 
Scruton's a-IgUment for such 'knoviledge by acquaintance' arises from 
demands made by the uniqueness of each work of art, then ipso facto 
such 'knowledge' must also be held to be necessary in crder to 
recognize anything which has a unique, irreplacable identity - which 
includes not only works of art but e. g. people and places. Nc amount 
of geographical and socio-economic knowledge about London, for 
example, could ever be sufficient to convey the emergent 'spirit of 
place' by which it is identifiable and distinguishable from other 
cities. We just have to experience it, to 'live' it. In the same 
way, if all that sufficed for understanding people were getting to 
know their 'objective' qualities, then the Dictionary of National 
Biography would be quite sufficient without any need for personal 
contact. 
2c 9 
V Insofar as the 'aesthetic object', like individual human beings 
and the 'spirit of place', cannot be brought into being by rules 
alone, but has Lo be exper. i enced 'at f irst hand', then this suggests 
an important continuity between how the pupil gets to know works of 
art and how he gets to know individual id-ontities in general, such as 
those of people and places. This continuity is underlined by the fact 
that many works of art set out precisely to capture such individual 
identities. In developing the pupils' appreciation of works of art, 
therefore, we may also, in part, be developing their ability to 
'appreciate' what is distinctive in people and places, among othter 
things, for as Scruton says: 
What I feel in the presence of works of art mcý find its ultimate 
expression in my behaviour towards my le, lows. 5 
The most important point about SLIch lexperientiall knowledge, 
however, is that its value resides primarily, not in the attainment of 
some kind of scientific 'objectivity', but in the richness of the 
relations that are set up between the pupills subjectiviLy and the 
object to which he is attending. As Sartlre says of our 2esthetic 
perception of landscape: 
It is vie who set up a relationship between this tree and that bit 
of sky. Thanks to us, that star which has been dead for 
4 
millenia, that quarter moon, and that dark river are dLSCjLosed in 
the unity of a landscape. 56 
-ed that such a personal i-esponse is a In this respect, if it is accept 
logical condition of aesthetic lappreciation', then developing a 
pupil's capacity to appreciate must also develop the pupil personally, 
in the sense of increasing the richness of his life. Of course as we 
have seen, aesthek'-ic education also involves the pursuit of object- 
ivity in aesthetic judgment which any concept of an 'educated' taste 
must bring with it, tcyether with the mastery of other kinds of knoLv- 
ledge that are art-related (such as knowledge of relevant conventions, 
cultural background and the work's non-aesthetic content). Although 
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necessary for ae--thetic education to take place, however, such 
objective elements are not sufficient in themselvec to justify it, for 
if an objective view of objects were a. 11.1 that was required for educ- 
ation then science would do the job just as well. 
0 
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CHAPTER TWO: How do ive ascribe meaning to aesthetic_judclmp. nts? 
The arquinerit from paronymy. 
At the heart of Scruton's empiricism lies a firm commitment to 
the view that: 
I-Je must ascribe meaning to certain sentences directly, without 
the mediation of others that 'give their truth conditions' in a 
purely formal manner. 1 
Insofar as aesthetic judgments, both evaluative and descriptive, 
are seen to conform to this requirement, such a view M2Y 
also be traced back to the fundamental Kantian principle that: 
There can be no rule accor-ding to which anyone is to be forced to 
recognize anything as beautiful. 2 
In other words, no one can grasp the full intended sense of e. g. 'thee 
music is sad' until they have heard the sadness, for no mediating 
formal rule, such as that 'minor chords denote sadness' will Lbe 
Sufficient to bring about the requisite unmediated mental state on 
wli-, ich Scruton, and Kant before him, want to ground the significance of 
our talk about works of art and our aesthetic perception of the envir- 
onment in generaL. Since most aesthetic theories, however 'object- 
ivist', at least pay court to the principle that aesthetic judgment- 
must depend on first-person perception of, and feeling for the object, 
what then, is so distinctive abouL this version? 
In order to grasp the special emphasis that Scruton, like Kant, 
places upon personal response here, an examination is needed of the 
contrast implied above between our rule-governed assertions and aesth- 
e-tic assertions, the latter of which seem to escape the 'net' of any 
sufficient set of criteria. For this, I shall lean heavily on Kant's 
important distinction between 'determinate' and 'reflective' acts of 
judgment, put forward in the Introduction to The Critique of Judqment. 
In a rule-governed assertion, or what Kant calls a 'determinate' 
judgment. we apply ready-made concepts to appropriate particulars: 
If the universal (the rule, prihciple or law) is given, then the 
jurlgmi-nt which subsumes the particular under it... is deter- 
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minate. 3 
For example, I see this line as an instance of a curve. My assent to 
the judgment 'This line i-- curved' does not depend on any reflective 
'awareness' of this particular line as such, insofar as the judgment 
instantiates a mei-e extensional use of the term, but upon whether the 
line satisfies (intensionally) a particular set of formal truth con- 
ditions - e. g. if it moves around an axis, then it's curved. No ex- 
perience of the object is required because I could make the same judg- 
ment blind from a verbal description of it. Indeed, the whole notion 
of formal truth-conditions presupposes a kind of indifference to the 
instances that fall under them. 
For most of our waking lives, such perceptual judgments work as a I 
more or less automatic decision-making process. We se-- the world as 
full of 'instances' of things with whichwe are already more or less 
familiar, which is why our everyday perception of the world holds such 
few surprises - why in fact, we become aesthetical-ly insensitive to 
what phenomenologists call the 'lived world'. This is alinozt certain- 
ly due 'to the dominance of a certain type of 'scientific' attitude 
within Western culture. Such a view is characterized by Dewey: 
Identification nods and passes on. Or it defines a passing 
moment in isolation, it marks a dead spot in experience which is 
merely filled in. The extent to which the process of living in 
any day or hour is reduced to labellinq situations, e, ý, ents and 
objects as 'so and so' in mere succession marks the cessation of 
life as a conscious experience. 4 
When we apply such 'determinate' judgments to works of art, this 
produces the classic 'philistine' attitude that I have outlined else- 
5 where . The philistine's conflation of 'determinate' with aesthetic 
judgment also serves to explain his blark incomprehension as to why 
there should be anything so special about the aesthetic object. For 
exampleg a painting, of a --jl-aridscape 
i-s seen simply as an instq-nce of a 
landscape, 'at best a convenient substitute for a good view out of the 
si. tting-room vjindow - but what -is so special about 
that? I can see a 
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landscape any day if I go for a -U4 rive in the countryside. Indeed, the 
identification of 'aesthetic' with 'determinate' judgment is almost 
certainly a root cause of why so many pupils fail to see what is the 
point of looking at paintings or reading novels, particularly where 
they involve a high degree of Irealism'. Seen in this way, works of 
art appear merely to offer a very heterogeneous collection of dubious 
'facts' in no set order. There is another 'higher "Level' philistine 
to whom I have referred elsewhere5 who approaches art primarily as a 
source of insight into life and for whom art therefore has some value 
as a quasi-text book, rivalling, e. g. the text books of psychology and 
history. However, seen thus, art becomes potentially redundant if 
real text books come along that can do the job better. (This in! port- 
ant argument of Scruton's I shall be consideri. ng in a later chapter). 
Ironically there have also been some 'formalist' aesthetic posit- 
ions that have ended up advocating 'determinate' conditions for aesth- 
etic judgments by reference to some hypothesized 'general principles 
of art'. According to Guyer6, much of the drive behind Kant's concern 
to establish the conditions for 'free beauty' arose as a reaction to 
those 18th century rationalists who believed that disputes in taste 
could be settled mechanically by rules -a pretence carried. to the 
J- extreme by a writer called Meier who offered no less than fifty rule3 
of good taste! 
What then is so special about aesthetic judgments in the eyes of 
aestheticians like Kant and Scruton? As we saw, whereas I can judge 
whether a line is curved or straight, or a landscape urban or rural, 
by reference to a set of formal truth conditions (the modern equi- 
valent of a 'determinate judgment), if on the other hard, I come to 
see that line as 'gracefull, or the landscape as 16, wesor. iel or 'sad', 
then it is riot because I have had recourse to a sii,, iilar ready-to-hand 
rule, but because I have submitted the object in question to my own 
37 
reflective gaze, pushing to the back of fny r,, dnd my 'determii-lZite' pre- 
conceptions. If a third party is to share this judgment then he or 
she too must in some way share this gaze. I do not make this judgment 
because I have grasped the determinate meaning of the object and see 
it as a good instance of something (the philistine attitude), nor 
because I have inferred it from a 'determinate' principle built into 
the predicate (the extreme formalist attitude). In the latter case, 
without the experience, my judgment would merely mime an aesthetic 
response, as unfortunately only too many pupils learn to do, when 
taking examinations in arts subjects. Rather, it is argued, judgment 
must arise from direct acquaintance with the object JI-tself which now 
assumes importance not as a mere instance of some general rule, but as 
a 'presence' which we confront by suspending our preconceptions as far .1LI 
as possible, in order to be open to it. Thus Dufrenne describes it, 
echoing Kant's original idea at every point: 
The aesthetic object is distinguished from ordinary objects which 
present themselves through impoverished sensations, dull and iransient, and prompt. ',, hide themselves behind a concept... It is 
necessary that the object exert a kind of magic so that per- 
ception can relegate to the back 9 round that which ordinary per- 
ception places in the foreground. 
An example of this would be the case cited by Elliott of perceiving .1 
the West Front of Wells Cathedral as 'weightless' through "the falling 
away of our every-d2y perceptual-imaginal habit of seeing large masses 
of stone as pressing down'18. 
Kant himself, in the Introduction to. the Critique specifically 
identifies the above type of aesthetic judgment as a species of the 
more general category of 'reflective judgments' through which he con- 
siders we should approach the 'purposive' side of nature - i. e. 
through the imaginative act of thinking of nature as if it had a 
purpose. Put very simply, such 'reflective' judgments involve a re- 
versal of the process involved in the 'determinate' one: 
A. -no to A capacity for reflecting on a given representation accordi 
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a certain princi-pleý to produce a possible concept. 9 
Without attempting to fo. 1low Kant through alI the complex rami- 
fications of this pos'Culated faculty, I want to focus on two of its 
main features that are most immediately ralevant to-the argument - 
namely, the notion of an 'indeterminate concept' and t he role played 
by imagination. The content of a reflective judgment for Kant is an 
'indeterminate concept' -a seemingly paradoxical category of concept 
that Scruton revives in his equally paradoxical -seeming formula of 
'non-descriptive meaning'. It becomes less paradoxical however, if we 
see it in terms of a mental attitude such that when we approach an 
object or state of affairs reflectively, we assume in a general kind 
of way that, there will be some concept embodied in what we are 
observing, but that the precise nal. -ure of such a concept cannot be 
predicted in advance of the experience by reference to any available 
rule. This is because, as Merleau-Ponty has put it, the very idea ol 
reflection presupposes "an unrefl,., -, ctive life which is its initial 
situation"10. 
In the case of aesthetic 'reflection' however, in order to escape 
the celebrated lantinomyl (created by the 'thesis' that no aesthetic 
judgment can be based on a rule, and the 'antithesis' that all aesth- 
etic judgments must be based on a rule in order to claim the agreement 
concept of others1l), the possibility of discovering a Idetermj-natel - 
is replaced by the dawning of a pleasurable awareness that the object 
of our contemplation has a feeling of order and 'purposefulness' about 
it that sympathetically echoes the very structures of the human mind: 
because the ground of this pleasure is found in the universal, 
though subjective, condition of reflective judgements, viz. the 
purposive harmony of an object (whether a product of nature or of 
art) with the mutual relations of the cognitive taculties (the 
imagination and the understanding). .. 
12 
We cannot infer the object's meaning from any rule, such as that the 
object is 3 good instance of IxI, but only through experiencing the 
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'harmonious Iree play of the imiagination and understanding' to which 
it gives rise. For example, I gaze at a chestnut tree in full autumn 
colouring, while at the same time putting to the back of my mind all 
such thoughts as one would find in The Observer's Pocket Guide to Tree 
Recognition, for these could only lead to 'determinate' judgments, 
such as that it is a good instance of a chestnut tree/deciduous tree 
etc. This is not an easy task, but its reward, if I am fortunate, Is 
the 'shaping up' in my imagination of a rich and wonderful configur- 
ation, intimating design but resisting categories - the source of my 
aesthetic pleasure. 
In calling the tree 'beautiful' therefore, I am trying to com- 
n, unicate a state of mind which, for Kant, will in principle be access- 
I 
ible to anyone else who has gone through the same process of trying to 
divest their judgment of Ide-terminatel preconceptions and in so doing, 
made themselves 'open' to, the experience. In such a state of mind, as 
Guyer points out, it is our imaqinati on which takes on the role oF 
unifying the representation that 'shapes up', in the absence of any 
'determinate' concept to satisfy the understanding: 
The harmony of the faculties is then a state in which, somehow, a 
manifold of the intuition is run through and held tojether as a 
unity by the imagination without the use of a concept. 3. 
I shall leave an examination of the validity of this part of 
Kant's argument until a later chapter on the whole issue of 'object- 
ivityle However, it is worth pointing out that insofar as Kant is 
right, it is far easier to evoke such an 'indeterminate concept' in 
the case of non-representational patterns and music than in the case 
of natural objects and representational works of art, which is what 
leads Kant to the 'formalist' aestheticism put forward in the Fir3t 
Book of-the Critique - although later abandoned, als we shall see. Had 
Kant lived in the 20th century, he might well have found in modern, 
non-representational art one of the W-ghest expressions of what he 
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calls the ideal of 'free beauty, - a Ibeauty' answerable only to the 
human feeling for form in whatever guise. 
The limitation with this account however, is that in the end it 
only seems to work for those 'pure' aesthetic predicates like 'harmon- 
ious' and 'gracefull that we apply to non-representational patterns 
(or, if to other objects like the chestnut tree, only on condition 
that they can be transformed into such patterns). However, when we 
come on to those kinds of aesthetic reflection where our feeling for 
'free beauty' seems to be so Intimately bound up with non-aesthetic 
truth conditions - as when we reflect upon representational art or 
draw upon words like 'sad' and 'powerful' to describe what we take to 
I be an aesthetic experience - then the whole theory comes in danger of 
falling apart. It is this type of reflection that Scruton takes as 
his starting-point in his examination of the paradigm case, 'the music 
is sad'. (Kant's own attempt to come Lo terms with the problem, first 
with the rather awkward notion of 'dependent beauty', and finally with 
the notion of 'aesthetic idolsl, where the imagination takes on a new 
role, I shall deal with in a later chapter, when I come on to consider 
Scruton's account of symbolism in art. ) 
Before going on to consider this problem however, I should like 
to wind up the discussion on lrýjflective judgment' by looking at the 
two main reasons why A iss so appropriate as an account of aesthetic 
expericnce. The first reason, which we have already partly explofed, 
i's that I do not'value a work of art as I do everyday objects or 
certain kinds of virtuous behaviour, because it is a good instance of 
some pre-determined concept (K(ant's 'judgment of perfection'), but for 
its irreplaceable 'presence', however much this may be circumscribed 
by conventions and traditions. As Mary Warnock says: 
In order for the imagination to work, it has 't-. o concentrate or 
one object*14 
From this point of view no formal truth condit-Ions can be set up 
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either for the appreciation of the be, --. uti ful or, of course, I or pro- 
ducing it - not that the attempt hasn't been made many times, e. g. as 
in the Renaissance search for the 'Golden Mean' in art. Even if we do 
not accept Kant's own, admittedly rather tortuous account of an 'in- 
determinate concept, we will still need something very like it if we 
are to do justice to this 'free' aspect of art. Furthermore, even if 
we did succeed in making a concept such as 'graceful' determinate, it 
could only be in relation to a specific work of art and not to the 
formulation of some general aesthetic rule since, as Scruton points 
out, "we cannot convert a sufficient condition into a rule that iso-- 
lates more than the individual case"15. 
Secondly, insofar as our aesthetic judgments and descriptions 
always involve the communication of an emotion, then something more 
than a concept is being communicated - for as we have seen, although 
we may recognize at a conventional level that a pietce of' music is sad, 
we may yet find ourselves unable to feel the sadness which gives point 
to the judgment. As Kant says: 
To apprehend a regular and appropriate building with one's cogni- 
tive faculties... is quite a different thing from being conscious 
of this representation with an accompanying sensation of de- 
light. 16 
While emotions are, of course, open to a determinate account in terms 
of their intentionality (a prohlem for Scruton's account that I shall 
be examining in a later chapter), there is an inevitable gap between 
recognizing that a certain feeling w-ould be an appropriate response 
and actually feeling it. As I shall argue later, we cannot be made 
to, or ever make ourselves have an aesthetic experience when we don't 
feel one to be forthcoming, because emotions, qua mental states have 
an essential involuntary dimension. One cannot judge aesthetically 
that 'the music is sad' unless one feels it in some way, whereas one 
can assert correctly that 'John is sqdl without feeling John's sadness 
-N 
in any way at all. 
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W ''hat follows from the above account of 'reflection' as applied to 
aesthetic judgment, is that insofar as any agreement in judgment is to 
be possible then it must be based not just on verbal agreement, but on 
the fact that others actually experience the same pleasures and pains 
4 as we do - that there exists a 'communL_ty of exper-Jence' -in 
fact. 
This is the idea expressed by Kant and echoed by Scruton that such 
judgment "expects con, irmation not from concepts but from the access- 
ion of others"17 - i. e. assent based on having had the same . exper- 
ience. But without the guidance of concepts to 'stabilize' (Scruton's 
word) this agreement, then as Kant points out in the 'antinomy of 
taste', how can we really talk of 'judgment' at all? Such 'judgment' 
would seem to end up either in the absolute privacy of the 'beetle in 
the box' or else in the fortuitous although communicable 'privacy' of 
the associations of our 'empirical ego' (e. g liking Wordsviorth's 
Prelude because it happens to revive happy memories of childhood ho, i. i- 
days) or the culture that 'moulded' us (e. g liking Wordsworth because 
one has been brought up to feel that it's the 'right' thing to do). 
To retreat into such relativism would be to deny the element of' 
freedom that Kant rightly took to be the very basis of all rational 
agreement and to provide contemporary I structura lists' with carte 
blanche for deconstructing our aesthetic 'postures'. I shal L argue 
later that the aesthetic distinction between 'autonomous' and Ire- 
lativist' accounts of aesthetic judgment is far too cut and dried and 
that one can, in fact, incorporate a degree of personal and cultural 
association Jinto aesthetic judgments without abandoning the connection 
between freedom and objectivity in the aesthetic realm - indeed such 
association-o play an important role in Scruton's own later arguments. 
The task to which ý, -; cruton addresses himself therefore, like Kant 
before him, is how to reconcile the subjectivity of aesthetic judg- 
ments, as nortrayed in the account of 'reflection' above, with the 
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normal requirement of agreement in judgments, that we should be able 
to specify objective truth-conditions for them. Scruton's own sol- 
ution is to argue for a 'paronymousl use oF words like 'sad' that 
enables us (a) to extend the field of reference to any stalte off 
. affairs or object that strikes us as appropricte for its application, 
while (b) retaining its intensional sense unmodil ied, thereby keeping 
our 'paronyinous' use within the fold of public language. This is com- 
bined with his empiricist concern to account for aesthetic experience, 
like Kant, in, terms of an unmediated state of mind - i. e. a response 
that's based on direct acquaintance with the object, rather than 
simply on a rule-governed grasp or its descriptive meaning. The 
question is - can he do this without distorting our ordinary notions 
I 
of language beyond recognition? This is, in fact, the very charge 
that Scruton himself lays at the door of the Kantian and Sibley-type 
accounts with which he commences his analysis]. 8. 
Kant's own way out of this problem had been to postulate, in 
Naragraph 8 of the Critique, a second act of reflective judgment, 
whereby one reflected on the origins of one's response in order to 
ascertain the-genuineness of its detachment without which there could 
be no free play of the imagination and understanding. Only in this 
w, -t,, - could one at least attempt to claim that one was valuing the 
object as an Ien. d in itself'. If this critique can be satisfied, 
which is what the four 'moments' of the First Book set out to explore, 
then one can reasonably expect everyone else who has carried out the 
same reflective exercise to have the same response in virtue of the a_ 
priori, features of cognition and sensibility shared by all human 
beings. This is what Kant calls the 'subjective universal validity' 
of aesthetic judgment. Such a view has great imporlLance for aesthetic 
education because it shows a way 'Ln which pupils can be taught to 
transcend not only their own immediate preferences, but also the Dre- 
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ferences of their culture in order to be i-eceptive to works of art 
that might otherwisc seem very alien. lt also allows fo-jý a degree of 
questioning the validity of one's own aesthetic experience which, as 
we shall see later, may not be available to Scruton's own account. 
However, the problem with Kant's acccunt from the point of view 
of communicability, is that it is never too clear just what it is to 
value an object as an lend in itself'. If the object is conceived of 
as a unique particular, then strictly speaking one couldn't really say 
anything at all about it, beyond simply pointing at it and perhaps 
emitting some kind of grunt of pleasure or pain, IJA-ke the legendary 
Antisthenes. Similar objections are voiced by Scruton in a later 
stage of the book towards those theories which try to set up art 
itself as a special kind of language - namely, a language of the part- 
icular that can't be translated, as exemplified in the theorioc. of 
Croce, Langer and Goodman. (In fact Scruton's own view of arti. 2it-1c 
'symbolism', expressed in terms of the work of art itself being 'thr 
elaboration of my thought' may be vulnerable to the same charge, as we 
shall see later. ) 
It is important to note that the above criticism is part of a 
larger objection that Scruton has to both Kant (at least the Kant of 
the Analytic of the Beautiful) 9, id Sibley, that in arguing for a very 
special use of words in aesthetic judgment, they "create too sharp a 
di*vide between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic world"19. In 
S ibley's case, it is because he argues that the terms with which we 
refer to aesthetic qualities have a 'second order' role that is un- 
conditioned by their primary use. This larger objection of Scruton's 
Lhe 
is important to remember inýlight of later sections of the book where 
he himself may be seen to fall into a position of remoteness in his 
concern to preserve the autonomy of art from non-aesthetic inroads. 
Scruton's aim then, in* this early section of the book, is "to se, 2 
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how far the public and observable aspect of aesthetic experience can 
be described112O (a rather circular way of puttiný, it, which in a way 
underlines the whole problem). On the one hand then, if the meaning 
of aesthetic terms has no relation to theirt non-aesthetic use then 
what is the point of naming them aý we do? If, on the other hand, we 
say that they have the same sense, then how can we distinguish them as 
a special class? At this point, it might be objected that in making 
his bid to establish the connection between the aesthetic and the non- 
aesthetic world, Scruton has picked a paradigm too favourable to his 
case in the example of 'the music is sad', because 'sad' has a primary 
non-aesthetic use. In another way however, the use of such ambiguous 
terms as 'sad' as 'indeterminate concepts' with their normal truth 
I 
conditions suspended in effect puts them in the same class as those 
'pure' aesthetic predicates like 'graceful' which, by their very 
nature are -indetterminate - 
i. e. we can't decide in advance whether any 
particular work or art is graceful, though we may still need some 
approximate notion of what is 'typically' or 'characterisLi c, 3 1. Ityl the 
case to distinguish between e. g. what's 'graceful' and what's 
'strident' -a point that Sibley develops at some length2l. 
Bearing in mind, then, that we are considering that class of 
aesthetic usages whereby we describe our response to an otiect in 
terms normally reserved for describing our feelings about the world in 
general, the problem remains - namely, how can words used in aesthetic 
descriptions have an aesthetic use and still retain their normal 
meaning? How can we say 'the music is sad' if we believe that this 
sadness is so very different from our feelings of sadness provoked by 
events in the everyday world, e. g. because as well as sadness it in- 
cludes an element of aestheti, -- pleasure, or because we can reflect on 
the sadness rather than just being 'in its grip', or 2bove all because 
we can't justify our usage by rpference to the usual descriptive v 
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truth-criteria? How, for exarnp'lleý can we reconcile it with Flegel's 
remark that 'art is essentially cheerful'? ' 
At this stage, it should be pointed out that Scruton is st;, -Jl 
primarily concerned with giving an account of meaning in terms of the 
intelligibility of our response, rather than ir terwis of the object of 
that response - which is in line with his self-appointed task, in this 
early section of the book, of seeing how far we can go in describing 
SLIch a state of mind. The key to Scruton's answer seems to lie in the 
fact that we spontaneously call the music 'sad' because that is how it 
strikes us - even though Scruton does not actually use this term him- 
self. Seen thus, 
Aesthetic description does not assert that a certain stC-Ate of 
mind is justified but rather gives direct expression to the state 
of mind itself. Hence the function of aesthetic description is 
not, primarily, descriptive. 22 
This does not mean, he qualifies in a later chapter, that aesthetic 
adjecti. ves don't also "carry a suggestion of genuine description" -- 
for the reason that, as we have already seen, there must be some way 
of discriminating between them. They are riot just substitutes for the 
ejaculations of pleasure and pain, which was more or less the early, 
crude empiricist view - although this is how we might have learned 
them in the first place. Nonetheless, their primary function for 
Scruton is one of direct expression, even though, grammatically they 
look like descripti'ons. 
But if aesthetic 'descriptions' are fundamentally expressive, in 
the manner of a gesture, how can we say apparently informative things 
like 'the music is sad"? As we shall see later, when we come on to 
the pedagogical problems of the arts teacher in Chapter 9, much of 
Scruton's argument turns on how 'expression' is here b%--ing used, as 
between the way in which we say that a sentence 'e-^-pr, -ss6, s' a propos- 
ition, and the way that someone may communicate in -2n 'expressive' 
manner - as . -., hen vje say thalt vie arc 'cheerful' in a Icheerfull 
tone of 
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voice. So how is Scruton using the term 'expressiGn' here? 
I sh2.11 use the term 'expression' as a name for this intimate re- 
lation between a sentence and a mental state, and I shall assurTie 
that there is a sense in which expression determines meaninq, 
through determining our understanding of a sentence; the suppos- 
ition is then, that certain aesthetic descriptions are non-de- 
scriptive in that they express not beliefs but rather 'aesthetic 
experiences'. 23 
In other words, we can express or understand someone else's expression 
that 'the music is sad', only if we have had the appropriate exper- 
ience, which has the same relation to our quasi-description as beliefs 
have to genuine description, -). The resultant 'meaning' is non-de- 
scriptive, as with Kant's 'indeterminate' concept, because it arises 
not from the application of truth-conditions, but from "certain non- 
cogniLive states 'of mind'123. 
At this stage of the argument, it looks very much as if Scruton's 
attempt to clarify the notion of 'non-descriptive meaning' embodies an 
attempt to have it both ways - i. e. he wants to have all the advan- 
tages of Lhe Kant-Jan type of 'indeterminate concept', liberated from 
truth-conditions, and yet also to have the advantages of treating it 
as if it were obedient to truth conditions, albeit not entertained "in 
the strong sense"24. Everything then, seems to depend on how he can 
account for this 'intimate rela'Lion' between the 'cogni. tivel and Inon- 
cognitive'. 
Scruton's solution is ingenious to say the least, and involves 
-s the appeal to 'paronymy' that we have already mentioned. Insofar C-A 
p. aronymy entails a widening of the extensional field of reference 
without altering the intensional meaning of the term, it is upon the 
extensional use of aesthetic terms that the whole weight of the argu- 
ment seenis to fall. To understand 'the music is sad', Scruton argues, 
we don't need to learn a new me2ning for 'sad', nor i3 it necessary to 
appeal to any kind of descriptive analogy (e. g. that the rise and fall 
of the music echoes the rise and fall of someone sobbing) or mer2 
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A 
personal association, such as the revival of childhood iiiemory. 
Rather, what is required is that we come to see the point of the 
word's paronymous use in this new context. Since klittgenstein'S 
story, referred to by Scruton, of 'fat Wednesday' and 'lean Tuesday, 25 
seems to be too much of a private joke to be illuminating, while 
Scruton's own story, 'call a thing "nuff" only if it attracts you, 26 
seems to involve the unnecessary introduction of a new term, I shall 
endeavour to illustrate the argument with a more homely example. 
Suppose that on tasting a glass of wine I say, quite spontaneously, 
'what a cheerful wine! ' Now assuming that I am not some 'wine buff' 
with a ready-to-hand collection of such terms but that the words do JLn 
fact spring spontaneously to my lips, then it must be because the word 
'cheerful' strikes me as eminently appropriate to the experience. Fo r 
Scruton, such a use seems to be apodictic in virtue of its lint-ima-cy' 
44 with my state of mind, and yet equally, we could not make t 
unless my sense of its appropriateness is in some way related to its 
everyday use. Without thiFý latter proviso, it would function as a 
mere ejaculation. If my scept-ic drinking partner says 'how pretent- 
ious to talk of a mere taste as though it were human', then I might 
reach for analogies and explanations of one kind or another, but ulti- 
mately, to see the point of my , udgment, he must have the same exper- 
ience as me. Furthermore., although Scruton does not introduce "Che 
imagination until later on in the argument, there must also be a leap 
oT imagination to grasp the paronymous use of 'cheerful', since no 
mere cognitive appraisal can generate the connection. 
Transpose this story to an educational setting, and it would 
follow from Scruton's argument that no arts teacher could begin mean- 
ingfully to introduce aesthetic judgments to his pupils unless he. 
could communicate an experience that he himself had had. Recipro--- 
ally, this would set up an equal challenge to pupils as a basis for 
4.9 
comr(iunicating their own judgments. Although Scruton, at this stage, 
does not consider an appeal to the role of established aesthetic 
conventions in order to support the 'public' side of aesthetic com- 
munication, it would not be much help -if he did, since on the basis of 
his own argumenf, conventions themselves would first have to be 
grasped paronymously (e. g. at some stage in history, minor chords 
would have to have been heard spontaneously as 'sad') -a very im- 
portant point, to which I shall return in a moment. 
Now as Scruton points out, while the notion of 'paronymous' use 
can be quite adequately incorporated into a 'speech-act' analysis of 
how vie use aesthetic terms, the limitation of such an analysis is that 
insofar as it is presenting us wi'k-. h a special non-standard use of 
0 
wo rds, it is in danger of falling into the very remoteneýis and obscur- 
ity of positions like that of Sibley, that he is try. Jng to avoid. 
Somehow, therefore, it has to be reconciled with the sei-iiantic theory 
of meaning, as embodied in Tarski's formula, in order to keep an 
anchor in the public world from which its intensional sel, i3e derives. 
ff4 
-o see how There are problems here however (a) because it is di _cult 
L 
a 'non-descriptive' sense could meet the formal demands of the 'sem- 
antic' theory, and (b) the normal epistemological requirement that we 
specify some state of affairs that determines the truth of oui- assert- 
ion is not available on Scruton's account. He therefore offers in its 
stead the rather awkward notion of another kind of 'acceptance con- 
dition' which attempts to yoke together a 'weak' form of truth-con- 
dition with Ithe experience of 'coming to see the point': 
The 'intimate connection' that exists between a judgment and a 
mental state ... can be redescribed as the relation of a sentence 
to its acceptance condition... Hence aesthetic descriptions need 
not have truth conditions i-i-, the strong sense, C-nd to justify 
them may be to jUS'o-ify an experience and not a beliel . 
27 
Whatever can it mean, not to 'have truth conditions in the strong 
sense'? Scruton's answer is once again ingenious. Once we have in- 
50 
troduced a paronymous use into the language, then, as with otthcr 1-%, inds 
of value judgments, "it is inevitable that they should borrow the 
logical transformations of descriptions128. (This process might be 
compared to the sociologist's concept of Ireification'. ) Thus jud- 
gments without truth-conditions in the epistemological sense may be 
"incorporated into a language piecemeal", and once there: 
will have a permanent and inevitable tendency to acquire real- 
istic truth-conditions, as indeed ethical judgments seem to 
have. 29 
This might be seen to echo Kant's account of the 'asymptotic' way in 
which 'regulative principles', like those embodied in 'refloctive 
judgment', function, as when they set the general goal of the purApos- 
iveness of object's without specifying actual concepts which they will 
or may fall under. This feature of the functJ.. on of regulative prin- 
ciples is described in The Critique of Pure Reasono 
The remarkable feature of these principles... is that they seem to 
be transcendental, and that although they contain mere ideas for 
the guidance of the empirical employment of reason - ideas which 
reason follows only as it were asymptotica'A- ly, i. e. ever mocre 
- reaching them - they yet possess, as synthetic a closely without 
priori propositions, objective but indeterminate validity, anj 
serve as rules for possible experience. 30 
In the same way, we might say that the paronymous use of an aesthetic 
term enters into public language asymptotically, in the sense that it 
may move nearer and nearer tow2lds epistemological objectivity without 
ever actually gettiny there. To make this point clearer, let us 
return to my earlier argument about the relation between aesthet-4t. c 
j. udgments and cultural traditionsq a*t the top of page 50. Here, 
although Scruton himself does not Cictually raise the issue, his 
account of paronymy may be seen as - way of explaining how many of the 
conventions of art first enter into public discourse. For example, 
the way that many colours, rhythms and harmonies are bound up with 
recognizable emotions ma,,,,, be because they started out as highly sub- 
jectiveg paronymous judgmcnts which then became gradually incorporated 
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(i. e. asymptotically) into the public lariguage and life of a culture. 
However, insofar as they show an "inevitable tendency to take on truth 
conditions", they 21SO contain the seeds of their own destruct-Lon - as 
when the highly original use of 'blue notes' (flattened thirds) in 
jazz, to express bitter-sweet emotionsg eventually ý)ecame a banal 
'formula' of popular music. This is because, just as for Kant, 'pure 
reason' is always tempting us to go beyond the bounds of the empirical 
world to assert a realm of metaphysical 'objectivity', so does this 
tendency of the paronymous use of terms to take on realist-ic truth- 
conditions hold out the temptation of a completely 'rule -gov erned I 
view of aesthetic creativity and appreciation. 
But once this spurious condition of 'aesthetic objectivity' is 
0 
re ached then it ceases to be laesthetic' for the reason that once we 
start to approach the aesthetic object with a set of totally pre- 
established principles then what would pass for 'aesthetic' creativiLy 
and appreciation would be something like a 'painting by numbers' vievi 
of art, and we would then become 'blind' to the posited acqua-intance 
with the 'presence' of the work - just as the 'philistine' only sees 
art as reflecting back his own non-aesthetic preconceptions about the 
world. Thus, one can now see that underlying all Kant's and Sicruton's 
tortuous attempts to show how seemingly private experiences rriý. y enter 
public, rational discourse, lies an immensely important principle, 
shared with modern phenomenology, that aesthetic judgment must be 
based on a 'bracketing off' of the taken- for-granted world (both 
'philistine' and 'objective formalist') in order that we may look at 
it afresh. As the writer Samuel Beckett, for example, points out: 
Our current habit of living is incapable of dealing with the 
mystery of a strange sky or a strange rcom... The old ego dies 
hard ... When it is upposed by a phencmenon that it cannot reduce 
to the condition of 2 coiýifortable and familiar concept, where, in 
a wordq it betrays i-LLs 'L-, rus'A-- as a screen to spare its victim the 
spectacle of reality, it disappears and the victim, now an ex- 
victi. m., for a moment free, is exposed to that reality. 31 
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Novi in one wa%,, it seems clear 4. at Beckett's notion of rendering the 
familiar unfamiliar (a view of literature for which there are many 
precedents, e. g. as in Wordsworth's Preface to the Lyrical Ballads. ) 
can only be understood if one has had or is capable of having the same 
'reflective' experience, which entails a direct perception of the 
object while suspending our preconceptions about it. But equally, as 
Scruton would be the first to point out, wearing his 'WUtgensteinian 
hat', unless we can somehow link this 'strangeness' to our familiar 
concepts of 'room' and 'sky', then we. can make no sense of it at all.. 
So does Scruton's account of our 'paronymous' use of terms in aesth- 
etic judgments really manage to bridge the gap of the incipient dual- 
ism that runs through the whole argument - i. e. the dualism char, -rscter- 
I 
ized by Wittgenstein when he speaks of our temptation "to imagine that 
which gives the sentence life as something in an occult sphere, ac- 
companying the sentence"32. 
The main problem with the argument from 'paronymy', as I iner-i- 
tioned earlier, seems to be that the main burden is born by the nc--)vc-I 
extensional application of terms like 'sad'. From a paronymous point 
of view, literally anything could be incorporated extensionally into 
an aesthetic judgment as long as it strikes me as appropriate, re- 
gardless of the usual use of the term. It is held that the possib- 
ility of making. such an extension intelligible as a third-person 
account rests as much on an appeal to our everyday use of the term as 
on an appeal to our sense of appropriateness. But insofar as the 
appeal to the 'appropriateness' of a paronyMous extension rests 
ultimately not on any intensional log'lc (which would be to pre-judge 
the object) but on 'the experience of seeing the point', then as 
stands, it is difficult to see how Scruton can avoid making it simply 
a bare assertion in the end. On Lhe other hand, there is a sense in 
wl-dch a 'paronymous' use must, in the first instance, kf_qýn with a 
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bare assertion. Providing that this is not '-, --ilfull or groundless, and 
if others then come to see its appropriateness in the sam. e way that I 
do, then clearly it will become somelt-lhing more than this. I shall be 
exploring this ad homir-em aspect of aesthetic claims later on, in 
Chapter Eight, but at this stage of Scruton's argument it does seem 
difficult to see how one could ever be mistaken about one's feelings 
of 'appropriateness', and of course if this is the case, how could I 
even make sense of it to myself? In a later chapter of his book, 
Scruton actually asserts that: 
Knowledge of an experience by C-Acquaintance (i. e. the kind of 'knowledge' that's being appealed to in the above argument) means 
having had the experience and be-ing able to call it to mind. 33 
but this of course is Lo fall precisely into the trap that Wittgen- 
stein warns of in the sto-jy about the man who bought a second copy of 
the same newspaper in order to check up whether what the first copy 
said was true. It would seem then, that unless we can relate the 
'paronymous' use of words like 'sad' to the epi. stemological truth con- 
ditions entailed -in its usuel intension, i. e. by relating 'the music 
is sad' to real sadness, then Scruton's account of Iparonymy' will 
remain hopelessly dualistic, and therefore solipsistic. This is not 
to say that Scruton hasn't discovered something very important about 
the way that paronymous usGge can explain the generation of aesthetic 
t4 terms, but that as it stands, he has ended up with advoca Lng a 
special kind of language which is as remote as that which he accuses 
Kant and Sibley of advancing. From the 'epistemological point of view, 
this paronymous use of 'sad' unasserted has the effect of putting 211 
such emotions into a very strange soirt of limbo world, thereby allow- 
ing his theory to fall victim to the very danger, in the early stages w 
of the argument, he is so anxious to avoid, namely the over-separation 
of art from life. FUrthermore, insol ar as paronymy n, ust involve an 
act of the imagination, it must be in a very limiting sense, because 
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it denies to imagination the very obvious anchor that it has in the 
world of real emotions, even when they're transposed to aestheti-c 
judgment. in fact there is no reason at all why I should not feel 
real sadness when listening to a piece of music, and still employ the 
term 'sad' in an aesthetic sense, as long as the object of my emotion 
is the music experienced - but this would be to introduce intention- 
ality into the account and therefore to undermine the whole notion of 
'non-descriptive' meaning. It also, of courseq introduces its own 
attendant dangers of over-determining the meaning insofar as an in- 
tentional analysis can't avoid talking about how we typically respond 
to aesthetic objects. How Scruton introduces 'intentionality' and 
relates it to the imagination I shall be considering in the next 
I 
chapter. 
One final point that has to be made is that so far, we have been 
considering 'aesthetic judgment' in terms of a fairly narrow aesthetdc 
response to works of art, even though, as we have seen, this inescap- 
I ably 
involves us in a consideration of non-aesthetic emotions. Once 
we get on to the non-aesthetic content of works of art (e. g. the pre- 
sentation of -ideas about society, psychological analysis etc. ) the 
problem with lunasserted responses' becomes even more acute, as we 
sh&. 11 see. 
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Cal-i aesthetic experience he [I -- 
V 'rational'? 
account of the Sc t 
_imaqination 
Contral, to th, -, '; -, iagjc' of- aesthetic experience i-. the phenomerion 
tr)at ý! Ie of ten respond to works of art as if vie believed rhaI- the 
'world' they embodied were, in some sense, real or present to u-z: - 
This i. s normally attributed to the power of imagination to q, -, freely 
beyond the given (the province of Kant's 'reproduc-Live imagir)2-tiorl), 
both as regard. ---, As thoughts (e. g. vividly conjuring up the f--*ctional 
world of a novel 'iii rjur mind's eye') and what it perceives (e. g. 
seeing the sadness in the blues of a Picasso portra-it or ý7 Tchai- 
kovsky symphony, or even 'percei-ving' intimations of immortality in a 
starry sky, as Kant did). How far such imaginative respons,., s are, in 
fact, pri marily volitional as Scruton would have us believe and how 
far they arise from invoJuntuary processes within us (Karit's 'eriipirlcal 
point to which I shall return. Some imaginatJon'), is) a debateabt(, r 
t- -1]. -' -, ý, ' 
I. have viewed such involun Utry re- aestheticians, notably E2 J ý): -ý 
sponst-s normatively, aas exemplifying our most vivid, powerfull &nU' 'ic)--. 
some, all too rare contacts with works of art, when they 'oome a! -;, vel 
in a revelatory sense. Up to a point, Scruton seems to sha. re this 
4 
view, and further wants to make the very intelligibility of oui, 
descriptions of aesthetic response depend upon the ability oil others 
Of iMlg4 to have the same kind C. inative experiences a-i ourselves. 
The problem is, however, that in talking of such 3.1periences as 
if their objects viere 'in some sense' real, we hedge them ei-ound L"Ith 
an 'as if' language that would seem to lead us right back to U-e 
central problem of the previous chapter - namely, that once aý,: ain 1we 
II seeiyo 'LCI b. C --osi ting c-A special' usage, a sadness that is both re; il and 
Unreal, parallel to the "special" mea, -ings th. -: t some testhcticianýs 
n have at. tr'! '-: L aesthetic udgm. ents. Aust -is one of the mnr,, 
's. th-ýý Ispecial me2ning' approdc1h, as when he tal-'Ks of the 
S, jr, ilar ot-irrinmeror of 'emp; -thy' . 
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We do tLaIl,, ' Of e. g. feeling &-i-110ther person's djsple@s! jr,. -, arid 3a y, 
e. g. 'his anger could be felt', and there seems to be somethill" 
genuine abOLI't, this. But the feeling we feel, though genuir, 2 f Fcllingl is not in, these cases, displeasure oi- anger, but a 
, nterpart feeling. 2 spe ial cou 
In reccýnt years this problem has attained something of the stattus oF a 
'ph-ilosophers' paradox' (which j. s as much as to say that the layman is 
not too bothered by W), as in the protracted and inconclusive series 
of articles that followed on from Radford's article, How can Vic be 
moved by the fate of Anna Karenina? 3. Much of the iriccnclusiveness 
surrounding this topic arises, I shall argue later, bek-ause all thase 
writers along with Scruton, ignore the very important distinction th, -. t 
needs to be made between the intentional and the -involuntary 2spects 
of such responses. Thus on the one hand, there is the rational preF; s- 
t, l 14Mit ure that seeks k. i our responses to what is apprcpriate in virtue 
of a consideration of the. intentionality of our emotions. From this 
perspective Of COUrsý-., . ýA 
does seem odd to have feelings directed 
towards objects that ., ve know to be imaginary - riot, in the case of 
works of art, becou-se an obvious mistake has been made like hearing a 
Ladio drama as a news bulletin, but because the work of art, although 
like life, is. not real life. On the other hand however, there is U, e 
fun(jament2lly involunt. ýjry side of emotional response, or what R. S. 
Pu.: -ers calls its 'passivity'4, which arises when we become 'in the 
yr-ip' of an emot. i. on, and which would appear to be -indj-fferent to tho 
nc--mal, rational criteria of lappropriatteness'. 
A similar problem may also be- seen to arise in those cases of 
perception which involve 'seeing an aspect' beyond what is given by 
our leveryday' awareness - e. g. the case cited by Ell-04-t5 of Iseeinn', 
the cathedral columns as a forest of trees, or hearing the sadness in 
li-iie. ýiiuslc -'A- . -L I- -n us 
i -e feelings. io-I I knoL, 'hat the i -c, as such, ca,. 
hav 
Lj. k 1-i s tnere any more to such I aspec t pe i, ception' han O. C-. 
MI,, Qtaking a tree for a charginq elephant in the twilight? As Elliott 
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stiys, "illiaci-, girial experieficD may 
L,, -- of -e ighest aosthetic import- 
ance", but then he a, 'ds, adopting the voice of the sceptic, lperhaps 
it is all superst. it-, on and deFcri. bing iL, an elaborate exercise in 
so 1. f -decep ti (,, it 
6. 
-) similarly alternates between these two Plet 
sing viL oppos 2.,! s of the im, -? qjna! icI, ' as a kind of revelation and as false 
belief and the fact that he was still putting forward the former view 
in the Phaedrus, written after The Republic would suggest that he 
never really resolved this dilemma. One might of course adv, --ince the 
k4 
'ind of view that Nietzsche e,., ibodied in his account of the Apollonian 
side of human nature - namely, that we are often willing partners in 
such self-deception: 
T'lle gtýound of Beingy evei- L; uffering and contradictory, time and 
again has need Gf rapt vision and delightful illusion to redeem 
i tsel F. 7 
but such a position is immed4. a', -, -,.. 
3. y vulnerable to Scruton's objection 
that this entails using the vj3r!, of art for a further, and JLn thJLs 
case, ultimately self -indulgent end. 
To 
-'LiAroduce belief J t,, - material reality of the aeýAhetic 
object would obviously be to confuse hopelessly the real and the 
imagined world. So how can we keep our experience of works of art 
within the fold of rationality when, at the same time, all our norma'L 
beliefs in the reality of vvh2l we experience seem to be held in a 
1" N. B. Tnis sense of 'suspended belief' needs to state of suspenslor? 
be kep; - separalte from the sen6e in which 
it was used in the first 
section of Art and Imaqination, where it was seen as a necessary con- 
dition for 'reflective judgment'. ) At this point it ought to be made 
clear that wnst is not in dispute is that most people are in fact 
capable of poý,, erfully responding to a whole range of objects,, ir. - 
uu-i nj or ar that ti-. ey knD,. -,, ýli-n the back of their minds" tn 
I De imaglvlary- L-ven bartro, for example, used to beheve, at one t-ime, 
that he was being followed around by a giant lobster! Leaving asidp 
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a MOM'-"n LL. th. L! S[Y-31C 1 aý, status c, 'I our ý'e, qpons) e 11JOrkS Of -Irt, týjj I 
is si-mply a contingent featUre cf humzin %_OnSCjoýjSrjeS_ I, which may b, 3 
seen bol. h as a curse and a ! blessing. [. 1-its-ide, the realý, of art hc,., j- 
ever, such responses tend inevitably to be seen as highly irratio. -iill 
vne, hc-, nc, --ý Ine expLA. ned av,, ay causally by associationist psychology. 
it is this type of imagination that Ruby Meager has in mind when she 
says: 
Imagination will. work on any ideas that float into our minds, 
however romote froim aci. -uality they may be; and left to itself 
will develop, them almost invariý-, -ibly along lines congenial to 
vjj,,.,. -. -fulfilme. nt or fear-fulfAw. ent. 8- 
For Kant, this js the terrain of the involuntary 'empirical 
ation' - to be contrasted ý,., -Jth the freedom necessary for arriving at 
rational beliefs (the freedom that makes possible, among other th. 4ings, 
the Kantian ideal of 'free beauty' thal: ' transcends all 'condJ ! J. ori. Dd' 
preferences). I shall argue later Lhp. t it is too easy to d4 Ed` t-L 
astiociCative responses tcj works of art as aesthetically 
although how this will be reconciled vi-ith the idea of as 
ez)sentially voluntary as put forward by Scruton (and also, althouclh in 
-o be seen. For the a rýither different form, by Sartre) re-mains f. 
-niogment, what we are primnar-ily concerned with is how we can be just- 
J. fi. ed in regard-ing our i. maginative responses to works of art as a 
rational kind of activity when, in relation to other kinds of 
imaginary objects, such responses 81. re thought of as irrational, super- 
stitio, 13, hallucinatory etc. As Shakespeare put it: 
What's Hecuba to him, or tie to HeCUba, 
That', he should weep for her? 9 
Silice, then, no C_'2inl T-or the literal truth of imaginary objects 
can be made without absurdity, it is somietimes claimed Ithsatt- art yields 
spi--. cial k-ind c-. f ll-rutli. only LO De found in art, 2S 'Lhough the artist 
were sjiiie K--no ol- But tfi-is is once P, ý,, ajn 
to Introduce. a 
3ense" ar,. Iur-,,,::. nt - in thi-S caqi?, a "special sense" of truth 
6.1 
nondition. Scruton attacks t1lis version of the 'magic' Of 2rt when he 
argues that: 
the appreciation of magic art is a confused affair in wh-ich belief and enjoyment are inextricably mixed. 10 
However, before we can go on to examine just what relationship does 
exist between imaqinary objects and truth (which is really the topic 
of the third section of Scruton's book) we must first 'clear the 
ground' by examining in more detail just what is meant by 'imaginary 
experience' in Scruton's argument, and how this r'elates to the 
possibility of a rational account of aesthetic response. 
In fact the very idea of 'imaginative experience, both in its 
mental 'conjuring up' and perceptual 'seeing as' roles, has come Linder 
much attack. If, in the first sense, we mean by it something on the 
analogy of an interior film show, then it is difficult to see how it 
can the devestating attacks made on it by Ryle, Wittgenstein 
and Equally, in the latter sense, if it is seen as entailing 
the viewer as in some way re-constituting the aesthetic object for 
him-ýelf, then it is difficult to see how this can be reconciled with 
the important role that direct perception plays in 'reflective judg- 
-ment'. Dufrenne, for example, sees imagination in a re-constituting 
sense as a direct threat to the 'plenitude ol the sensuous' revealed 
t(-- us by the 'imperious' aesthetic object: 
Imagination appears to us to be repressed rather than stimulated 
by the aesthetic object. 11 
Of. Debussy's La Cathedr2le Engloutie, he says: 
Is it suitable that we evoke this submerged cathedral, that we 
raise images of some fabulous city, oif submarine ruins in trans- 
parent and perfidious water, and of bells whose spirlt survives 
the disaster b 12 some miracle? Such representation only obstructs 
the listening. 
Here, we might want to argue that the vc---ry r. chness of Dufrenne's de-- 
scription betrays a tacit acknowledgement of the evocative power of 
such music to produce, within our imagination, a coherent ;; P. qth(-tic 
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experience which could never be equalled, at any rate in this case, by 
the austere attenti-)n to pure sound that he seems to be 2dvocating. 
Nonctheless, what both arguments have in common (i. e. Ryle et all-l-s 
and DLJfrenne': -, ) is a protest against the over-population of our 
perception with two objects when what is intended is only one object, 
namely, that which the work of art is trying to bring to our attention 
(metaphor4j-cally speaking) - just as when we try to imagine an absent 
object such as Ryle's Helvellyn or Sartre's Peter, it is the original 
that remains the proper object. of our intended meaning. 
In thinking about imagination then, the great temptation to be 
avoided is the positing of a sunken cathedral as a kind of mental 
entity that can 6nl, y be reached by introspection. As Wittgenstein 
says: 
One ought to ask, not what imýiýqes are or what happens when one 
imagines anything, but how the tri, --d "imagination" is used. But 
that does not mean triat I want , Ik only about words. For the 
question as to the natt! re of the : Lici. yination Js as much about the 
word "imagination" as my question And I am only saying that 
this question is not to be decjdcd neither for the person who 
does the imagininq, nor for anyone else - by p ointing; nor yet by 
a description of any process. 13 
The 'logically privC-Atel image, i4s distinct from the describable pri- 
vate associations of the individual, is literally unthinkable because 
any description that I may offer of my imaginative experience (or what 
I find myself perceiving) must presuppose the public meaning in virtue 
of which it is identified. Therefore to describe an 'image' as such, 
as opposed to an image of something, would be to describe nothing at 
all. From this point of view, the central problem with the first 
section of Scruton's book was th2t, in characterizing aesthetic judg-- 
ments in terms of my spontaneous response to an object (e. q. I iust 
find myself experiencing sadness when I listen to the music), the 
'dirertedness' of such responses is ignored. Emotions like sadnezs, 
for ex, ample., can never be conceived of adequately in terms of the old 
empiricist model of autonomous mental states, floatirg alround in sýmc 
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'inner space' because, in Scruton's words: 
Responses are intentional ... they involve an a-, -. areness and under- 
standirg of their objects. As a res-jlt they must be founded on a 
certain conception of their 
The unavoidable introduction cf intentionality in this middle 
section of the book would seem however to crea+ -e several prcblem- for 
Scruton's complex synthesis of 'empiricism' and 'conceptual anal\. sis' 
- not least of which, of course, is the vexed Status Of 'non-cog- 
nitivel acquaintance. What most immediately concernss us here, how- 
ever, is to find out whether or not the introduction of the intent- 
ional aspect of responses works against the rational possibility of 
feeling real emotions about unreal objects, insofar as the normal 
beliefs and judgments by which we identify the various emotlons, and 
upon which they depend for their intelligibility, seem to be left in a 
kind of limbo. For example, I am normally saddened by states of 
affairs that I judge to be suitable objects of p-J Ity, hut how could a 
piece of music or a fictional character fit th. Js description? 
In terms of the 'grammar' of imagination thien, how can Scruton 
reconcile the demands of the argument from intentionalit. -y with his 
notion of a 'weak acceptance condition' - i. e. one where "neither 
belief nor desire are presentid5? Scruton bases his answer on a 
theory of imagination as an "activity ... essentially contrasbA with 
-i belief"16, This in itself is not too difficult to astallish, being 
based on (a) a straightforward concepLual contrast - i. e. if I 
asserted what I imagined then it would become a belief; (b) an appeal 
to the psychological phenomenon already mentioned - namely that we 
just do find ourselves experiencing wany emotions, ranging from mild 
amusement to para-lyzed horror: 
as responses to 'L. '-,. e sceries that a ý. sri calls up in his imagin- 
at 101117 
a far more suspect view of the imaginatiorý as par. -4digmatically 
voluntqrv. by contrast witi. belief- 
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Behind this separation of imagination from belief, however, lies 
a far more ambitiou.,. aim to base a whole theory of art on a philosophy 
of iiiind that radically separates objects of belief from objects of the 
imagination - with works of art coming wholly within the latter cate- 
gory: 
My experience of a work of art involves a distinctive order of intentionalit T derived from imagination and divorced from belief 
and judgment. 
This drive towards a belief'-free view of art (the central theme of the 
third section of Art and Imagination) would seem to arise from 
Scruton's concern to establish that the intentionality of aesthetic 
response must rule out any attempt to describe such a response inde- 
pendently of the aesthetic object (e. g. by reference to a separately 
specifiable emotion or personal association, or, as in the third 
section of the book, Io our beliefs about the world at large). With- 
out this anchor ir. -, ntentionality, Scruton fears that we will 
inevitably be led the undesirable use of works of art such 
that we only come to value rhem for the feelings that they arouse in 
us (or, as he argues in the third section, for knowldege about the 
world that we might gain from them but which we might as easily gain 
from a text book). The disappearance of the aesthetic object to which 
such an -,, ý). ttitude is seen to lead, helps to explain the philistine 
phenomenon often so poorly understood by teachers, of how very banal 
or sentimental art (such as Tretchikov's 'Chinese lady' or some pop 
M. usic) can be found more moving be many pupils than Anna Karenina - 
not that their responses are necessarily banal in themselves. 
Scruton's argument is questionable, however, in that it arJA-ses not 
only from a Kantian concern with specifying the proper object of 
aesthetic --.. esponse, but from a far mo. ---- stipLIat, -%, e, and ad 
hominpm 
appeal that such a view: 
goes completely ag3inst our 
4 deep conv_Letion that art does not To 
MUch arouse as control the emotions, co. -, vertiing crude I 
(15 
into directed thoughto19 
But can't it also work the other way round? Thi-- seemL-, --. - be an un- 
duly limiting prir-ýciple for the imagination's operation in aesthetic 
experience, to which I shall return in a mom-nt. 
As with the argument from paronyni%,,, Scruton's most pressing 
problem in this middle section of the book, then, is to show how we 
can entertain the thoughts and 'aspect-perceptions' of imaginative 
experience as a rational activity when normal truth conditions are 
suspended. To achieve this, he sets out to show that there are other 
examples of intentional acts that hold belief in suspension yet are 
generally regarded as rational. This is not too difficult to demon- 
strate, since there are ready to hand: 
f 
modes of thouqht that involve not the assertion of V, but the 
more elusive abitity to hold the prcposition that p býfore one's 
mind, to er, *Leýrtain p as a possibility, or as a supposition. ?0 
Imagination is to belong to this class of mental acts in vJ-rtue 
of its capacity to "entertain propositions as unasserted", as when we 
imagine the cathedral columns to be a forest without ever bellieving 
that a real metamorphosis has taken place. In all such cases: 
the content of our thought is the content of a beliel; but the 
thought process itself is independent of this belief. 21 
Whether or not the thought is later asserted, as it might be in the 
case of scientific speculation, the meaning remain3 the samie in either 
case because 'assertion', as Frege pointed out, is not part of 
#meaning'. Imagination then: 
is a special case of 'thinking of x as y'. It has two objects: 
'- has to be imagined), and the the primary object (the X or p that. 
secondary object, which is how X or p is described. 
22 
However, we clearly can't sin. piy -ave it at t, ')i--, since (-: Is it 
stands, Y could be anything GuE whereas th(-:: rationality of activ- 
ities 1-imle the scientific i-paginal-Jon -Iies in it6, ultimately leading Iý -L I 
to assertion (or wh2t would be the po-int of entertaining such specull-- 
ations in the first plac. -. -? 
), aesthr-. -tic -imagining need 
have no such 
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goal. Yet we are clearly prepered, in a weaker sense, to assert the 
appropriateness of our descriptions of imaginative experience, and it 
is on a filling out of this 'appropriateness' that Scruton's case 
rests: 
(Imagination) involves thinking of these descriptions as appro- 
priate in some waý to the primary object. Imagination is a 
rational activity. 2 
But if it is "the thought that lies at the heart of the exper- 
iencell that is now centre-stage in Scruton's theory, what of his 
empiricist belief that the ul %_ 
'timate intelligibility of our aesthetic 
descriptions must come to re3t in a direct experience of the 'know- 
ledge by acquaintance' type? If Scruton is under pressure from the 
argument from intentionality to produce a propositional account of art 
in terms of the rational rule 'entertaining as unasserted but appro- 
priate' (in the Rylean tradJition of treating imagination as a species 
cf 
. 
'pretending'), he is still under pressure from his empiricist 
alter-ego to carve out a rationalizable place for non-propositional 
experience in filiing out his 'appropriateness' criterion. Thus 
although an image (e. g. of the lion as fierce or of the music as sad) 
is always "a kind of thought about something", i. e. it has intention- 
ality, equally, iije learn that it is never just a species of thought, 
because it has additional prop--rties like "intensity and exact dur- 
ationtt24. In fact an almo, -t Humean view of the imagination creeps in 
vvh en Scruton points out that: 
we . speak of imays as fading -a description that is not applic- 
able to thought. 
Nonetheless: 
Little of interest... -can be said about aesthetic emotion, beyond 
describing the thoughts on which it is based... There are no 
subtleties in our zýesthetic emotions th-sit: are nolt matched and 
'- -s - they are founded explained by suDtletJes in the thouc,,, '. - -, n L. 1 . 1-1 iCh 
... If we attempt to co riýimunicate an aesthetic emotlon then, we 
commliniC2, Le a thouo , 
ht. 6 
The crux of this claim is not so much that the expefience -Jýý 
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synonymous with the thought, but that any attempt to commun. -Leate it 
can only he in a propositional form. 
However, although it is difficuit Ito see how we con expect a de- 
scription of -aesthetic e,. perience to be anything more than this, the 
fact remains- that, -s SCruton agrees, there is still, at the heart of 
the thought, a resistant core of direct experience, even though con- 
ceptually it is nothing: 
Jndeed all ou. - ways of referring to images seem to suggest an 
element of experience over and above the constitutive thought*27 
Recourse to phcnomenologica-I descriptions here cuts no ice with 
Scruton, being dismissed as "pleasant but uninformativeit28 because 
they are not 'descriptive' in the required but impossible sense of I 
giving us direct access to such experience. If we are to make any 
sense at all of this extra-linguistic core, then we muOst ask: 
Wha'- is it about another that enables us to say G. " i-JIM that he has images? 28 
One answer to this is that, although both mental im2ge-s (e. g. imag- 
ining the chairman as an elt-lphant) and aspect-perceptions (e. g. seeing 
the sadness in someone's face) depend on subjective experience in the 
sense that they go beyond the literal thought or the habitual react- 
ions of our everyday perception, both nonetheless find expression in a 
public language in the senso th. t someone: 
will describe his visual image of x in terms that are equally 
appropriate to the experience of seeing x. 29 
Secondly, as we have seen, in the absence of normal truth conditions, 
the communicability of such descriptions will further depend on: 
thinking of '. -he description as appropriate in some way to the 
primary object. 30 
The probj'. em with the criterion of 'appropriateness' qua rational 
appraisal is : iow any particular interpret-ation of an aesthetic object 
can be coinimiuni za Led withr, ut reference to truth conditions of any kind 
whatsoever. Scruton's predictable answer to this is that: 
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T 
In imagining, propositions are ente'ltaJined for a reason, and the 
reason is to be found in the subject matter and nowhere else. 
This is all we need say here about the concept of the 'appro- 
priate' . 
31 
His choice of Alice in Wonderland to illustrate the point for the way, 
that it "exploits ... amusing possibilities without paying the least 
regard to plausibility or truth"31, v,, orks all right, but only because 
it is a favoured example. His other example of Madame Bovary is less 
happy: 
(Flaubert) chose the detail of his story in the lighL of what he 
thought to be most revealing and expressive of the provincial 
state of mind, whether or not such details were in any w3Y likely 
to occur. 32 
To cite this as an example of a 'proposition entertained as unasserted 
but appropriate' looks li-ke a glari. ng equivocation on 'Lhe word 're- 
0 
vealing' that shows just how vulnerable Scruton's radical separation 
of imaginative objects from objects of belief really is. Of cours---, s 
proposition that is "revealing of the provincial state of mind"' 
vokes truth conditions in a general if not a literal sort of way and 
if Flaubert had painted an inaccurate portrait then, in th---, ) -instancee, 
it woul, d clearly be inappropriate as a description, as opposed to the 
Alice in Wonderland example where it would be all part o-If the fun - 
although even here, one might make out a case that Carroll 6vas giving 
a 'true to life' account of the absurdities of adult behaviour as seen 
through a child's eyes. I shall, however, leave a detailed account of 
this aspect of Scruton's argument until i come to look at Uie third 
section of the book. Suffice it to say for the moment that Scruton's 
account of the intentional side of 'appropriateness, seems to suffer 
from some of the same arbitrariness that was found in his earlier 
account of the 'Paronymous' meaning of aesthctic terms. 
What then of Scru-ton's account of 
4 he role of so-called 'non-. 
cognitive' experience as a contributory f accor Ji n establishing our 
sense of appropriateness? This appears in two ways, related respect- 
69 
ively to menta', and perceptual imagery. In the case of the former: 
It involves the ability to form an image which 'matches' the 
experience. 33 
- as when, on reading a poem of Wilfred Owen's, I try to imagi-ne the 
precise experience of dying in battle that the poem intimates. This 
ability "is not given by the ability to describe the experience", 
because, as in the case of Siegfried who wanted to know what fear was 
like, one would need to know what it was like independently of it-- 
description. As we shall see later, it will be Scruton's very im- 
p%-. -, tant contention, in the third section of the book, that works of 
art can communicate such 'knowledge', though of course not in the 
sense that an extra meaning is being communicated. 
I As with mental 'images', when I imaginatively perceive some 
aSDect beyond what is given by the primary object (e. g. seeing the 9 
cathedr, al columns as a forest of trees), the same appeal to appro- 
priateciess J. s evoked. I may of course also point to analogies and 
physical correspondences, but insofar as my 'seeing as' transcends the 
given, then: 
I wish also to show what my image is like, in the sense in which 
really to know what it is like is to have the image oneself. 34 
Thus, as with mental images, imaginative 'seeing as' has, over and 
above the intentional interpretation of the object, a necessary 
element of "unqs. serted visual experienceit35 on analogy with the un-. 
aszierted propositions that form the objects of our mental imaginings. 
As Elliott describes it, in suitably dynamic terms: 
A sort of struggle ensues between the real and imaginal for 
possession of the visual impression. 36 
- as when, for example, the cathedral columns 'shape up' as a forest. 
Where does this leave us? Just as earlier, it was argued Lhat i, o 
adequate description of an aesthetic experience coul,.; bf. - given 
ity of the response, so now the emphasis starts ignored the intentlonal.. 
to swing back the opposite 
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For it is clear that, in the exp--riential sense of 'seeing as', 
the thought cannot be isolated from the experience and described 
independently. 37 
f- 
If imagination is thus a type of thinking, then it would seem to be a 
very unLypicol type becLuse in asking others to agree to the appro- 
priateness cf our aesthefic descriptions, we are not simply asking for 
agreement in judgment but agreement in experience -a far more demand- 
ing criterion than that which normal assertions seek. For example, 
whether or not we consider the triplets in SchUbert's A minor Sonata 
I to be Iviistfu. A. ly dancing' or 'tragically stumbling' will ultimately 
depend, when all the interpretive arguments have been run through, on 
the fact that we just have to hear them this way - since both inter- 
pret&. tions can be s, -, ppo-. ted by reference to first-order features of 
the work. Interestingly, a kind of analogic9l imagination iis still at 
work here, although not so much in terms of finding correspondences 
.114 fe, as in that: between the sadness in the music and sadness in rt,. 'ý.! I 
the experience ol hearing the sadness in the m. usic is in some 
irreducible way analogous to hearing the expression of sadness io 
another's voict,. 38 
- e. g. Schubert's 'falling' phrose may expressively intimate the ex- 
perience of someone sobbing vvAh grief rather than just trying to copy 
the sound of sobbing . In the same way, the 'halting' rhythm may in- 
timate the image of someone tray-ically stumbling. 
In some -ways, thý. s is possibly the richest section in this middle 
part of the book - not. only beLause of Scruton's brave attempt to set 
the highly subjective-seeming area of our vivid personal experience 
within a rational framework, but furthermore to make this area the 
ultimate court of appeal for the appropriateness of our aesthetic de- 
scriptions to hec-Ar the sadness in the music, we must hear it for 
I 
ourselves. ). This is seen to be made possible by the power of our 
imagiration to take us into the 'inside' of the work of art, beyond 
the reach of any descript-ion. However, in the absence of truth cnn- 
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d 1ý ! A. LCA-IS, such examples as that of the responses to Schubert triplets 
above may still be very vulnerable to the sceptic's charge in that,. as 
Wittgenstein might ask, 'how could we ever know that this exoerience 
of hearing sadness is like a previous experience, w-ithout any inde- 
pendent way of checking up on it? ' 
However, there is yet another pressing problem that 'Scruton finds 
left on his hands in his attempt to establish a rational basis for 
aesthetic responses. Insofar as the emotional elements of such re- 
sponses are experienced with: 
neither the belief nor the desire characteristic of (them)... 
present. 39 
it would seem that they may be in the strange position of not actually 
having any errrotional content as such: 
Indeed, it may be that the word 'responseel is already tendentious 
as a description of this experience. For 
I 
'L 
seerris to imply some- 
thing emotional, while it may well'be the ecse that the recog- 
nition of sadness JLn a work of art involves nothinq emotional at 
all. 40 
Of course, insofar as we are reflecting ý! ý, 6ýcrjptivp. ely on the intent 
ionality of an emotion (e. g. I reflect on Lear's anger, entertai-ning a 
rich profusion of propositions about old age, ingratitude, parent- 
child relationships, the mind attaining insight under great str. -ss 
etc., all shaping LIP into a complex thought of the 'anger of an old 
man'), then Scruton is quite right. It is of the essence of art to 
enable us to reflect on powerful emotions w i-thout becoming their 
victim - and in this respect, 'entertaining' is virtually synonyr-,, ous 
with 'distancing'. But what of the other side of aesthetic response, 
originally delineated by Aristotle - the 'impulse to draw near'l which 
imagination also makes possible? -- i. e. when we sre not simply 
entertaining a work of art but imaginatively ent.. -ring inl-o it, as wheen ' 
we feel L-, ar'-c anger of F. I-el pity fcr him, not to mention feeling the 
beauty of the lines in , -! nich all this misery is expressed. of course. 
norte of this would be poc',. )ible without a grasp of the inLentionality 
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of Lear's ei-. iot-ions, but Scruton's view that "the intellectual content 
of the aesthetic experiences may be so pronounced that any talk of 
lemotion' seems out of placeit4l suggests that. he means to apply this 
not' just to reflecting on the nature of the emotion but to our eip- 
pathic responses as wel'L. This once again highlights the arbitrari- 
ness of his criterion of 'appropriateness'. Such 'detachment' may of 
course be appropriate as a response to something like Bach's Art of 
Fuque, but it might also be argued that such an austere or, dare'on-- 
say it, anaemic imaginative experience may be due to a failure of re- 
sponse on the listener's or reader's part. We recognize, at a de- 
scriptive level, all the subtleties of Shakespeare's account of Lear's 
anger, but find that we are unable to feel it or to feel pity for h1m. 
Such a response may also be due, of course, to the Lnadequacies of , he 
work of art itself - it fails to move us though we may acknow ledge its 
subtle intellectual content, as for example in t,,. - -e of 'twelve I-c ---, - 
tone' music. 
Now if Scruton really means our empathic responses to works of 
art to be empty of any real emotional content, then we are right back 
to the problem vvith which we started - namely, recommending a 'special 
sense' of emotion which once again threatens to destroy the vital con- 
ti. ---uity between aesthetic and non-aest. hetic experience on which the 
rationality of. o. ur aesthetic responses must rest. Scruton is well 
awcire of the problem, and also of the fact that: 
if aesthetic experience did not involve emotion., or something 
like emotion, we would be unable to indicate its value. 
42 
He therefore makes an ingenious attempt to being empathic emotion back 
within the pale along the following lines. Just as I can entertain 
propositions without believing in them: 
Why can I not also 'entert: -iin' df-s. ires?... just as i -itay recreate 
I in my imayinatilor, the LLtioughits that 1 wouid have (e. g. that The 
-o which these lion is 11fierce'), sc. I can recreate the feelings It. 
if- thoughts give rise (e the result, 
_ing 
fear that I would feel i 
the lion were real),. 4T 
i 
However if we thought that 1--his promi3ed a mosore full-blooded kind of 
emotional response J. n Scruton's accountý we would be wrong. Such an 
"imagined counterpart" is kept securely tethered by the role of con- 
vention in art, the purpose of which, for Scruton, is "to overcome 
emotional involvemontvt44 along with -;;.. ts attendant danger of fan- 
tasiz'Lng the aesthetic object. 
Convention neutralizes fan'Lasy and removes the sterile gratific- 
ations which fantrasy seeks in art. 44 
Furthermore, insofar as, in the 'knowledge by acquaintance' sense: 
little of interest... can b-- said about aesthetic emotion beyond 
describing the thoughts on which it is based45 
the aesthetic emotions do seem to end up for ScrUton in a special 
category of I ineffab. -I. li-ty 
d4 Hence the so-calle ineffability of aesthetic emotions is a 
logical consequence of their being mental states at all. 45 
What we seem to be left with then, for all Scruton's Jrjection of 
'knbw. "j'-edge by acquaintance' into the argument, is a fundamentally pro- 
positional view of art in whichl 'non-Cognitivel emotions as such play 
-hat nothing but a strange 'ineff(ablel role. Much of the problem tt 
Scruton seems to have with putting our aesthetic experience on a 
rational footing lies in his preoccupation with keeping a rather 
narrow view of the aesthetic object centre-stage, while keeping at bay 
any argument that seems to bring extraneous intentional objects into 
the proceedings - be they real emotions or anything else. This leads 
him to ignore, among other things, Ihe crucially important role that 
imagination may often be needed to play in giving 'body' to a work of 
art by filling out its missing gaps (a role that it plays in ordinary 
-ion too) - which may ranne from supplying the concealed percept 
lands-cape behind q character's head to concluding that Hamlet studied 
metaphysics when he was at university. It might also be argued the. -L-e- 
fore that the im-ugination has a Similar constitutive role to play in 
supplying emotions of the 'knowledge by 2cquaintance' type to fill cut 
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the subtle Lhoughts of the text. Sartre, for example, argues that: 
The literary object has no other substancc than the reader's 
subject ivity. Raskolnikov's waiting is my waiting, which Ii end him. 46 
Scruton's argument, as we have seen, ds based on the p: -emise that to 
experience real emotion in relation to works of aTt is not tc exper- 
ience the work of art, but something else. But this begs the question 
by assuming that real emotions must be tied to real objects to be 
rational. Now while this may be true outside the world of art (e. g. 
in the case of delusions and hallucinations), Scruton has not shown 
why it should be true of art as well. True, as he points out, belief 
drops out and along with it the impulse to act, but this in itself is 
not sufficient to cause us to reclassify aesthetic fee'Ling as a 
I 
special 'ineffaýle' emotion. What of the more or less uriversal tend- 
ency to 'suspend disbelief' in the presence of artistic fictions? We 
mcvýv she is only a really do weep over Anna Karenina for all that vie 1. 
.1 
fictional character; and, since all talk of 'appropriateness' in re- 
lation to aesthetic response must come to rest in an ad ho, 'f'jnCM appeal 
(the only kind of appeal you can make to 'knowledge by acquaintance'), 
I would venture to suggest that most people would regard this as a 
-- being so reasonable response - more reasonable, in fact, than not 
moved. This would imply that Scruton has not so much defi-ed the 
nature of -imaginative feeling as advanced a recommendation 
that we 
make the goal of aesthetic experience a very high-level intellectual 
response. How he reconciles such normativeness with his professed aim 
to present an empirical account of the terrain is none too clear. 
Scruton's theory may be seen as a useful corrective to the 'affectivel 
theory's emphasis on emotional response at the expense of the intent- 
ional object of that rcsponsse. However, a-ý: i a general theory, it not 
later, is2 more reason- only runs counter to what. as I shall argue I 
able and mare natural response to art, but also ignores the verv I 
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portant role that involuntary imagination may be seen to play in such 
experience - both as regards the 'free play' of associations (crucial 
to a work of art's evocativeness) and the phenomenon, already ment- 
ioned, of being 'in the grip' of an emotion. 
The 'involuntary imagination' has been greatly- neglected in aes- 
thetic theory because it h2s generally been dismissed as mechanical 
and arbitrary, the province of Kant's 'empirical imagination'. How- 
ever, particularly with respect to the role of emotion, we cannot 
avoid taking into account R. S. Pet -er's crucially important argument4"i 
that emotions are connected not only with beliefs and judgments (the 
'appraisal' side), but also with causal factors that are bound up with 
individual and social psychology (the 'Dassivel side). While it is 
the 'appraisall side of emotions that makes an understanding of them 
possible (i. e. as emphasized in Scruton's account), their 'pýissive' 
(i. e. involuntary) side seems to have a life of its own that 11-a--gely 
escapes the influence of reason and objectivity - hence the doep mis- 
givings of philosophers like Scruton that have been echoed from the 
time of Plato onwards. Nonetheless, without the presence of this 
'passive' element we cannot be moved in any way by the work of art, 
however much we have grasped it at the descriptive level. Insofar as 
this element is involuntary, it can only arise spontaneously within us 
- although it i-s- more likely to do so if we give our imagination and 
understanding 'free play'. If such an'emotion does not arise within 
us, as in Scruton's case of trying t'o imagine the experience of what 
it is like to die in battle, or standing in front of a painting whose 
aesthetic 'message' one has not yet felt, then one can only await its 
dawning, which may not occur, rather in the way that we try to send 
ourselves to sleep by invitiFg sleep ta. come. It is further typical 
of such experience that the harder we try to bring it about through an 
act of willthe more elusive it is I L-O'L-.. 0 to prove - yet often, in a 
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sudden moment of relaxation, when we least expect it, it may arrive, 
thus underlining its involuntary nature. It may, of course, come as 
the reward of close and arduous attention to the meaning embodied in 
the aesthetic object, bUt it may also arise in a very immediate way, 
as when we seem to apprehend the tragic quality of a symphony f rom a 
few opening bars, even though we have clearly not had the time to give 
it our close attention. Sometimes we may feel overwhelmed by an 
emotion or association of ideas evoked by a work of art, and yet be 
unable to identify the source of such an experience. In such cases, 
the whole process works in reverse and it is the experience which 
sends us off in search of a meaning, as in the well-known case of 
* 48 Proust's madeleine 
In all such cases of the 'involuntary imagination' at work, we 
have to offset the potential dangers of self-i. ndulgent fantasizing and 
what T. S. Eliot called "having the experience and missing t-he 
meaning" agi-inst what seems the equal danger of Scruton's approzich 
that we njay over-intellectuitlize the work of art and miss its legiti- 
mate 'magic'. Kant certainly seems to recognize the importance of the 
free play of involuntary imagination in his account of 'aesthetic 
ideas' in para. 49 of the 
'Critioue, 
which I shall be considering later 
in relation to Scruton's chapter on 'Symbolism'. For the moment, 
suffice it to say that insofar as Scruton's account refuses to acknow- 
ledge a role for the -involuntai, y 
imagination, it does indeed staft to 
I ook rather anaemic when set alongside the kind of epiphany to which 
such imagining can give rise, as exemplified, for example, in Kant's 
account of the 'aesthetic idea' to be explored later, or in the works 
of Proust, or in R. K. Elliott's free-ranging account of the spon- 
taneous associations generated by the perception of the cathedral 
columns as a forest of ti,,. -es: 
We experience a rush of associations, astonishment, a sense. of 
-: r privilege and freedom, and, sincc Ithe world of the forest Js a 
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remembered world, perhaps a feeling of nostalgia. It is as iý 
the spectator suddenly experienced the meaning of some joyous 
-onscious. 49 idea which had been gathering force in his url 
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CHAPTER FOUR: Do works of art point beycnd themselves? 
Scruton's account of 'representation' and ' expression' as 
"special cases of aesthetic interest". 
How does the aesthetic 'world' (Le. the world of perceptu-ii form 
as an 'end in itself') relate to the wider world that might seem to be 
represented, expressed or symbolized in most works of art? Until now, 
there is a sense in which the whole discussion has been dogged by a 
nagging ambiguity in our use of the word 'aesthetic', as between its 
'pure' use in relation to the beauties of perceptual patterns and, en 
the other hand, its connections with standard, non-aesthetic human 
emotions - an ambiguity deliberately exploited by Scruton to preserve 
the continuity between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience. Such 
ambiguity tends to arise because too 'tight' an account of aeshetic 
I 
response can only lead either to the unnatural contortions of the 
'formalists' who treat the non-aesthetic content of works of art as if 
it were a irne--e peg on which to hang the exotic garment of 'significant 
I formll or else to the ultimately banal collection of 'aesthetic ob- 
jects, which Kant invites us to consider as exemplifying 'free 
beaLlty' : 
Birds... sea shells... delineations a la Grecque, foliage for 2 borders of wallpapers... all music without words. 
Not even Kant can have been too happy about classifying music along 
with wallpaper! 
On the oth er hand, if we turn away from the narrowness ol: " the 
aesthF-, te's use of 'aesthetic' and attempt to extend its use to cover 
4 
our responses to the representational and expressive elements w Lthin 
the work of art, then we are in equal danger of falling prey to the 
aesthetic insensitivity of the philistine insofar as this entails re-- 
placing the aesthetic object with something outside the work of art as 
the focus of our attention. As such, no account of th. -. r. ature of our 
aesthetic interest can then be given. Once again therelfore, we are. 
back with the problem of how we ean do justice to the aesthetic 
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qualities of works of aft while maintaining their continuity wi'Lh the 
world at large. 
Of course, OS With the previous account of imaginative exper- 
ience, that works of art combine aesthetic and non-aesthetic features 
is not in dispute. Thus at one end of the scale, there are works of 
art which create worlds whose governing principle seems to be aesth- 
etic (e. g. Turner's romantic sea ports), while at the other end there 
are works whose main interest seems to be to give us a view of the 
world, governed by a quest for truth (e. g War and Peace). It is part 
of the richness of art as a human enterprise that it has encompassed 
such a range, virtually from cave paintings onwards. 
However, no appeal to tho 'facts' of art history can help us to 
solve the immediabý problem with which we are confronted here - 
namely, how vie 3re to give a unified account of our response to the 
fmixed' nature of most works of art (i. e. all those works of art which 
.14 don't feature on Kant's ASQ, without forcing art into the distorting 
moulds of the aesthei-r- or t; ie philistine (i. e. the 'philistine' who 
would only value art as a quasi. -text book). 
One solution to the problem has been to treat the forms that are 
the intentional object of pure aesthetic response as though they had a 
further, and in some cases metaphysical significance. Clive Bell, for 
example, in his self -confessed 'wilder moments' is sometimes tempted 
to make pantheistic claims I or 'significant form' as revealing "the 
God in everything. Ahe all-pervading rhýthm113, while it is central to 
Kant's later arguments in the Critique that our imaginative perception 
of 'design' in nature gives us intimations of the unassertable 
'rationall. idea-s' of freedom, immortality and the summum bonum. 
Whether or no'k, laims for aesthetic form - we go along with such specip]. c 
21 not be of much help to us in solving 'he problem of however, it wi. ý L. 
the 'mixed' work of art as regards the rest of its non-aesthetic 
33 
content. Unless, thereforeq we can give a unified account of our 
response to such works, we may be left with havino to accept that the 
aesthetic and rion-aesthetic 'worlds' are mutually exclusive, thus 
making their contiguity in works of art a totally arbitrary state of 
affairs -a thesis that the aesthete ca7--. hold without inconsistency 
(i. e. as long as 'significant form' is achieved, it doesn't matter 
whether you are writing about 'war and peace' or painting a bowl of 
fruit), but which for others might be seen as tearing the work of art 
apart. 
Now in one way, the whole issue can be seen as distorted insofar 
as it has been set up in terms of a contrast between what takes us 
outside' the work of art and what leads us to make the work of art 
our only focus (the Kantian l end in itself'). This is because in 
fact, the demands of the 'pure' aesthetic response also end up by 
taking us as 'CIALSidel the individual work of art as do the seem- 
ingly non-aesthetic demands of representation and expression. This 
- wh;, ch cul- may be seen if we I'look at 
the conventional categories undeA 
tures divide and sub-divide their art forms. Thus, to read a poem as 
a poem (or a lyrical ballad as a lyrical ballad) must presuppose that 
one has at least some idea of what is meant by the concept 'poem' (or 
'lyrical ballad'), which will in turn, as Scruton points out, be: 
determined by an intention, which is in turn, dependent upon a. 
system of conventions and traditional effect-s. Aesthetic inter- 
est will, therefore, depend for 4 
its lull expression on a complex 
knowledge of human institutions. 
In this respect, the individual work of art RýLa aesthetic object does 
indeed point beyond itself to the public world of the 'aesthetic- comm- 
unity' in which it takes place, such as that of Renaiz-, sance painting, 
New Orleans jaz7, Cubism or even the 'communiýyl of the 'Dada' move- 
ment whiý: h could only piaperly bee understood, at 'Least in part, in 
t4 
terms of the conven Ions that it overthý-ew. lhus if Kant had taken 
the Oiew attributed to hifn by Scruton: 
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that aesthetic appreciation does not depend for its existence orl 
any classification of its object5 
then he v., as clearly wrong - although it seems unlikely that Kant did 
think th-,. s, in the light of the 
following passage in the Critique which suggests that beauty in art is 
probably 'dependent': 
if the object is given as a product of art and as such is to be 
declared beautiful, then, because art always supposes a purpose 
in the cause ... there must be at bottom in the first instance a 
concept of what the thing is to be ... it follows that in judging 
of artificial beauty the perfection of the thing Must be taken 
into account. 6 
In other words, our ability to recognize that a particular work of a. rt 
aspires to be a 'sonata', a 'romantic landscape' or a 'tragedy', and 
that it exemplifies the goals of a particular 'aesthetic community' 
I 
such as that of 'Cubism', 'Symbolist Poetry, 'Early Renaissance' or 
'Late Romantic', must pirly a part in any intelligible aesthetic re- 
sponse. Insofar as all -ý. ----. 
Ahetic appreciation must therefore pre- 
suppose, however minimally, our familiarity both with the work's 
formal type and the context of the 'aesthetic community' in which it 
arose, then it follows that no aesthetic judgment worthy of the name 
can arise sui generis. 
However, although such familiarity is a sine qua non for Ithe 
priýper appreciation of any work of art, this is never a simple matter 
because it must also include an awareness of how, for example, suc- 
ce--ding 'aesthetic communities' and especially our ovin contemporary 
ones, have revalued past works of art. This in itself may lead to 
much confusion in aesthetic judgment insofar as we may make demands 
upon a work of art that may suit our own perspective but be inappro- 
priate to the work within the context of its original 'community of 
taste' - e. g. like cri ticizing 't,., je'Lve tone' musiL; for Us lack of 
melody, Shakespearian drama for its failure to follow the claSasIcal 
lunities', or New Orleans jazz because i-tIs not 'prrogressive'. Since 
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such cornp'Lexities don't directly affect the argument in hand, perhaps 
all that we need say at this point is that it is a tribute to the in- 
exhaustibility of great art that it survives and even flourishes on 
revaluation. All that concerns us immediately, however, is thalt. the 
aesthetic identity of works of art is necessarily bound up with refer- 
ence to formal and cultural criteria, which may themseIves need to be 
grasped at an 'acquaintance' level, as we argued in Chapter Two - i. e 
if we are, in Scruton's sense, to 'see the point' of . 
'sonata form', 
'Cubism' etc., (for ultimately, what is the point of e. g. the 'twelve 
tone' row as opposed to e. g. 'late romantic' music? ). In practice of 
course, we may still respond aesthetically even when we are wo., -king, 
in our ignorance, with very general and therefore imprecise categories 
- e. g. pupils do riot need to know about sonata form to respond to 
Schubert's sonata 3s 'music' or what a sonnet is to respond to a 
j Shakespeare sonnet as ý. _ýpoem' 
but then from an educational po-int of 
view, this is precisely how our general concepts of 'music' and 'poem' 
t0fe on new and more subtle shades of meaning so that ultimately, we 
come to appreciate the sonata as a 'sonata', the satire as a satire 
etc. As Scruton says: 
The attribution of thought requires a certain background 'of be- 
haviour. I can only attribute mathematical thought to someone 
who is able to display a measure of matheMatiC21 competence. In 
a similar way, there must be a recognised background of 'musical 
behaviour' -before we can meaningfully attribute musical e--ýper- 
iences to a mp-n... The background of musical behaviour iss cultur- 
ally determined, and its place in human thought and feeling is 
given by its place in a culture as a whole. 7 
The acquisition of such a background would involve our attempts to 
'share the gaze' of the aesthetic communit'y from which such convent- 
ions grew - even though this would not be seen to exhaust 'Che work's 
potential significance for other cultures and epochs -an assumption 
that must be made, incidentally, by any educator advancing a Imulti- 
cultural' aesthetic education. 
However, as said earlier, it is not just by aesstheýic cate- 
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gories that we identify particular works Of art, but also by what we 
see them as represf-, nting (e. g. 19th century society, Guernica, the 
sea) or expressing (e. g. sadness, irony). It would seem then that an 
appr6priate response to such an object must presuppose not only an un- 
derstanding of formal ccnventions, traditions etc. but also an under- 
standing of that to which, however obliquely, it refers: 
It seems then, that the experience of art, unlike the experience 
of natural beauty, involves understanding. A man may understand, 
or fail to understand, the Four Quartets. 8 
Such a view of the role of understanding immediately seems to admit 
vast areas of knowledge and experience into our appreciation of art 
for: 
there is a sense in which no one unfamiliar with religious exper- 
ience can understand the I-ate quartets of Beethoven, no one ig-- 
norant of mediaeV21 civilization can understand the Divine 
Comedy. 9 
In his book Painting and Experience in Fifteenth Century Italy for 
example, M. Baxendall points out of Piero della Francesca's Annunc- 
i0tion that: 
if all Christian knowledge were lost, a person could well suppose 
that both figures, the Angel Gabriel and Mary, were directing 
some sort of devout attention to the column. 10 
Expression in art likewise points beyond itself to acquaintance 
with the mental states being expressed: 
To understand exp--ession in art, we must first understand the in- 
tention that underlies expression in life ... Being expressive is 
related to bei. ng evucative. I cannot find an object expressive 
unless it Irem-inds' me of something. 11 
as the face of' Piero's Mary, according to Baxendall, would have 
evoked for an audience familliar with the 'annunciation' story, a com- 
plex emotion in which would be mixed surprise, disquiet, reflection, 
inquiry and submission. Here the work of art doesn't just point the 
reader beycnd itself towards knowledge of the v., orla but a'-! -,. o to 'knoim- 
ledge by acquaintance I with the mental states which the work ;,. s ex- 
pressing. Because this knowledge can't be put into words, it look-, c-:, -- 
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1. 
if Scruton is here advancing the 'paronymous' argument agrain (i. e. the 
music strikes me in some way as expressive of the 'i-eeling of sadness). 
However, as with our response to aesthetic conventions, Scruton aiso 
links such expression (e. g. the expressiveness of Podin's hands or 
Brancussils birds) once again to a public background: 
Someone with sufficient culture and exper-Jence will grasp from 
these works something that he may be unable to put into words. 1.2 
What follows from all this is that works of art not only point 
beyond themselves to things in the world, including mental states, but 
also to the 'aesthetic communities' in which they take shape. But 
there is also a further implication here, which Scruton does not seem 
to take into account. Insofar as the identity of a work of art 
de. pends on its representational and expressive aspects, it will in- 
evitably reflect the nature of its 'aesthetic community'. Thus, in 
those cases where the communitty itself is partly defined by its 
interest in non-aesthe-i[ic issues - e. g. the preoccupation of early 
French 'romantic' painters with revolutionary subjects, Impressionists 
and Cubists with celebrating everyday li fe, or Jacobean drama with 
political corruption - Scruton's attempt both to recognize tI, e 
artist's intention and to deny that the work of art can ever take 
'strong' truth conditionS, must inevitably come into conf Iict with 
works of art that belong to such traditions (i. e. where a caoncarn with 
truth is central to the tradition). 
The importance of understanding works of art then, has naturally 
suggested to many aestheticians the view that art may be seen as: 
an instrument of knowledge... In partJ. 1-cular art has the power to 
represent reality and to express emotion. 
13 
This is charac4-erized as the 'cognitive' theory of aesthetic response 
- the problem being or course, how one cLýi call it a 
theory of aesth- 
-he work of etic response when it presupposes that somettning bevcr-id t 
art must be the object of our attention. It is to be distinguished 
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both from the weaker 'semantic' theory and Scruton's own attempt to 
treat representation and expression as "special cases of aesthetic 
interest" - both of which aim to keep the 'aesthetic object' cent-ee- 
stage. The 'cognitivists' view of representation is exemplified e. g. 
by Weitz14 who argues that literary statements in general, while 
making no original claims to truth, are nonetheless capable of im- 
plying other statements that do make verifiable truth claims. Thus, 
for example, the 'surface' fiction of Balzac's novels implies mI any 
verifiable propositions about 19th century France, among which are 
those discovered by Engels, when he speaks of Balzac's: 
complete history of French Society, from which, even in economic 
details (for instance the rearrangement of real and personal 
property after the Revolution) I have learned more than frcm 1-11.1 the professed historians, economists and statisticians of the 
period put together. 15 
Croce servus to illustrate a kind ol 'cognitivist' view of 'ex- 
pression' insofar he regards the real work of art as residing in 
the artist's original. lintuition' or vision for which the 'SUrface' 
strUCture of the work is a mere vehicle of communication. What Crcce 
and Weitz have in common is that the work of art as such comes to be 
seen as 
one symbol among many, with a function that is primarily. refer- 
ential. 16 
In fact Croce actually describes his aesthetics as "a general theory 
of linguistics"17* 
The 'cognitivist, then is someone who values art primarily fGr 
its power "to stimulate our curiousity about the world" qua repre3ent- 
ation and/or its power to communicate an original 'intuition' qua its 
expressiveness. Whether or not such a position can be reconciled 1- h wi,. 
keeping our main focus on the work of art, I shall be consideriiig 
later. In the extreme form in which Scruton presents uheir case how- 
ever, it would seem that there is little place Irift either 
for (a) 
aesthetic plc--sure, insofar as form is redUL; ed to an unim- 
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portant feature of the 'suriacel structure, or (b) the iniagination, at 
4- least with regard te its relationship to representation where the oniy 
role that seems left to it is one of 14A-ghteni. ng the burden of learning 
with vivid, but ultimately dispensable images. 
Unless the 'coynit a ve thesis' can survive such objections, then 
it follows that works of arjc assume the status of quasi-text books: 
I learn from works of art, facts about the human condition18 
says Scruton, and as such there is always the possibility that the 
particular work of art could be replaced without loss of meaning by 
something which did the job much better, such as a psychology or 
sociology text book. In Book X of The Republic Plato did in fact take 
the view that the artist was at best a writer of inferior text books, 
since if poets or paintcrs really knew anything "about cobbling or 
generalship or anything whatever", then they wouldn't waste the. -J -o I-i me 
in producing works of art, but would get on with some real 
or go off and fight a battle! Seen through such phil-istine eye,;, the 
artist can only look like a pseudo-expert who writes about thing-s of 
which he has little knowledge or experience. Furthermore, even il it 
were argued that there are many occasions on which the artist does 
make a better job of it than the 'expert' (e. g. Balzac on French his- 
tory), then Scruton would still nave to argue that the work of art was 
only being valued for th, ý-. cognitive 'translation' that was being 
wr enched from it, leaving what remained (i. e. the aesthetic form and 
imaginative content) as an empty husk. 
I 
Scrulton's objection to the 'cognitive thesis' is not simply con- 
fined, however, to a protest that it makes the work of art potentially 
redundant, bu, that, in introducing 'strong' epistemological truth 
condition,;,, it entails a mistaken view of art as a 'tru-nslatablc' 
language. For Scruton, translatability is of the essence of 'natural 
language': 
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For translation is a possibility as soon as there is an interpre- tation, and all natural languages are inherently interpreted. In 
other words 'reference' in a naturnl language seems immediately 
to open the possibility-of tr ansl ati on... Truth introduces th. - idea of equivalence, and hence Of 'Lranslatability. 19 
To treat art as a language, however, not only makes fur insuperable 
difficulties in the case of forms like mu--ic (whe-., -e the analogies be- 
twe'en grammar and musical form are very superficial), but directly 
conflicts with Scruton's view that (a) works of art come to rest in an 
tuntranslatablel experi-ence of the 'knowledge by acquaintance' type, 
as when he says that: 
The recognition of expressiveness belongs in part to 'knowledge 
by acquaintance', and cannot, therefore, be fully replaced by 
description. 20 
and Ithat (b) the very sense of a wcack of art is uniquely tied to its 
particular forrý. of expression, so that any 'translatj-o. -, ' must entail 
the misrepresenting of this 'embodied thought'. For exatý-IpLa, in the 
case of perceptual imaginati-ve experience: 
Insofar as it might be useful to conceive aspect- pe-. Ception as 
the sensuous 'embodiment' of a thought, we must recc. -jn.: ze that 
the thought itself can never be lully specified Jindel-, cridently of the 'perception' in which it is embodied. 21 
The same goes for the mental 'images' evoked by literature, which are 
seen to be equally tied, unlike the 'translatable' thoughts embodied 
in natural language, to the aural impact of sounds and rhythms which 
are the literary work's counterpart to the sensuous qualities of the 
visual arts and music. 
At every point where a poem presents something that needs tc be 
understood, understanding comes to rest in an experience, and not 
a mere hypothesis or paraphrase. 22 
Indeed, this is the one area where Scruton is prepared to adn, "Lt that 
works of art can be a source of knowledge; in the only sense of 'knovi- 
ledge' thatiS compatible with thc 'unt: 7ansIstah-j. l--iLty' thesis namely 
'knowledgo by acquaintancc': 
Their -value resides partly in the Fact t1hat one C---n learn from 
them ., -,, hat an experience or state of mind is like, even when no 
words can convey thi-- knowiledge in their. Istead. 
23 
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Such an argument -; s particularly attractive in considering such 
notions as 'atmosphere' and 'evocativeness' in works of art: 
The very suggestion that we could say what is expressed by the 
Ii. nes: 
Dans l'i-nterminable 
Ennui de la plaine, 
La neige incertaine 
Luit comme du sable... 
is absurd: in understaridi-nq such a poem we come to see that its 
atmosphere is i-ndescribable. 24 
Nor is it of much use for the 'cogni. tivist' to protest that what 
he is really concerned with is something beyond the literal signifi- 
c . rice of the words, i. e. all the subtle layers of meaning that 'lie 
below the surface', because insofar as he is still concerned primarily 
with uncovering verifiable propositions then, as with non-aesthetic 
propositions, these can be phrased in any number of different ways, as 
long as the truth-criteria remain the same: 
In the sense in which one may understand the thought of a sci 
ific or historical treatise, the identity of a thought is 
not by the identity of its expression but by the identity off' tl-, o 
conditions for its. truth. 25 
Unlike other assertions then, no work of art can be seen as a 
member of a class of equivalent expressions whose meaning can be 
specified independently. Thus for Scruton, not only are the thoughts 
of art untranslatable into truths of other forms of knowledge , (which 
is the case in any form of knowledge - e. g moral truths cannot be put 
mathematically etc. ) but it would also follow that each particular 
work of art embodies a thought which can never totally reappear in the 
thought of another work of art. Insofar as this distinguishes art 
from all other forms of knowledge, it is here that its special 
identity and value is to be found. This still leaves the nature of 
the relationship between the arts and o-LLher forms of knowledge to be 
sorted out, and I shall return to this @11-iMOOrt2nt question after 
--on fills out the thesis. Fi have examined how Scrul. -rst however, we 
must look at a major problem arising from the above account. Insofar 
9n 
as Scruton seems to be arguing I or a complete identity of sefise and 
expression, then how can he explain the existence of works of art that 
are over-ornamental or verbose, or, on the other hand, too elliptical? 
Furthermore, Scruton would also have to admit that even the alteration 
or omission of a Fev- insi. gnificant words or brush strokes would affect 
the work's identity. The fact is that artists tend naturally to 
rewrite and correct their work, even to the point where, as in 
Wordsworth's rewriting of The Prelude, we might prefer to talk about 
two different poems rather than more or less successful versions of 
the 'same' poem. The fact that 'one to one' correspondence between 
the artist's intention and its surfacing in aesthetic expression seems 
there-fore to be only an ideal (or what Kant might call a 'regulative .0 
demand of reason') might seem to lend support to Croce's dualistic 
account. However, as I shall be exploring in more detai-I in the 
chapter on lobjectivity26, and what the artistic process of j 
correcting really seems to suggest is the presence of very subtle and 
difficult to describe acts o, ' aesthetic judqment such as Wittgen-. tein 
describes: 
How do I find the 'right' word? ... Wi-thout doubt it is sometimes 
as if I were comparing them by fine differences of smell: That is 
too ....... that is too ....... - this is the right one. - But I do 
not always have to m3-ke judgements, give explanations; often I 
might only Say: "Tt Sirrp'Ly isn't right yet".... Sometimes I can say 
why. This is siti! ply what searching, this is what findi-ng, Is 
like here. 27 
As Wittgenstein argues all alung, such judgments can never be for n. - 
ulated as rules, but only arrived at through sustained experience of 
the appropriate 'form of life'. 
Similar considerations also apply (a) to those works of art that 
do not li-epre: ýent' as well as they might (e. g. a portrait that does 
not quite "hilt. it off'), but as this WOUld 21SO involve consider2t-JOrIS 
of truthfulne-ss, I shall leave aside such cases until later in the 
discussion; (b) to the all too familiar tension that is often to be 
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found between our imaginative experiences of works of art and the 
often seemingly feeble attempts that i. -.., e make to expre3s their: . As 
Elliott says: 
Descriptions made immediately af"Ler ar, imaginal experience... are 
4 beginning to lose their aut A -hority even before we have wr _tten them down. Wh2t exactly did the C2thadral look like wher; it was 
as if floating?... Remembered contents of a stat -e of i%apture 
always seem very scanty and disappointing. 28 
Such an experience also gives us an intimation of what the artist 
may go through - although we must be careful not to slip back into 
too much of a Crocean view, for here the danger is always that in 
making a 'ghostly' intuition the main focus of our attention, we down- 
grade the sensuous 'surface' of the work of art to a mere vehicle for 
the communication of an independently specifiablc truth, and thus 
bring on the unacceptable type of 'dualism' against which Ryle and I 
Wittgenstein so often warn us. 
The main problem with the 'cognitivist' thesis, as far as t,., e are. 
immediately concerned, is that in giving an extensional constructioi--i 
to what's represented and expressed in works of art it reCers Los b--- 
yond what is in the work to what is in the world at large, including 
mental states. In its full-blown form, this inevitably 1eads to the 
'philistine' thesis that values a work of art "because its a good 
likeness", however much the crudity of this formulation is rep. i'-aced by 
more sophisticated interpretations of 'resemblance' going beyond 
notions of literal likeness. Since aesthetic appreciation must, of 
necessity, be directed primarily towards the aesthetic object and not 
beyond it, the problem for Scruton therefore is how he can incorporate 
I representation and expression into the aesthetic object, while at the 
same time preserving their JLntensionall. connoctions with the world at 
large. Unless the ini, ensional connection between things in the 
fictional world and things in the reai world can be preserved, then. 
the account will once more be doqa_ed by the problem of 'special 
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meanings' that beset the earlier account of 'the music is sad'. 
This is, in fact, precisely where the 'semantic thesis' put for- 
wprd in various forms by such writers as Langer and Goodman, ruos into 
difficulties. The 'semantic thesis', a weaker version of the 'cog- 
nitivel one, seeks to account for representation and expression i-n art 
not in terms of its actual resemblance to the real world (i. e. extens- 
ionally), but in terms of the way it denotes in virtue of its sense 
(i. e. intensionally). Where fictional objects are concerned, it is 
suggested that we may therefore explain their 'representational' func- 
tion as we would an 'empty' description - i. e. they have a definite 
sense, but no reference, like 'The present King of France is bald'. 
In trying to give an account of intension without reference however, a 
I 
'semanticist' like Goodman is led to posit a 'special' intensional 
construction of fictional objects as class-terms embodied in the 
notion of ' unbrepak,,, ' Ie one-place predicates I like I Pickw ick- picture' : 
What tends to mislead us is that such locutions as 'picture of' 
and 'represents' have the appearance of mannerly two-place pre- 
dicates and can scmeti. mes be so interpreted. But 'picture of 
Pickwick' and 'represents a unicorn' are better considered one- 
place unbreakable predicates, or class-terms like 'desk, and 
Itable'... Obviously a picture cannot, barring equivocation, both 
represent Pickwick and represent nothing. but a picture may be 
_p4 ure or a iman-picture - of a certain kind - be a Pickwick Lctu 
without representing anything. 29 
Nov- this highly ingenious 'solution' in fact raises almost exactly the 
same problem a. s. Sibley's 'special' use of 'sad' in that it fails to 
give an adequate explanation of how the (intensional) sense of luni- 
corn-picture' connects with what we normally understand by 'unicorn' 
(i. e. which enables us to apply it extensionally). As Scruton points 
out: 
It can be immediately objected to this that it fails to explain 
the sense in which our classification of pictures is secondary LO 
our classification of the objects they portray. 
70 
In other words, to appreciate that 'a is a picture of b', it must be 
possible to see the content of the PiCtUre as W, and so there must 
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be a relationship here with a prior intensional grasp of V, even 
though "a', 
_qua 
ficti. ---nal object, consists in a re-arrangement of ele- 
J- ments tLken from the actual world that wouldn't be found there in that 
particular form - as -J. n 
the case of a fictional hero drawn from a 
composite of real I ife characters, or, in the case of the unicorn, 
taken from a synthesis of such realistic categories as 'horned anima. 
and 'horsel. 
Nor does the 'semantic theory' fare much better in its handling 
of the non-fictional content of works of art - as in the attempt of 
writers like Langer3l to give an extensional account of expression in 
terms of an 'unLranslatablel revelation about individual existence. 
For such writers, according to Scruton: 
Artist-i-c syýiibolism is entirely sui. generis: it does not express 
know. 'Iedq- of uni. versals; instead, it conveys a sense of indi. vid- 
I ual e,, 'J.! Ae-i, _, e. it is ror this reason that works of art cannot be trans-latc-d. A-A t, -is not conceptual, but rather 'immediate' or 
I intu_i. t ý 1.. ýe' . 
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1n Langer's argument, for example, because words do not present the 
logical form ol' indiividuali Cand because it is in virtue of sharing 
logical form that works of art refer to individuals, works of art are 
therefore to be seen, qua expression, as untranslatable 'presentat- 
ional' symbols. But once again, this suffers from all the obscurity 
of other 'special use' argumerl s, in this case because its trying to 
be both cognitive and non--cognitive at the same time - i. e. in the 
sense that -works of art are seeii to refer to individual existence, but 
Without any rules of reference: 
The work of art picks out an object (in this case a feeling), but 
predicates nothing of it. 33 
At best therefore all that we can say about the relation between the 
work- of art and -. vhat it Arefers to on such an account, 
is that it's 
such a ana logous, to saying "Look at that! " and painting. Of course . 
vi. ew of 'untranslatabil-ityl is to be- distinguished from Scruton's o-,, vn 
version where the thought is 'embodic. -Il -, n the 
text, rather 
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boycrid j. t. 
A further damaging consequence of the Isemant-ic thesis', which it 
shares w. Jth the 'cognitive thesis' although for different reasons, is 
that the work of art 
_qýLa 
sensuous surface once again disappears from 
view. This is because, insofar as "(a painting's) placee in the (sym- 
bol) scheme is fixed not by its reference but its senseit34, then it 
follows that: I 
The relation between representation and visual appreciation will 
now be entirely arbitrary. 35 
Insofar as no account can then be given of the role of iconic imagery 
in art, all connection between aesthetic interest and representation 
is now severed - which now starts to make the 'semantic' thesis look 
4 
even more extreme than the 'cognLtive' one. 
Scruton's own aim, then, is to show that representation and ex- 
pression in art, far From taking us beyond the work of art or being 
aesthetically irrejovon's-, are in fact "special cases of aesthetic 
interest"36, helping both to explain our interest in the work and 
acting as a guide to the imagination. Furthermore, as pqrt of the 
more general programme of maintaining continuity between the aes'thetic 
and non-aesthetic worlds, he must show, as against the Isemantic 
theory', how the relation between the intensional and extensional con- 
structions of what is represented and expressed can be understood. 
The solution for Scruton lies in parting company with both vercions of 
the 'cognitive' thesis by severing all connections with 'refere. -icel 
and in its place providing an extensional construction in terms of the 
'intentional object' that comes into our mind as we attend to the work 
of art -a solution that is clearly phe!,. omenologic2l in conception p 
despite Scruton's misgivi. ng-- about this school Gf thoug; A: 
If 'a i's a picture of W were to mean *2 is intended to resemble 
bl or 'a can be seen as W, then V wouid occur lin each case as 
part of a complex psychological predicate, and serve to identify 
the so-called 'intentional object' nf a mental state37 
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- in the same way as believing'that p' doesn't entail the existence 
of p, although the meaning of IpI would be the same in either case 
(i. e. both intensionally and extensionally). Here, the 'intentimial 
object' carries the weight of extension without any need to acc -ount 
r 
further for the lack of reference. The parallels with phenomenology 
are obvious. Thus I can be thinkinq about e. g. Blake's tiger intens- 
ionally (which is what Husserl calls the 'empty intention' or bare 
thought of the object - image-free and feeling-free) J while at the same 
time, attempting to realize an appropriate embodiment of it in my 
imagination (which is what Husserl calls 'intuitional fulfilment? - 
the 'filling out' of the bare thought with a proliFeration of imagined 
viewpoints of the tiger): 
I 
The intensional sense would then be prior, the central component 
of meaning in either construction. 38 
I shall reserve. -) detailed discussion of what this implies until 
Chapter Six. 
However, as it stands and in such a 'phenomenological' form, such 
a concept of the 'intentional object' is far too free-floating for 
Scruton in that it can't account adequately for any of the following: 
(a) the distinction between genuine and accidental 'seeing as' (e. g. 
seeing pictures in the clouds), or the seeing of resemblances where 
none were intended (e. g. seeing a Mondrian 'abstract' as a species of 
modern architecture); (b) the distinction between 'realistic' repre- 
sentation (e. g. a Chardin 'still life' of a bowl of fruit) and 'un- 
realistic' representations of the same object (e. g a Cubist 'still 
life' of a bowl of fruit); (c) the way that aesthetic 'seeing as', as 
we have seen, is inescapably affected by our knowledge and experienc. -, 
of conventions and traditions. 
In order to accommodate such objectLons (which aLl relate LO the 
limitations that public language necessarily placp. -, l upon intention- 
ality), Scruton has there, ore to lj., ýJt the scope of his account of 
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aesthetic response by reference to two dc-cply interwoven UALernal 
factors. Firstly, the artist's own intentions have to Ithe taken into 
account (allowing for the fact that in many cases we may never be in a 
position to know, them with any certainty). This in turn entails ref- 
erence to the backgiýound of conventions and traditions in which, or 
against which, the artist worked: 
Convention and tradition iimbue the painting with a sense of in- 
tention; the arti. St's meaning becomess through their aid a visible 
reality. 39 
Whether or not the introduction of the intentionality of the work of 
art effectively takes care of gratuitous aspect-perception will, of 
course, depend ultimately on how far one believes that the identity of 
a work of art can be defined in a non-arbitrary way. 'Structural- 
ists', like Barthes for example, reject the whole idea of the auteur 
and along with it the 'bourgeois' notion that there is any such thing 
as a 'privileged' reading of a text. Since, for them, the relation 
between the 'signifierl and the 'signified' is quite arbitrary, an in- 
finite plurality of readings is possible - for example, that King Lear 
could be about Manchester Unitedas has been suggested in a recent 
article, because: 
the Munich air disaster 11 Q-A 3 been called a tragedy for Manchester 
United, and the managerial difficulties of the club have certain 
similarities to the problem of succession in Lear. 40 
Is this any less legit-imate than interpreting the play as a Christian 
allegory, for example? Scruton chooses to ignore the battlefield sur- 
rI ounding this issue but, if pressed, Would undoubtedly say that a 
full-blown pluralism would render impossible any rational basis for 
aesthetics, and that although his account of intentionality "by no 
means implies the heteronomy of aesthetic judgement"41, one has to 
draw the I-ine somewhere. 
As wilLh -, -: Lnii-'Lar arguments 
in t'he first two sections of the book, L %- 
Scruton's ultimate 2rbiter on 'aspect perception' is still, the lirred- 
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1. 
ucii.. blee' experience of the work - although this now has to be modified 
to allow for our knowing as an external fact that the work of art is 
meant to be seen as lb', whether or riot we can see it'. as that for our- 
selves. Nonetheless, in the case of a work's expressiveness: 
The 'identity' of expressiveness is not deterriAned by the applic- 
ation of an external standard. This identity is the identity of 
an experience. 42 
And similarly for representation: 
By the intentional construction I mean the sense in which a s-mi- 
larity of appearance depends on a similarity between the exper- 
ience of seeing an aspect and 
* 
the experience of seeinq the obje--t 
... A realistic representation a of b's f4ace is not one ! vhere a 
looks like b's face, but one where the face I see in a is like 
b's face. 43- 
Insofar as Scruton is here arguing that works of art do point 
beyond themaelves (i. e. not only to the artist's and his aesthetic 
community'S intentions, but also to our own experiences of those 
things which are expressed and represented by the work of art), it is 
crucially important not to confuse 'Lhis wit -h the kind of symbolic or 
t 
.4 iconic theories of reference put forward by the two cogni Lve 
theories. This is because wh2t Scruton is arguing is that there's an 
identity between our experience of Y (e. g. seeing a starry sky aL 
night) and our exper-ience ol the aspectý both representational and 
expressive, presented to us by the painting (e. g. Van Gogh's IStarry, 
Sky') which transcends both similarity of appearance (the 'rognitiv- 
ist thesis') and reference in virtue of sense (the "semantic thesis). 
Furthermore, in the case where we never really noticed starry nights 
until Van Gogh opened our eyes to them so that now we see the stars as 
Van Gogh did (or as in Alyosha's 'Kantian' vision of the starry night 
in Brothers Karamazov44) works of art then become, as has been pointed 
out, an important source of 'knc-wiledge by acquaintarce. Such an- 
account 2. -1--; o illojus Scrutor, to put fc,. r,,,,., j. -lrd a theory of 'realism, in 
art that frees it from the tiaJLve ph. ilis', -ine view of surface resembl- 
ance and locates it insiead in the way that an artist, howlever 
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abstractly, 'hits it off': 
It makes sense to say that, while Guido Ren. i. 13 head of Chri-st i-, 
a realistic portrait of the appearance of a suffering face, the 
Christ of some more primitive master (suCh as Cj-, nqbue) is inore 
realistic as a depiction of the suffering. 45 
The main point here is that, even when no identity of appearance is 
involved, the work of art still does not function as a symbol, but as 
an embodiment of the experience. Such an account of 'identity' is 
also echoed by Wittgenstein: 
I draw a few dashes with a pencil and paper, and' then rask: 'Who 
is this? ' and get the answer: 'It is Napoleon'. We have never 
been taught to call these marks, 'Napoleon'... No one would say 
'This is the same as that' in one s ense. But on the other hand, 
we say ' That's Napoleon'... We have le2rnt the use of 'the same,. 
Suddenly we automatically use 'the same' when there is not simil- 
arity of length, weight or anything of the sort. 46 
Here, our grasp of the identity between Napoleon and the hastily drawn 
caricature is as incorrigible as our perception of the sadness in 
Cimabue's portrait - although of course not everyone will see it this 
Way . 
Unlike the 'formalist' then, Scruton does accept that a viork of 
art may point beyond itself, even to the point where we may have to 
attribute an 'objective' aspect to it (as in the case cited by Beard- 
-sley47 of the poet Housman's intention that his poem 11887' in A 
Shropshire Lad be taken seriously as a patriotic statement) despite 
the fact that we find ourselves unable to experience it this way (e. g. 
we find that vie can only respond to the Housman poem as satire). So 
how does Scruton reconcile this with his view that representation and 
expression are 'special cases of aesthetic interest', leading us into 
the work of art, rather than away from it? Scruton's answer is that 
WithOLIt a complex backqround knowledge (both qua description and 
experience) of aesthetic conventions, traditions, the artist's Intent- 
J ng ex- ions, the things being repres-ented aiid the States of mý, id be- 
pressed, we could not even identi. T-y the work as) 13 work of art, 
let 
alone make any sense of it. In the case of literaturt-, owing to its 
"il. 01 
'mixed' nature, he is even prepared to ailo, v-; #, that an interest in truth 
may have a role to play: 
The thought involved in apprecic-Ation of literature is, character- 
istically, lunasseeted', bull this does not mean that truth is 
irrelevant to aesthetic interest. On the contrary, without an 
i. nterest in truth, it would be impossible to be interested in 
meaning, and ht-nce impo3sible to be interested in literature at 
all... One may admire a play or novel I or. the truthfulness of its 
vision... It is p8irt of the 'impurity' of the novel that, more 
than other literary lorms, it hovers in this way between assert- 
ive and unassertive discourse. 48 
However, for Scruton, such truth as we discover can never be the 
object of aesthetic appreciat-ion because if it were: 
The content of the work could be phrased in any abstract way 4 and one s interest would not outlive the perception of its truth. 9 
Furthermore, although Scruton doe3n't raise this point, such proposit- 
ions as we do abstract may often seem very banal as compared with OUr 
response to them as 'embodied thought' in the work. As Archibald MC- 
Leish comments on Herrick's well-known poem To Daffodils: 
If you take the sayings cof the poem out of the poem you have 
little more than the obvious banality of the observation that 
life is brief - that men care as mortal as daffodils. If however 
you put the sayings bac'r, ' Into the poem something seems to happen 
to this banality... In Herrick's poem we are mortal - all at once 
and without warning we become this knowledge we think we possess 
and are shaken by it. 50 - 
For Scruton then, as we have said, the work of art does point be- 
yond itself towards an outsi-de context of great complexity which no 
account of aesthetic app-, eciation can choose to ignore - in fact one 
can almost define differuit aesthetic theories by where they choose to 
draw the line here. However, as I pointed out earli-er, this does not 
mean that no one can appreciate works of art until they have a com- 
prehensive mastery of such a background since, as with Wittgenstein's 
account of how we learn about colour ,a hierarchy of aesthetic con- 
cepts wculd k-nevitably t)e involved in the learning process. Thus 
young children, operating with very goneral categories, could st-111 
appreciate balladý; and free verse aspoetry, or lmpre. -sionist painting 
'though or indeed the absLraction of their ovin art rxrk as painting - Gý 
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clearly it is the task of aesthetic education to take children beyond 
such general categories, developing and refining ', hem through a pro- 
cess of exposing children to a 1. ange of art forms, including those 
from other cultures. 
However, for Scruton, the complex context towards which the work 
of art points is to be seen ultimately, not as a cognitive goal but 
rather as a set of lenablinq conditions' - i. e. a necessary back- 
ground, the possession of which fac-: Llitates the guiding of our 
imagination along the paths of appropriateness. Once you have the 
background, then as with phenomenological 'bracketing', you put it 
behind you and attend to the work of art as the autonomous 'intent- 
ional' object of your reflection: 
We appreciate it not as a means for conveying information but 
rather as a vehicle of thought in whatever form. 51 
The problem is, once you have admitted in such a background 
includes truth conditions) can you really manage to turn your back o-i 
it so completely without putting the whole notion of the 'aesthetic' 
into question? Institutionally it would seem that art, lik ,ee. g. geo- 
graphy, is a Imixed model with no sharp cut-off point betwean art-- 
istic activities and many other kinds of human activity. Nov. -lists 
are frequently preoccupied with such 'non--aesthetic' issues as the in- 
terpretation of history, psychology, morality and metaphysi. cs - in- 
voking or challenging our preconceptions about the world in a v., ay that 
seems to demand a response far closer to belief than merely to lenter- 
taining in imagination'. The interest of many painters in perspective 
and how we perceive light and colcur borders on the mathematical and 
phenomenological. Furthermore, the suspension of be 14 ef becomes par- 
ticularly acute (a) in certain cases whe-re a value that we hold 
strongly is powerfully cc., I, _, -: idicted - e. g. the objectionable anti-sem- 
it ism in Eliot's Gerontion; (b) in those cases where the writer 
intends to put some generzI truth across, but gets it wrong - which is 
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often taken as a distinguishing feature of, bad art, e. g. as in the 
ludicrous sentimentality of som, 3 Pre-Raphelite paintings, certain 
nov&. Is and poems that give an idealized picture of war, Barbara Cart- 
land novels etc. Of course this wouldn't apply to works of art that 
are intentionally antestic like fairy stories and idyllic pastor2l 
poems, nor would it apply to those cases where the artist gets some 
particular truth wrong - e. g. Uie way that Shakespeare got his facts 
wrong about Rich2rd III. Where it does, or at least ought to bother 
us, is where a work of art p. -Aesents us with something false masquer- 
ading as a general truth, as in the bland and sanitized 'portrait of 
the artist' in the film Moulin Rouge, which was nonetheless a beauti- 
ful film to watck. On Scruton's account, such examples of falsific- 
ation could not be seen as 'inappropriate' unless they embodied an 
aesthetic fai. lur. -. Of course it also has to be said that Igetting it 
right' doiý.,. sn"-- guarantee aesthetic success either. 
Inso', ar as Scruton maintains his thesis consistently, it can't of 
course be decisively refute(f any more than can the 'formalist' posit- 
ion. Ultimately, however, despite its far greater cogency, it is as 
prescriptive as the Iformallist' and 'cognitive' theses which it 
challenges. The unity of all of them inevitably comes to grief on the 
Janus-like nature of most works of art which point both inwardly to- 
wards an imagined world whose full realization certainly does depend 
on the kind of 'acqUaintance' I-hat Scruton outlines; and outwardly 
towards the real world, as expressed in the propositions, implicit or 
explicit, contained within their aesthetic framework. One tempting 
solution to this problem of a nibivalence is to say that the work of art 
renders such truth as it contains far more vividly than any text book, 
but this J--- still to downgrade the representational and expressive 
side of art in the end, to the le-vel. of a mere illustration of ane. c- 
dote. What therefore seerfis to foilow from all this is that in orde- 
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to justice to the notion of an apprcpri. ate appreciation of works of 
art, we may need to set aside the logical demand-: Dnd accept that the 
of 
I 
the 
an idea that I conceptj aesthet-icl is a fundamentqlly arlibigUOLIS one L, 
shall be examining in Chapter Seven of this thesis. 
0 
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CHAPTER FIVE: Can levocativeno-s>. -al in works of art have a rational 
basis? - Scruton's account-of 'symbolism' in the arts 
Just as vie learn to interpret the material signs of language so 
also, with the aid of imagination, do we learn to 'read' the world 
around us as another, veiled 'language', symbolizing thoughts and 
emotions that lie beneath the level of surface appearance. What dis- 
tinguishes such non-linguistic signs from linguistic ones is that they 
already have a primary meaning (e. g. a red light) which according to 
its context may come to symbolize a secondary one (e. g. that traf fic 
must come to a halt, or that we are entering a 'red light' district). 
To borrow for a moment the convenient terminology of 'structuralism', 
we may recognize the world around us either at the 'surface' level, 
where we take everything at its 'face value', or else at the 'deep 
structure' level, where our response to objects often goes far beyond 
any simple act of recognition. In the case of works of art, certain 
expressive symbols may come to dominate the whole work so that rather 
than presenting us with On 'aspect', as Scruton points ou'Ll, they come 
to 'suffuse' the work vvith a special atmosphere in which the 'second- 
aryl thought is 'embodied' - Virginia Woolf's lighthouse, M211arm6ls 
faun, Baudelaire's temple of nature, Henry James' pattern in the 
carpet, Conrad's shadow-line and Lawrence's rainbow, for example. The 
question is, on what basis do we ascribe meaning to such symbols? 
The problem really arises because such acts of symbolic recog- 
nition may come about in a bewildering variety of ways. Thus, at one 
end of the scale, there are those categories of symbol which approach 
the truth-functional 'stability' of the linguistic sign - i. e. all 
those symbols which depend for their recognition on our knowledge of 
the conventions of a culture as embodied, for example, in the 
'standard' ways that we interpret geAuras, clothes, ti-affic signs, 
allegorical fables etc. Then there are those categories of symboi 
which depend for their recogri-tian cn our knowledge of' some Ideep/sur- 
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face structure' theory such as that of Freud or modern 'Structural 
anthropology'. This type of symbolic interpretation lays claim to 
objectivity insofar as we are held to discover the underlying meaning 
rather than deriving it from a conventional source. Here, the 
'expert' sees hims, 7. lf as being able to 'read off' surface structure 
symbols in terms of their reference to the objective 'deep structure', 
as in the case of Freud's posited mechanism of the unconscious. This 
category would alsc include, however, less 'dogmatic' symbol schemes 
like that of Kant in which we are invited to consider aesthetic ob- 
jects as if they were a symbolic representation of morality and a 
'designed' universe, even though we cannot assert this as such. 
At the other' end of the scale, symbols may arise Isympotomatic- 
ally' from quite arb-it-Lary porsonal associations - as It, . Ij -he 
taste of the 
madeleine comes to suggest `, are. elIs childhood in Remembrance of Things 
Past. It seems likely that mrýst, if not all people have their store- 
house of such 'private' symbols which, for the individual concerned, 
have powers of evocation t! i-., 'U are beyond the reach of any other type 
of symbol: 
ýI ,, o sooner had the warm lliquid, and the crumbs with it, touched my 
palate than a shudder ran through my whole body, and I stcpped, 
intent upon the extraordi-n. -ry changes that were taking place. An 
exquisite pleasure had invaded my senses... and at once the 
vicissitudes of life had L, %--. ome indifferent to me, its disasters 
innocuous, its brevity illusory -- this new sensation having had 
on me the effect which love has of filling me with a precious 
essence. 2 
Insofar as such 'symbols' as the madeleine arise from a 'mechanical' 
association, we can make no appeal. to any aspect in the primary object 
to aid our interpretation. Such 'symbols' as these (including, also, 
those whicih may evoke very painful meanings) are empirically although 
not )ogically private to the individual who experiences them, in the 
sense that only that individual can hold the key whiCh unlocks thir 
signi ficance to others, as Marcel reveals the sign ficance of the 
madelei-ne to the reader. Even then, the key, may be lost to the indi- 
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Vidual himself, as in the case of Marcel's 'vision' of the avenue of7 
trees at Hudemesnij3. On the other hard, as I sh(-, ll examine in more 
dell-ail later, the reader's ability to recognize the evocativeness of 
the madeleine at the 'knowledge by acquaintance' level. must come from 0 
his capacity to relate it to analogous symbols in his OlAin experience - 
insofar as he himself possesses 'private' symbols which have the 
effect of restoring his ovun childhood. This is what Proust himself 
seem -s to be suggesting when he says that: 
In reality, every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of his own self... The recognition by the reader in his owr self of 
what the book says, is the proof of its ve-racity. 4 
However, in the process, what happens to the work of art as the in- 
tentional object of the reader's response? 
This is, in fact, precisely the problem to whic'n Scruton ad- 
dresses himself in his account of how the act of gazing at an e-stuary 
in hazy sunlight evoked in him 'a mixture of peace and longing' 
state of mind which he then finds 'perfectly expressed' in the 
Vois sur ces canaux 
Dormir ces vaisseaux 
Dont Ilhumeur est vagabond. 5 
Here, Scruton seems to base the incorrigibility of his judgment that 
both estuary and poem symbolize the same state of mind, noIC on any 
appeal to the 'transparent' intentionality of the work of art, but 
rather upon the kind of incorrigibility that Kant identified in the 
'judgment of pleasure, 6 - i. e. we can be no more mistakL--n about 
whatever an object may happen to evoke in us than we can about what 
pleases us immediately. Insofar as this judgment is based on 
immediC-Ate acquaintance with the state of mind evoked and our ability 
to 'call it to mind' (Scruton's condit-ion 'A' - see footnote), then 
Footnote (extract from Scruton op. cit., p. 2-1: 1): A. It as necessary 
that the subject should be able 1k1--o call the faeling in qUeStion to 
mi. nd, and thus 'imagine what it i-s like'. The knowledge thý--tt is 
qained I ropi the recognit-4 
(P. T. 0. 
0 on of e,, pressi. on 
is, in this as -in I 
ill 
this is to say no more than that the estuary and poem evoke whatever 
they evoke - and if they happen to evoke an identical -state of mind 
then this does not necessarily tell us anyth-ing 'objective' about the 
poem itself. Even with conditions IBI and ICI added (see footnota), 
to the effect that such a state of mind must arise from first-hand 
contact with the work of art7, this still does not rule out the 
possibility of accidental and irrelevant associations 3ince, as we 
shall see in detail later, there is a causal, 'passive' side to Ihe 
relationship of 'evocativeness', in virtue of which anything can 
potentially evoke anything according to the individual's case history 
- e. g. the estuary and poem might evoke incorrigibly for me, a feeling 
of restlessness. Again, if we look at 
I 
this problem from the I po-Int of 
view, of the artist's ;. -ntention 
then V0An Gogh's chair, for example, 
evokes incorrigibly for me a feeling of radiant calmness, but how do I 
know that for Van Gogh it doesn't symbolize, say, a numbing -n. i, itil? 
What Scruton's story misses out, apparently deliberately at thi-s 
stage, is any account of the 'public' side of the primary symbol, 
although one is evidently available to him, e. g. in the way that boats 
rocking on the tide tend, by association, to evoke a longing to visit 
distant shores. In this respect, even if we were able to trace a 
cc. -, isal case history for Scruton's 'vision', along the lines of 
P -oust's madeleine, the secondary object (i. e. the feeling of peace 
ai-d longing) may also been seen to arise from relatively 'public' 
(Footnote continued: ) every case, a form of knowledge by acquaintance. 
The subject is made familiar with something which he may not be able 
to describe in words. B. The feeling should be called to mind by the 
work of art. That is, the thought or perception of the work should 
cause the subject to think of, or entertain, the feeling. We cannot 
say, in the abstract, wh-ich features of an object might give this 
evocative poNer, and this accurds i,,. lell with the intuition that what 
makes a work of art express-iLve of sonic e! i'. 0tion cannot '-be laid dot-jiri in 
advance of 1-he particular case. C. It is necessary to perceive or 
have perceived the work of art if one is to take it as an expression. 
That is, the experience of syi-,,. boiism Cannot be obtained at second 
hand. This condition needs, I thirk, nc further comme,, L,. 
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features of the primary cbject that simply aren't avaiIable in 
Proust's case. Thu-, although qua passivity, I have no control over 
what an object may evoke in me, I may still be able to transcend this 
subjectivity through re-Flection on such 'public' features of the 
primary object. I 5hall return to this point in a moment. The pro- 
blem for Scruton is how one manages to do justice to this intentional 
side of the work of art while keeping our experience of it as the 
primary object since, as he points out later on, it is quite possible 
to experience a work of art symbolically in one way, while offering, 
at the same time, a very different, rational explanation: 
I might experience a work of art as 'a symbol of regret, while 
producing reasons for treating it as a symbol of the frivolity of 
courtly existence (assuming that the Watteau, or some similar 
painting, will bear both interpretations). In other words, the 
idea of justification do, --s not in itself suffice to explain how 
my feeling is 'directed' at the picture. 7 
Before we can go on to examine this further however, we MUSL 
first complete our enumeration Gf the different kinds of way in tv rl2-, -, - 
we may come to recognize symbals. Finally then, somewhere in the 
middle of the scale between the F; emantic, conventional symbol at the 
one end, and the personal 'case history' symbol at the other, comes 
th at class of symbols produced by the power of the 'analogical imagin- 
ation' where the primary object shares some quality or other with the 
secondary idea towards L-Jiich ilt points, but where there is no 'ready 
to hand' rule of interp., -3tation in advance of individual cases - as 
when we see the storm in Lear as symbolizing the inner, mental storms 
of the old king, or when we see a seascape as Matthew Arnold saw it in 
Dover Beach as evocative of a 1whole world of inescapable sadnessq 
repeated endlessly by the sound and motion of the waves, or finally 
Kant's example of the hanmmill as a symbol for the despotic state: 
For betwiesn a despotic state and a h2ndmill there is, to be su: e, 
no SiMilar-ty; bur- tnere is a sirpi-larilty in the rules according 
to which we feflect upon these two things and their causality. 8 
Unli-ke the other types of symbolism already considered, the symbels 
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prodauced and understood by the aid of the 'analogical i may-Inatioin' are 
both from the determinate rules of conventional and Idee. P, ' 
surface structure' symbols (Lon-less they end up, as some do, 
conventional 'dead' metaphors) and from, the psychological constraints 
of 'association' that rule the 'empirical imagination'. Thus Kant 
puts it: 
The imagination is very powerful -; n creating anot i ure, as - her na'. it were, out of the material that actual nature gives it. We 
entertain ourselves with it when experience becomes too common- 
place, and by it, we remould experiences always indeed in accord- 
ance with analogical laws... Thus we feel our freedom from the law 
of association (which attaches to the empirical employment of 
imagination), so that the material applied to us by nature in 
accordance with this law can be worked up into something which 
surpasses nature. 9 
In this respect, our ability to grasp such analogical symbols haS much 
0 
in common with. our similar ability to grasp the use of cestAhetic pro- 
dicates, as discussed in Chapter Two - and most notably as regards the 
role of 'reflective judgment' here. 
-hose already discussed are Now insofar as such symbols as 41. L 
'translatable' by reference to the conventional, symbolir crdjes of' a 
culture, to the 'deep structure' of some theoretical perspective or to 
an individual's case history of associated ideas, then our ability to 
respond to such symbols will primarily depend on cognitive procedures 
- even where, as in the case of semiological 'hermeneutic--', Ot PlUral- 
ity of interpretations is aimed at. Where artistic symbolism is in- 
volved, this clearly brings on once aga-in, the familiar oL'. jection 
already outlined against the 'cognitivist' aesthetic in the previous 
section - namely, that the symboli--. m only has interest as a code to be 
cracked. What is of primary interest here, therefore, is whether 
there also exists a class of symbolg to be found paradagmatically in 
11 JSO 4 works of art, but an our experience of Lhe world at large, where- 
by the : 3ensuous iffiage itself (i. e., tho 'priimacy object) is seen to be 
an 'embodiment' of 'secondary' thoughts and feelings, n0t in the 
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manner of a ruierential symbol, anecdoLe or illustration, but rather 
as an untranslatable 'fusion' of the particular 'primary object' wit1h 
a universal 'secondary object. Thiý; 'fusion' may, perhaps, be de- 
scribed as an affective response to a meaning. For example, Watteau's 
Embarcation 6_Cyth6re evokes in me what I can only describe very inad- 
equately as 'feelings of regret about the transience of human happi- 
n e, --> sI* However, I do not see beyond the painting towards a general 
reflection upon human life that I might have gleaned from any number 
of sources including real life experiences, but rather the look of the 
painting itself "provides the elaboration of my thought"10. 
Insofar as such a construction of a 'symbol' is idiosyncratic 
(although there are important precedents in Kant's account of 'aesth- 
etic ideas' and Hegel's 'concrete universals"), we once again run into 
the familiar danger of recommending a 'special use' approach with 
words like 'embodiment' and Santayana',,., Ifusion', that may effectively 
explain nothing. As Scruton says: 
Either we invent some new met. -Aphor, or else we turn back in a 
circle and explain 'fusion' in terms of symbolism, insisting the 
while that here, symbolism is sui qeneris and not to be ex- 
plained in terms of some linguistic or semantic paradigm. 11 
Either way, the connection with normal usage, so important for pre- 
serving the connection between the aesthetic and non-aesthetic wo. -Lld, 
is lost and the mysterious poetical qUality that'. we tend to experience 
through such symbols degenerates into mystification. Nor does it 
help, at this stage of the argumentq to point, as we did earlier, to 
features in the primary object which relate to the thought (e. g. the 
rather mournful light that bathes the landscape in Watteau's paint- 
ing), since this can only: 
be seen as providj-ng us with the g -enes-is of symbolism, not ii-s 
, -nalys-ýs. But this d oes not tell is what it means to Say 
that 
the poem symbolizes a certain state oý mind. 12 
So what do we mean by 'embodied thought' in the work of art? 
Part of the problem is that if such ýý),,, ribols as 1,, Iatteau', g pa, in't-ing are 
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recognLzed not by an appeal to predetermined rules of interpretation 
(unless, of course, lie belonged to an laesthetic . -ommunity' that was 
developing a sy., -.. bolic Ivocabulary' 1J. ke e. g. the Symbolist poe'LS Of 
the 19th century), but rather through refler-tive feeling and -imagin- 
ation, then as with the similar case of 'the MLIS-; C is sad', how can 
they enter into a 'Public' language? In the case of' symbolism which 
is representative rather than expressive - e. g. a political cartoon 
that purports to represent the 'militarism' of our present prime 
minister in terms of a nuclear missile with an identifiable face - one 
may always appeal to such an 'aspect' to lend stability to the symbol. 
However, Scruton wants to argue that often, in the case of expressive 
symbolism, no such 'aspect' is available to us insofar as what I 'see' 
I 
in the primary world of Watteau's seaport is another 'invisible' 
world, the transience of human happiness which is the intentional 
object of ! 9-,,? feeling, and: 
It is not yet clear what it means to say that a picture can be i -Z 
seen as somethiny that is in itself invisible. 
In particular, Scruton identifies this 'invisible wor-Id' with the 
poetic 'atmosphere' evoked by such 1works of art, although he w--ll not 
allow it to function as an 'aspect' - presumably because of its rather 
dramatic difference from the duck/rabbit paradigm. 
In particular (the notion of an aspect) seems not. tc cover the 
phenomenon of atmosphere, in which a large part of the express- 
iveness of works of art consists. Certain w0iks seem to -,, e 
'suffused' with c. motion - such as Watteau's, Dfibarcation ý Cvthere 
or Tennyson's Ulysses ... These are prime examples of artistic 
re treated as perfect expressions 'symbolism'; such works of art aL 
of a state of mind and in this task of symbolism we can think of 
no prosaic statement that could stand in their place. 
14 
For Scruton then, the 'way in' to such 'recognition of expression', in 
the absence of any referential rule, is ý! ia the relationship of 
'evocativeness' established between the spectator and the work Of art: 
An object is expressive if it 'corresponds to', or '-symbolizes' a 
state of mind where correspondence is a maLter ol evocation, not 
of reference. 
15 
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Now I., -he concept of 'evocativeness', which is often regarded as 
synonymous with the presence of a mysterious (i. e. 'indeterminate') 
'poetic' quality in art, e. g. as cultivated by the 'Symbolist' poets 
like Mallarm6, is a complex and ambiguous one in two main ways, (a) 
aesthetically, and (b) psychologically. 
A) Although there is no necessary connection between responding 
to objects aesthetically and as symbols of the 'embodied thought' 
variety, such symbols often do seem to enhance our aesthetic percept- 
4 on, lending to it this 'poetic' quality. Thus a landscape may move 
me aesthetically, but if it also evokes, e. g. a lost childhood p3ra- 
dise for me, then its aesthetic qualities may seem to be immeasurabjy 
enhanced. Is this really legitimate? If others share this reaution, 
e. g. as a result of sharing a certain cultural background, then it may 
have aesthetic relevance, providing that it is not abused by making 
the object a mere spring-board for self-indulgent fantasy - Scruton's 
recurring'and legitimate worry. Scruton himself wants to locate the 
ar'sthetic significance of such symbols in the Kantian criterion of 
desire to prolong the experience: 
Part of the expression of this state of mind will reside in the 
desire to go on observing a particular object, and this is why we 
might wish to say that interest in 'symbolism' is always. aesth- 
etic. 16 
But it is also a feature of 'evocativeness' that an aesthetically in- 
different envircnment, e. g. a suburban avenue, may be equally as 
evocative as the rural landscape in virtue of some chance association 
and seem to take on 'poetic' qualities that it ought really not to 
polssess, in much the same way as Proust's madeleine. Now of coursee 
Scruton, following Kant, would quite rightly reject such an arbitrary 
lassociation of ideas' as having any aesthetic releV2n%. -e, but 
the 
problem for him is this: if you make 'Lhe state of min,. -J' f-liatis e,, oked 
the primary intentional object of your feeling (i. e. as embodied in 
the kind of 'affective thecryl to,., jards which Scrutor is veering in 
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Chapter Fifteen), then where and how do you draw the line between 
'private' evocativcness 6 la madeleine and 'aesthetic' evocativeness 
as cmbodied, for example, in the landscape? 
A full discussion of this problem must awai. t the di. scussion of 
aesthetic 'objectivity' in Chapter Eight. Clearly however, the con- 
trast that is needed at this stage is one between those cases where a 
public link is established in virtue of the culturally recognized ana- 
logies and associations that go with the primary object (such as the 
association between 'forests' and 'childhood' reinforced by so many 
children's stories) and those cases where the link has no other found- 
ation than an accident of personal history in which case, virtually 
anything could stand in the object's stead, e. g. as the smell of 
furniture polish or the sound of a lawnmower could stand in the place 
of the madelpine. Whereas the madeleine, then, only has links at the 
arbitrary level of a fortuitous 'association of ideas', the landscape, 
on the other hand, has both kinds of connection - i. e. at the level of 
IaSSOCiation of Jideas' it ha6 an arbitrary connection such as that I 
just happeried to spend my childhood holidays in countryside like this, 
but a suburban avenue or even a run-down housing estate might happen 
to be equally evocative and thorefore substitutable as a 'symbol' of 
that state of mind; however aL the more 'public, analogical level 
there are connections such as the one already mentioned between 
'forests' and 'childhood' which i. -. any painters and writers clearly take 
advantage of, for the evocative power that they know these will have 
for their audience. 
The problem remains however, that while one might, without too 
much imaginationg recognize such 'analogical' connections at the cog- 
nitive lekiel, these might still fpil to evoke, at the 'acquO-intancel 
level, the affective state of mind whereiln, for SCrull-on, aesthetic 
experience comes to rest. An appeal to public fe-atures of the primar,, / 
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objeCt is therefore not enOLIgh in itself to bring the aesthetic exper-- 
ience about because, as with all such experience, there are really two 
intentional objects here; the 'public' primary object and the sub- 
jective state of mind that it evokcs. As we have seen, coining words 
like 'fusion' doesn't help, so what is Ithe relationship and cFn it 
ever be given a public basis? Scruton's answer is that: 
When I see a as b, or see b in a, then my perception has two 
immediate oýjects: a (whick is ýIso the matýrial object of per- 
ception), and b, the aspect, these two objects being fused in the 
sense that whý_t I see must be described in terms of both of them. 
I think that we must recognize that 'double intentionality' is 
here entirely primitive. 17 
This leads on to condition 'EI18 (see footnote) which seeks to estab- 
lish the intentional connection between my affective state of mind and 
fe. atures in 'the primary object. But given the arbitrary side of 
levocativeness' that we have just been examining, I do not see how 
this condition with it1primitivel resting place in direct 'acquaint- 
an cea I could ever rule out arbitrary associations and their power to 
enhance aesthetic aspects of the work of art, as when Proust's Swann 
never admires Giotto or Botticelli as much as when he discovers their 
style in the faces of women that he loves. As Proust cays of 
Vinteuil's 'little phrase': 
After all, it might be the case that, if Vinteuil's phrases 
seemed to be the expression of certain states of soul aiialogous 
to that which I had experienced when I tasted the mCL eleine... 
there was nothing to assure me that the vaguenu-ss of such states 
was a sign of their profundity rather than of our not having 
learned yet to analyse them (i. e. by reference to the 'cissocia- 
tion of ideas' - N. M. ), so that there need be nothing more real 
in them than in other states. 19 
In this respect, it is worth contrasting Scruton's position here with 
Footnote (extract from Scruton op. ci t., p. 234): E. Although the 
subject's feeling is exprp-, ssed-towards bjhctt is sy. -ýibolized (the 
attitude, in this case'), it is directed nlsso towards the tvork of art 
-hý, sense that ti; e sub!, -ct is disposed to descr-; -be, and itself in L 'i -Ia 
perhaps to justify, his emotion in tciýms of features of the work. 
(He 
descrjbes Ihe lassitudinous postures of the people in Watteau's 
painting; he refers to the sombre final lines of Herrick's Corinna. 
and so (in. ) i 
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that of Kant because, as we havt: already mentioned, for 'Kant there is 
no problem with establishing the connection between aesthetic and 
symbolic experience inscfnr as all aesthetic objects are seen to 
symbolize (in the sense of 'give us intimations of') morality and a 
'designed' universe. Significantly, Scruton too comes round to a 
version of this view as the ultimate reference for the 'objectivity' 
of aesthetic values as embodied in the cri de coeur with which he 
closes the final chapter: 
To be certain in matters of taste is, therefore, to be certain in 
matters of morality: ethics and aesthetics are one. 20 
I shall not attempt, however, to follow up this particular line of 
argument. 
I B) As was mentioned on page 117, over and above the aesthetic 
ambivalence of 'evocativeness', there is a second type of ambivalence 
which has already been partly discussed - namely that, as with the 
similar case of emotional attitudes, it appears to havcr between in- 
tentional 'directedness' on the one hand, e. g. 
It is the look of the picture that provides the elaboration of my 
thought. 21 
and on the other hand, an essentially involuntary 'passive' side which 
it. -: )elf seems to hover between the 'free play' of the 2n2l. 0aical 
imegination and the causal 'conditioned responses' of '2ssociationist' 
psychology (i. e.. the terrain explored by Proust). Insofar as our 
giasp of the work of art at the intentional level cannot, as we have 
already seen, guarantee the evocation of the affective state of mind 
therein symbolized, it would seem therefore that acquaintance with 
this state of mind must involve an involuntary element. At times 
ScrUton seems half to recognize this, as in the spontaneous way th3t 
he says he recognizes in the poem the same powers of evocat-ion that he 
found in the sight of the estuary - but this never real 
Iy 
gets 
developed since it clearly contradict-:,; his view of imagining as a 
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primarily voluntary activity. As a resullt. of this, he does riot pay 
nearly enough attenti-on to the 'dynamics' of 'evocativeness' which, in 
turn, leads to a very static view of the phenomenon, a. -3 reflected . ýn 
his examples which all b. -Iong to the class of symbols which are seen 
to be "perf c-, t expressions of a state of mind". In this, he seems to 
come close to Dufrenne's view that the work of art itself does all the 
real work and therefore "spares us the expense of an exuberant 
imaginati-on"22. As we shall see later, this is in marked contrast to 
the far more dynamic, 'asymptotic' account that Kant gives of the 
'aesthetic ideal in para. 49 of The Criti_quf of JudgTent - lasympt- 
otic' in the sense of getting nearer and nearer to a goal without ever 
quite reaching A. Furthermore, as in the case of Scruton's earlier 
account of the identity of sense and expression In works of art, it is 
difficult to see how he can give any account of those works of art 
that imperfectly symbolize states of mind the case ol those 
carved lions that one sometimes sees at the entrance of imposing 
buildings, that are clearly [neant to evoke a senso of grandeur, but 
fail owing to the rather insipid expressions on their faces. 
Scruton's account thus markedly contrasts with Hegel's, of the varying 
fortunes ol the 'concrete univercall in the history of art, as when he 
explains the 'outlandishness' of the 'Symbolic Art' of the Middle E2St 
and India in terms of its desperate attempt to embody the "Idea' in 
concrete form: 
So. now the idea exaggerates natural shapes and the phenomena of 
reality itself into indefiniteness and extravagance; it staggers 
round in them, it bubble-s and ferments in them, does violence to 
them, distorts and stretches them unnaturally, and tries to 
elevate their phenomenal appearance to the Idea by the diffuse- 
ness, immensity and splendour of the formations employed*23 
Sssical Art' of Praxiteles and the Greeks For liegel, only the' 
Cl 
ýA 
achieveS Scruton's norm, whereby vie f. -i-nd: t 
The Free and adequate embodiment of' the Idea in the shape pecul- 
iarly appropr-iate to the Idea itself in its essential nature... 
2-4 
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For a'LL its obscurity, at least this view recognizes a dynamic inter- 
play between meaning and sensuous image (as also%., does Kant's account) 
that seems to be lacking in Scruton's own account. 
How then, given the complexities of the evocative symbol, can we 
put the 'recognition of expression' which it solicits on a rational 
footing? Could anything in art seem less subject to 'rules' than 
'evocativeness' - especially in 20th century art where the obscurity 
of the personal symbol (e. g. Chagall's violinists on rooftops or 
Rothko's great, purple slabs) often seems wilfully to dominate, there- 
by alienating many of its audience? The problem here, to restate it, 
is that no truly 'poetic' symbol can be governed by any predetermined 
rule either of a semantic nature (eg. that fauns Symbolize 'unattain- 
0 
abie desires' or rainbows, 'perfection'), or of a psychrilooica. l. kind, 
based on 'mechanical' association (e. g. that the smell of Floo. - polish 
evokes my childhood). In the former case, this would re; ic. 'er ssuch a 
symbol 'translatable', thereby destroying the subtl-e and intimate 
04-lor of- lem- dependency between thought and symbol contained -in 
the nL 
L 
bodied thought'. In the latter case, the symbol could only by evocat- 
ive for the individual concerned, insofar as it contains within itself 
no 'public' features that can be interpreted by a third party beyond 
-hiing to guide us ; iow can this arbitrary association. Yet without somell. 
we avoid our own arbitrary associations enter-ing into the 'recognition 
of expression', particularly insofar as our own perception of the 
world is laden with a continuum of personal and cultural associations 
that may be very different from that of the artist's? Surprisingly, 
Scruton makes no reference here to the way that such symbols may some- 
times evolve from within an laesthetic community', as in the case of 
tht, - rather obscure all-; gories that feat-,., re in Renaissance p ainting 
like Botticelli's Primavera, or the French 'Symbolist' poets' search 
for lluniver-selle analoqie25. In such cases the 'intention' of the. 
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community and not just the indii. vidual artist would tend to determine 
the interpretation. I shall return to this point in a moment. 
Scruton's move, as elseL-,, here in the. book, is to tie the state of 
mind intentionally to the work of art, thereby overcoming the ub- 
ocurity of concepts like 'fusion' to which the laffectivel theory has 
to resort (conditions V- see footnote - and 'E' - see footnote on 
p. 119). 
For to give a complete account of the thought on which his 
feeling is founded, the subject must refer to the work of art 
that is before him. This is so despite the fact that the object 
of feeling - which is defined by his thought - is not the work of 
art itself but rather something beyond the work which it Isym- 
bolizes'. 2ý 
However, once again, the tension between intentionality and non-pro- 
positional 'knowledge by acquaintance' surfaces insofar as such an 
account would only provide us with evidence of the subject's response 
at a 'knowledge by description' level. As such, it would be quite 
possible, as we have already seen27 to offer one deý-, cription of the 
work of art, while experiencing i 
Ik 
as something el-se or not exper- 
iencing it in the affective, 'acquaintance' sense at all. For 
example, a teacher might try to explain the evocative force of the 
waning moon in Wordsworth's 'Lucy' poem: 
My horse moved on; hoof after hoof 
He raised, and never stopped: 
When down below the cottage roof, 
At once, tl. ie. bright moon dropped. 
What fond and wayward thoughts will slide 
Into a Lover's head! 
10 mercy! ' to myself I cried, 
'If Lucy should be deadi'28 
in terms of analogies between the 'virginall qualities of the moon 
Footnote (extract from Scruton 
, 
op. ci t., p. 233): D. To see P_ as a 
symbol of b is to react in some v,, ay tc,,, -,,, ards b, Pab a result of per- ' in im. agin- this --acLjon should ceiving ýj! It is possible thalt 
ation only - 'entertained' rather than adopted; and if b is itself an 
emotion, then the reaction will have a SyMp2thetic cheracter, as when 
one responds to the grief in the music of a requiem. 
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(which, a3 a matter of fact, hovers between being a 'conventional' and 
an 'analogical' sym'i-o, -)l) and his loved one, and its sudden disappear- 
ance as being an 'appropriate' nbject, for the outlandish anxieties of 
a first love. It would IL-e quite possible for all the pupils to see 
the point of this, yet remain -*P. mpervious to the state of inind that 
Wordsworth is clearly trying to evoke through the symbol. As such, 
the poem would seem a rather pointless and even faintly ridiculous 
exercise - at least that is how it seemed to me when I first had it 
explained to me, along these lines. 
The Solution for Scruton, as elsewhere, is that the ultimate 
'acceptance condition' wherein we most fully come to recognize the 
point of the embodicd thOLight must lie in our non-describable 'know- 
ledge by acquaintance' with the work (condition IF'): 
(F). What the subject learns from the painting - what 111'he 
painting 'brings home to him' - is something that he in 
the experience of the painting, and only in that experiencý-,. 1) - 
However, as the estuary story showed, such experience is by no gmeans 
incommunicable insofar as T -nay recognize in the poem the evocation of 
a state of mind with which I am already partly familiar, although the 
poem sheds new light on it: 
While the poem expresses the feeling more completely, it stands 
in a relation to the ', -eeling that is essentially similar to the 
relation that, exists betweeii the feeling and the estuary. 
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We may illustrate this by returning to the Wordsworth poem. Supposing 
that the teacher had then said (as actually happened to me), "Have any 
of you ever had an experience like this - waiting outside the cinema 
for your girl-Friend who is late, and saying to yourself 'if she 
doesn't arrive by the time that screwed up bit of paper has blown 
across the pavement and into the gutter, then it must mean that she 
doesn't love me any moreM" At that point I think nearly all of Lis 
recognized the expressJon of the Wordsworth Doem in a way that would 
Lt has said of such 'recognition': satisfy condition IF. As Elliot 
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Though it cannot be stated, it can be communicated through con- 
versation and through art, including the art of the writer and teacher... Jf it were knowledge at all, it ýýiould be a kind. of 
knowledge by ccquaintance-. 31 
But how can we ever be --ure that our response at the 'acquaint- 
ancel level is 'appropriate', in Scruton's sense of being true to the 
artist's intentions? - allowing of course for the fact that an artist 
may sometimes deliberately create ambiguous symbols or even symbols 
that are capable of many interpretations (e. g. Shakespeare's 'bare 
ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang') as an integral part 
of their evocativeness. At the descriptive level, of course, 'public' 
criteria of a kind are available. For example in the case of the 
screwed up paper blowing across the pavement, there are accessible 
Ippetic' analogies such as being blown about by the winds of fate, the 
hopelessness of lying in the gutter etc., and even if one substituted 
a purely 'private' symbol such as clutching a 'lucky chorm: that one's 
girl-friend had given one (i. e. a symbol that has no recoqri_, zH.,,. -, Iy ana- 
logical connections with the waning moon), then as long as the indi- 
vidual for whom it has significance explains it to us ýas Marcel 
explains the private significance of the madeleine), then the symbol 
enters the world or public language. As Scruton says: 
This experience of recognizing symbol-ism is, like all the pheno- 
mena that share the formal properties of imagination., within 
rational control. There is such a thing as defending an inter- 
pretation as appropriate to a given work of art... 
32 
The fact remains though, that insofar as the 'acquaintance' sije of it 
is, in Scruton's words 'sui qeneris' (the nearest that he ever gets to 
acknowledging an 'involuntary' element) than, as Scruton would be the 
first to admit, hovvever much analogical and other features may control 
our response to the primary object, they can never get as far as guar- 
anteeing that the work cf art will evoke the intended state of mind in 
us. Consequently the 'acceptance condiLion' T', in the end, looks 
like little more than an act of faith. 
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Now this would not matter so much if Scruton were working with a 
more dynamic model such as that of' Kant. wherein the spectator's own 
imagination, associated experiences and thoughts clearly have a con- 
stitutive role to play - the 'aesthetic ideal being like a pabbJe 
tossed into the pool of our mind, generating ever widening ripples of 
evocativeness as our understanding and imagination undergo a mutual 
'quickening' and enter into 'free play' with each other. As I pointed 
out earlier, this is essentially an 'asymptotic' process insofar as 
the 'aesthetic ideal in Kant's terminology is a 'representation of the 
imagination' for which no concept is adequate, while the 'rational 
ideal hinted at by the symbol (e. g. 'freedom' or 'immortality') is a 
concept for which no 'intuition' is adequate: 
I 
Thus, for example, a certain poet says, in his description of a 
beautiful morning: 
The sun arose 
As calm from virtUe springs. 
The consciousness of virtue, if we substitute it in our thOL]ghtý. 
for a virtuous man, diffuses in the mind a multitude of subliwe 
and restful feelings, and a boundless prospect of a jOYfLj'L 
future, to which no expression that is measured by a defillite' 
concept completely attains. 
In a word, the aestheticall idea is a representation of It-lie 
imagination associated with a given concept, which is bound up 
with such a multiplicity of partial representations in its free 
employment that for it no expression marking a definite concept 
can be found; and suCh a representation therefore, adds to a 
concept much ineffable thought, the feeling of which quickens the 
cognitive faculties, and with language, which is the mere letter, 
binds up spirit also. 33 
4 There is little. doubt Ithat this last sentence refers to the same thing 
as Scruton's own 'knowledge by acquaintance', but without the idea of 
arriving at a definite end such as is implied by Scruton's account. 
The fact is that Scruton has created a real problem for himself 
here by suggesting that, at the 'acquaintance' level, we can recognize 
works of art like Watteau's Embarcation cý Cythbre and Tennyson's 
Ulysses as "perfect expressions of a State of miru, ', 34 A0 
What can he 
mean by 'perfect' here? (especially when you consider that Watteau 
actually painted no less than three versi. ons of The Fmbarcation! Is 
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ScruLon aware of this, one wonders? ). He cannot mean it in the 
Crocean sense that the work of art has perfectly -ommunicated to. us 
the artist's own state of mind because, then, the work of art wou-Id be 
expendable. What he must - mean here, I think, is that the work of art 
is something like a realization of the ess%--ntial meaning of something, 
both incorporating and transcending the individual viewpoint - just as 
Wordsworth's poem manages to reali. ze the 'essence' of first love 
through the retailing of a particular realization of it. In reading 
the poem, we feel that no one else has ever realized A quite so well. 
Wittgenstein speaks of such an experience in The Brown Book: 
I will examine one particular case, that of a feeling which I 
shall roughly describe by saying it is the feeling of 'long, long 
ago'. These words and the tone in which they are said are a 
gesture'of pastness. But I will spec-1-fy the experience which I 
mean still further by saying that it is that corrosponding to a 
certain tune (David's Bundler Tanz -- "Wie weiter Ferne"). 
I'm imagining this tune played with the right expi, --ss ion... Then this is the most elaborate and exact expressio., i zjj Fa feeling of 
pastness which I can i-magine. 35 
The point here is that this feeling of 'pastness' j.,, c-, inseparable from 
the particular form of expression (the tune) that gives rice to it. 
It is certainly not to be confused with the abstraction of some essen- 
tial meaning, since as Scruton says: 
(Such) 'recognition' has a dimension of 'fullness', and in this 
sense, recognition cannot be explained simply as a case of 
realizing that a certain proposition is true. 36 
The posited irreducibility of such 'embodied thoughts' is also echoed 
by the French critic Deleuze when he considers Proust's achievement-s 
in this direction: 
Beyond subjective chains of essociation and resurrect4ons by re- 
semblance or contiguity, are the essences... They transcend the 
states of subjectivity no less than the properties of the ob- 
ject. .- 
This is why each essence is a patrie, ii country. It is not re- 
ducible to a psycholog, LCal state. -Por even to same forin of a 
higher subjectivity ... 
Com.. 'ray rises up, not- -qs it vics experienced in contigu. ty with 
tion, but, in as lend-, r, w-ith a "trutii" which never the post sensaL 
, Lity. 
3V 
fý _p had an- equivalent 
i 1, -e 
Hotmievccr, as in the cz-Se of Scruton's earlier attempts to recon- 
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cile 'representation' and 'expj. %., -, jioi-, ' with an 'autonomous' view or 
art, it would seem that, in the end, our sense that some work of art 
may be seen as a 'perfect' symbol for a state of mind (i. e. the state 
of mind that affectively embodies the essence of 'first love' for 
example) must ultimately depend on 11, eference to an outside context, 
including, for example, truth-values and moral beliefs. To take an 
example from outside the field of art for a change - suppose that I am 
gazing up at the tower-block which*houses the head-quarters of the 
National Westminster Bank and see it towering over me as a moving and 
'perfect' symbol of what I can only describe very inadequately as 'the 
power of advanced capitalism, dominating the city in which I live'. 
As an experience this is incorrigible for me, but is it an lappro- 
I 
priatel act of recognition? Sjuppose novi that I am changed into the 
chief manager of the NatWest, I might then be gazing at this s, -,, r,, ie 
building, floating gloriously above the city -a 'perfect' in, -. )vj. ng 
symbol of all that's best in a 'free market' economy. Such an exper- 
ience would be equally 'incorrigible', but once again, would it be 
'appropriate'? Clearly no amount of lookinq at the tower-block will 
settle which is the more appropriate response because we are not jUSt 
talking about the building here, but also about a whole background of 
beliefs about the economy, society etc. Furthermore, as was mentioned 
earlier, such 'sy. mbolic' perception does tend to enhance our aesthetic 
awareness of the architecture, e. g. as 'oppressive' or 'glorious'. If 
Scruton is therefore going to invoke the criterion of 'appropriate- 
ness' for our recognition of such symbols then in the end, I don't see 
how he can turn his back on such a background of belief, as he did in 
the case of imaginary representation, because unlike imaginary repre- 
sentation, the 'essences' in the above examples are inot fictions. 
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'i--c imaqin-: ng take ace? CHAPTER SIX: VI -j 11 -Pi The ý: aaqjqýjtiqn aý! d le-mbe-di-ed thought'. 
P, ---rhp,, )- the importar-eL, messaqe to come out of Art and Im2gin- 
tion is th, 7)t the reader Is/li stener's/vi ewer's imaginatien plays, 
paramount role in giv-, ng him special access to the work of arl. -- a 
world that i,, ý; not simply there awaiting an adequate descript. 1-on, but 
to be lived thrOLIgh "in the imagination". This empiiri. cist positting of' 
a special access chal 1 enges the prevailing orthodoxy of 'anzlyl, - ic' 
philosophy. For Pxyle and Wittgenstein, to posit an account of 
imaginaticii in terms of extra-linguistic 'experiences' that occompany 
a meani. ng and "bring it to life" i. s to posit, at best, expendable and 
philosophically uninteresting appendages to that meaning (c. g. mental 
'pjctures' Mid the physil-al Shakes and trembles that accompany eii-io- 
tions) and, at worst, impos-S. ibly loccult' phenomena (the 'beetles in 
the box). This same view, v.: i regard to 'images' at- any rate, is 
also taken by S1 Jartre in his -. rdI-iL! ue of the Ii, 11usion of immanence' 
Over and against this view thei-t, it, iss fundamental to Scruton's po, -. i- 
tion Lhat thie d-ifference between a thought (e. g. that 'hurf; an happiness 
is transient') and the embodiment of a thought in a work ol art (e. g. 
yL_ Vilatteau-s 'picturi. ng. ' of this Jidea in The Embarkation to_g herea) is 
not just a superficial one of the presence or absence of seMntically 
expendoble 'experiences'. Thus he says of 'aspect perception', for 
example: 
When bve examine the phenomenon we must conclude that it is im- 
possible to treat the sensory aspect of 'seeing as' as a mere 
optional. addition to an underlying core of thought. 
2 
Put thus, as I shall argue later, it would seem that Scrouton is 
-Ig a goal very similar to that. of Kant in his aCCOL! nt of 'aesth- pu suit i 
etic ide-Ei, --, ' in Plira. 40 of The Cl'iticAue of Judqr-, ient, and more recent- 
Investioatiorls, where Ty, III tý- ý,. lxth -cnF. the Loqical A. 
it qued that the lempty intentions' of bare thought seek com- 
pict-icil-I in the' 'intuiticonpýl fulfil-ment' of im2ge and perccpti, -)n. H, --) 
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ev, -r, as J hDv6 tried to show il-I arlier chapters, the empiricist form, 
in iý. fhicri Scruton p-, ý-senl, c-- hJ. s case might seern t, make the comm nic. - 
i pu 
t4 V_ abill-ty of such imeigina A ý_ 'experience"s' a problematic act of 1 aLth: 
IIT 
I lhat there Js sorpe cont -iection between the meaning of our utterances 
and our mental states is undeniable, " he says, underlining the dualism 
that frequently charact. --rizes his philosophy of mind, "but in the case 
of aesthetic experience the connection proves hard to descri-be. "3 Yet 
at every stage of the argument, lie is only too well aware, of course, 
that Wittgenstein is looking over his shoulder L! ýjith the familiar 
warning that: 
Here, it is easy to geL into that dead-end of philosophy where 
one believes that the difficulty of the task consists in our 
having to describe phenomend that are hard to get hold of, the 
present experience that slips quickly by, or something like 
tha 4 
In fact, at the semantic level , Scruton and, as we shall see 
later, phenomenologists like are in full agreement wi. th the 
analytic position that the epibodiriu, -nt of a thought or lempty interlt- 
ion' in image or perception does not E-, rid cannot add any new meaning to 
what was already there before. As Husser. 1 riqht'Ly points out: 
The word- has its sense quite apart from its attachment to (any) 
intuition ... sinco 4%his sense is everywhere the same. 
r 
Similarly, Scruton is quite clear that the meaning of any aesthetic 
description is exhausteu by what we have put into the description-. 
There are no subtleties in olur aesthetic emotions that are not 
matched and explained by SubtletJe3 in the thoughts on which they 
are founded ... If irýe attempt to communicate an aesthetic emotion, Uen vie communicatc OA thought. 6 - 
Seen thus, at any rate from an 'ana-'Lytic' perspective, it would seem 
natural to think that an aesthetic description 'Like that referring to 
, 
tUMhl 4 C the Schubert triplets as 'tragically L., -Igi7 is indeed all that vve 
have ciot, Amaking an), 1-urthe. -- talk of 'experience' -LeL'undant. 
Tho crucial question to be answered therefore is this: if the 
posited 'experience' in which our ima(,. ination summons up the very 
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presence of Schubert's U ani-cally stumbling triDletc, nonethellez3s adds 
nothing m-)re tn- the ,, -ieaninq of that particular descripticn, then wha', 
does J. 41- matter 'jilhether ouv grasp of this meaning Is or is not acc$cm- 
pani. ed by imanes Of' SLUmbling, 'sympathetic' boddly accompaniments to 
the tragic emotion --ind the like? In other words, how does the pre- 
sence of posited phenori-icna like 'knowledge by acquaintance' and 'in- 
tuitional fulfilment' lead to a greater understanding of the wor! < of 
art if not in terms of an addition of more meaning? The answer to 
this question must, however, await its turn. First we need to remind 
ourselves once more of the central aesthetic problem to which Kant 
addressed himself in the 'Antinomy ol Taste. Thus, on the one hand, 
no on-ý- can appraise the beauty of something that he or she has , ot e x-- 
perienced at first hand, he, -- CA . use: 
the feeling of the subject, -. nd not a concept of the object., is 
itsdetermining ground. 8 
On the other hand: 
The judgment o 'I taste IS baSed 011 concepts, for otherwise..., vie Q couIUc not quarrel. about it., 
Therefo. re, as Scruton points out, any theory which seeks to locate the 
source of the aesthetic world in subjective responses invariably has 
serious difficulties in account. -ing for the directedness of such re- 
sponses towards a public, iodeptindently specifiable world of meaning. 
Thus an experience, be it image, feeling or perception, only makes 
sense in terms of vuhat it is ao experience ol , and never as a hypo-- 
stasized phenomenon in its own right, fhe 'beetle in the box'. Simi- 
larly, no account of what the imagination is in terms of what we know 
'from experience' about its workings and the place that it occupies in 
human natUre can be given L-jithout reference to the fact that the 
concept of 'imaginatdon', I ike that of any other mental act, is 
char act eijzed by the spec-i aI ways inwbida it directs if-sc.., f towards its 
object. Like any other rr)cntal act. it cannot escape from it. s public.. 
133 
I ), ule-noverned i eatures, such as how it differs- from, arid what it has 
in cummon with other mentall act. s like wishing and believiiig. 
What then cha,.. 'acter--, Ze3 2C-; sthe'.. ic discciurse for Scruton is Lhe 
tension between seemantic -and 'experiential' i-mperatives - the latter, 
which is the point at issueý clc-: Ii! -ning ep-istemological priority. Thus, 
hoviever persuasive we, may find the many rcasons as to why we should 
imaginatively hear Schubert's triplets as agically stumbling' (e. g. 
with reference to Ithe minor kcy, the slow tempo, the yearning melody 
and hesitant rhythms etc. ), the ulti. mate 'persuader' is held to be the 
experiential response whose spontaneity cannot be commandeered on a 
rational basis alone. Of course, as we have seen, no account of this 
subjective side of imagination cC--)n be given without presupposing a 
linguisti. c and cultural background. From this point of view, there 
will inevitably be a conventional element built int-o any analysis of 
the inter-SUbjective basis of aesthetic discourse, sinc'l- ou., vi. ews of 
what counts as 'art' and limagination' are clearly SUhjecI to hi. -stor- 
i c! EýI change. Hoviever Scruton, while accepting all this, is adamant, 
along with Kant, that unless our grasp of aesthetic description equal- 
ly presupposes that it both expresses and evokes the 'presence' in our 
imiagination of e. g. the 'tragically sturribling' triplets and moves us 
wj'_h the discovery, then all talk of linter-subjective' agreement will 
have an ultimate. 'disembodied' emptiness about it - i. e. we will only 
'see the point of it' at 'Che level of a plausible conceptual con- 
nection which has no need of images and feelings. The description may 
also fail to persuade us of course, if it is inappropriate in some 
way. But then, in the last analysis for Scruton, and herein lies the 
problem, the response that underlies the apprcisal has an element of 
ncorr j gi b il it about. it that ov erride. q iny appea I to pub I-i c norms, 
despite t1he facti thal, over a pericid cf t-i me it may enter 'parony- 
mously' into publi. c usage. Thus, on Sc--,,. jt. on', --- account, My appraisal 
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that '41-he rnus- 
. 1, c 
is sad' could be appropriate, even though I were in 
minoriLy of onc, providing that I COAd 'see the point' of my ovin 
u-sage -- he., iee '-he oltimate obscurity of his account, as war, discussed 
in Chaptor Two. 
Wha'L fOHOWS from all this is that any adequate &esthe'LiC theOl'y 
must meet the challenge of relating (a) the public, rule-governed side 
of the 'aestheetic object' as vie find it embedded in the various 'aes- 
thetic ccri-; munit-LeS' that human beings have evolved, to (b) the way 
that, as a matter of fact, we just find ourselves responding to such 
objects - which is to say as subjects who not only think the lempty, 
intentions' of pure meaning, but who also experience these meanings 
tnoeticall. yl as the phenomenologists have termed it, from the point of 
I 
vi ew of an experiencing subject who does the actual perceiving, imag- 
ining and feeling. Clearly, 'embodied thought' would not be possiblo 
in the first place unless there were also embodied subjects to provide 
a Ilocation' for such experiences. As Merleau-Ponty has argued on marjy 
occasions: 
The body ... is on the side of the subject; it is our point of view 
of the world, the place where the spirit takes on a certain 
physical and historical situation. 10 
It is (b), then, that would seem to create the need fcr 2 pro- 
perly empirical enquiry. As we have seen however, Scrutcon's own 
approach to the problem is to attempt to yoke together the two oppos- 
ing steeds of a traditional empiricist philosophy of mind whose pro- 
vince is what we know 'from experience' with a 'public language' 
argument whose original purpose was to demolish this very position. 
Not only does this seem to be, in the end, a near impossible task, but 
as a result. (as I sh-,,, 1,11 expe. nd upon ir, a mornent), it seems to inherit 
certain mL,, J-r PI-oblems inherent in both tho empiricist and analytic 
accounts of mental acts. Thus, from ILS empiiic ioots I' shall 
argue that Scryton's 
GACCOUnt ultim3t. -Iy ret. -ains 19-h, -I. obscurity '%I-hat 
has 
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always surrounded this versi on of 'knowl, e6ge by acqu, -,, 
i nt, -mce'; and L C, 
that furthermore, -, 3 a result of this, Scruton never p-, operly deals 
with the phenomenological inadequacy of Hume's 'standard' account ol' 
1vivid ne sso 1. On the other hand, from its 'analytic' stance, 1 shall 
argue that it derives a most unempirical view of both works of art and 
our imaginative responses to them, in ter . MS of a highly stipulative 
and thereby narrow account as to how we should experience viorks of 
ar t. Moreover, as I have attempted to show earlier, Scruton masks 
this sti-pulative side of his argument by ad hominem appeals of a 
dubious naturell. I shall argue in due course that the kind of syn-- 
thesis of empiricist arid analytic views advanced by Scruton points 
natui-ally towaris, arid would be better served by, a more phenomeno- 
logically orjet)LaLe%-t resco'LuLion of this tension between experiential 
and semantic demands. Here I have in mind the kind of intimate re- 
lationship between (I,; the way something appears to us in what liusserl 
has called the 'intuitional fulfilment' of what was hitherto grasped 
only as a 'bare' thought, a-, d 1, b) the viewpoints from which we per- 
ceive such appearances, whether posited as perceptual or imag-ina, -)/. 
As Merleau-Ponty has said, "Is not to see always to see from some-- 
where? 't12 and the same goes for acts of imagining. Before exploring 
this further however, let us fij st turn to those aspects of empiricist 
and 'analytic' philosorhy which relate respectively ILo the obscurity 
and over-stipulativeness inherent in Scruton's argument. 
One way of looking at the classical empir4icist view of the imag- 
ination as put forward by writers like Hume is to see it as, in pact, 
lead'ng an attempt to answer the important although potentially mi- 
que, stion - "Where do phenomena like imagining and feeling take place? 
" 
The empiricist answer, as is well known, i. s that imagination takes 
-d fleeting and pIQ. Ace on a kind of 
inner screen on which are projcctC 
q elusi. ve 'pictures', desperately cha,, ý, ed by lqngua,, f,. Such a view, 
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Cowley poirlts ()utl3, derive-s From cr. uncrit-ical acceptance of the 
scientific model of 'representation, -, 1 perception' in which our con- 
sciousncss of an object is identified with the object of our consci- 
ousness so thEýt, for examplf-, my vieivj of this tree beccmes a vie-ý., u of 
my image of the tree, rather. than of' the tree itself' as seen from, this 
point of view. The objects of the im. agination are then seen to be 
pale 'after images' of what was once located on the retina. On this 
view then, the 'eye' is not regarded as something which 'Looks out upon 
the world, but rather as the 'passive receptor' of behavioural psycho- 
logy. 
The Rylean and Sartrean objections to such a hypostasized mental- 
image are conclusive. It is Helvellyn itself that I imagine in its 
absence or see in its pi-esence, not my image of Helvellyn. In the 
case where the object imagined is a fictional one, it is still I-hf, 
case that it is not my imaqe of e. g. a dragon towards which m.,, 
imaginative thought is directed, but rather the dragon as it would '10e 
if it existed, for how coulc; a mcre imaqe of a dragon be terrify-Mg? 
In other words, -,, jhen I imagine a fictional world, however fantastic, I 
am still imagining an external 'out there' world as it might be, given 
the fulfilment of certain material conditions, such as that dragons 
exis , t14 intentional object, then, To posit the image itself as the U 
is to succumb to whaý Scrtre has called the 'illusion of immanence', 
whereby "we pIcture consciousness ag a place peopled with small like- 
nessesitl5. And, of course, insofar as these "small likenesses' are 
conceived to have a kind of existence independently of our thinking 
about them, so that 'acquaintance' with them can only come through 
introspective 'observation', then we arri-ve at the total obscurity of 
a 'private longuagel. 
A further consequence of this empiricist accouint of the ; imagel, 
of crucial import2llCe to aesthetics, is the phenon, enological inadc-.! - 
17 
quacy of Hume's distinction , _,., jeen 
'imayinatior ý- 4-,, v V and 'perception' i,,, 
terms of the greate. L force and vivacity of the perc-eptual imaye - as 
though imagination were straining itself to a-chieve the condition of 
perception wiýhout ever qud. fe managing it. This leads to a view that 
a 'vivid' image is s-imply cone with greater clarity and sharpness, as 
in Hume's example of perceiving and imagining P2ris: 
I have seen Paris, but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of 
that city, as will perfectly represent all its streets in their 
real and just proportions? 16 
But clearly we can perceive Paris obscurely, say in a fog, and yet 
imagine the city vividly in its absence just perhaps from a half- 
sketched outline of tables on a sidewalk, a hint of accordion musi. c or 
the vaguely remembered smell of furniture polish or a Gaulojsp,. In 
fact we would not really call a 'photographic' mental. image of Paris 
'imaginative' at all, but rather 'unimaginative and literal min--, ',, - d. ' in 
the manner of an uninspired 'photographic' type of p@inting. F L, r ý-t z- 
more, any attempt that we do make to imagine in a qUaSi-pniotogrcphtc 
way is often feeble and everi, on occasions, rather ridiculous Pas v-11hen 
I try, for example, after readinq A Tale of Two Cities to imagine my- 
self storming the Bastille as though I were the star of a 'private' 
epic film on the French Revolution. That 'vivid' images depend for 
their vividness, not on one-to-i, ne correspondence but rather on their 
power to evoke the 'presence' of the imagined object may be illus- 
trated by the following Japanese Haiku: 
To the yearning seekers of blossoms 
With pride would I offer 
A delight of the eye, 
The green from under the snow, 
'ime. 17 In a mountain village in springL 
He-Ae, the power of a single image, 'the green under the snow', to 
evoke the ý-jhcle 'prusence' ol spring For our imagination contrasts 
with the literal-rPinded 'seekeers of blossoms' who seek to 'capture' 
spring much as a tourist aith a carnera does. I shall, however, leek,, ý 
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aside a more detaj. l-. d acc-coint of 'vividness' until later cn. 
Now insofar as Scruton consistently treats imagining as a way of 
thi-nkiný.., embod]ied in acts of pub-Li-c expression, he certainly cannot 
be accused ol" posit ing a 'private language' for i magi nation. Yet 
insofar as he wants to rpaintoin a key role for empiricist 'knowledge 
by acquaintance' as the ultimate arbiter of the 'acceptance con- 
dition', what is lacking in his account is any clear, alternative way 
of character iz i ng 'embodied thought' as a phenomenon, particularly as 
regards the 'vividness' of such experience on which, presumably, its 
persuasiveness comes to rest. This is probably because the only real 
alternative account of 'acquaintance' open to him, namely a phenomeno- 
logical one, is dismissed by Scruton, as we have seen, as hope. lessly, 
introspectivelB. This is noL to say that Scruton does not frequently 
hint at an alternative account as in his occasional excursions into 
quasi -phenom eno logical descrj-p'--. -. ons like that of the 'estuary' 
-ow, ards an 'evocative' rather than a storyl9, which do seem to point t 1-3 
'correspondence' view of 'L "' mental image. Yet at other times, he 
'i 
be 
seems to/sailing perilously close to positing a Humean hypostasized 
image - i. e. where it is the mental image itself which is attributed 
with perceptual features: 
images can be more or less vivid or intense, while remaining con- 
UA stant in respect of' detail.... It is a characteristic expression of 
visual imagery that one should screw up, or even close one', 3 
eyes, as though subjecting oneself to an impression, and the im- 
pression may be strong or not so strong when it finally comes. 
20 
Surely- one closes one's eyes not to qet an impression, but to get it 
less distractedly, by shutting out the intrusive perceptual world? 
Ultimately therefore, what is the 'xI that stubbornly remains 
after we have described our impression? The nearest that we ever get 
to it with Scruton is that it is an incorrigible, exper-Jential or 
I non-cogni L-ive I state of mind that necessarily can only be cli-larac- 
terized in a negative sort of wax/.. We know it when we have it, hlltt. 
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this does not add anything more to what vie can say about I 'L. In the 
end, one just has to hear the Schubert '-ri. plets a, -- tragically stumbl- 
ing, or see. Watteau's Embarkation to Cytherea as evocative of the 
Itransience. of human happiness' which, aST- have argued before, put 
this way, sounds like little more than an act of faith on the part of 
the speakers that the 'same' experience is being communicated. 
Before we come to alternative ways of approaching this problem 
however, let us first return to the other main difficulty in Scruton', -- 
account - namely, the decidedly unen-pirical way in which he stipulates 
the limits of our imaginative response to art. For Scruton, although 
the aesthetic world cannot help but share the same meanings as the 
real world, what charact -erizes the ces-thetically imaginative response 
I 
is that our normal beliefs and emotions are suspended, to be rep'Laced 
by the 'language game' of "entertaining as appropriate but unass- 
erted". I want to argue here that thils side of Scruton's position 
arises primarily from a problem in the analytic 'public language' 
account of the imagination, and in particular from the analytic answer 
to the question 'where does imagining take place? '. Now in a sense, 
the 'analytic' answer to this is two-fold. (a) It is not denied that 
our imaginative thoughts may be contingently accompanied by such 
things a-- mental images and 'sympathetic' bodily accompaniments to 
emotions which will, as such, have some kind of bodily location - 
although this is seen to be of little philosophic interest. (b) In 
another way however, it is seen as entirely the wrong sort of question 
to ask because, insofar as we are talking about the meaning of our 
images, e!, iotions and 'aspect' perceptions, then such thoughts are not 
the sort of things that can take place anywhere being, like Husserl's 
'empty intevitiors', a-positional, imageless and feeling-free. For 
analytic philosophers like Ryle and Wittgenstein then, -ýho are con- 
cerned to argue against any theory that would make meaning an extra- 
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linguistic, 'occult' accompaniment to the sign, A is C)f' jr-ý- 
difference whether our mastery of a de0cripti-or is or is not acco1r,! - 
panied by ary additional 'experience' like a mental jrpn-ge or bodily 
feeling - 
Meaning is -us little an experience as intending. But what dds- 
tingui3hes them from experience? - They have no experience con- 
tent. Fo- the contents (images for instance) which accompany and 
illustrate them are not the meaning or intending ... The language- 
game "I mean (or meant) this" (subsequent explanation of a word) 
is quite different from this one: "I thought of (x) as I said 
it. " The latter is akin to "It reminded me of (x. ), "21 
The view that such 'experiences' are expendable comes, as we have 
seen, from the fact that someone who experiences, imagines or feels 
something for the first time that he has hitherto only known by de- 
scription, would not be able to say any more about -it than what Ine 
could before. Thus the only difference, for example, between Sieg- 
fried knowing 'fear' by description and by acquaintance, on this 
ac-ount, would be the presence in the latter case of philosoph', cal"iy 
uninteresting shakes and trembles, possibly accomp-qnjed by 'mental 
PiCtUres' of impending disasters. For the analytic philccz)ph. -Ir then, 
there is no more to our understanding of an 'experience' Lhan Our 
mastery of the use of the concepts which it is instantiates. R. S. 
Peters, for example, in wri. ting of the emotions, argues that: 
My thesis... about the appraisals involved in emotion is riot that 
they provide very valuable evidence as to what the distinct emo- 
tions are; it is rather that these different appraisals are 
largely constitutive of the different emotions. 7 
On such a view then, the 'experience' or Imental state' is rele- 
gated to the status of a redundant appendage to the concept, serving 
at best, as in the case of 'mental images', a peripheral, illustrative 
or aide de memoire function, as in Wittganstein's 'llanguage-game' of 
"I thought of... -is I said i. t". Like book -i-Ilust-rations, such images 
function merf, --Ly as an a-Itt-mative way of picturing the same tý-, Jng, but 
as Wittgenstein says: 
it im inore essential to the understanding of a proposition 
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t that one shouId imagine anythin, ý in connection with it thcn thaL 
one should make a sketch of it. ' 
Images as 1-: uch, therefore, -can only arise as a by-product of our 
thought and not as something independent of it, from which -we can gain 
new knowledge - hence the "essential poverty" that Sartre attribUtes 
to this view of the image24. 
Can there be any justification then for positing an extra-lin- 
guistic 'experience' that 'animates' the sign, as both Scruton and 
Husserl (and not forgetting Kant) in their own ways maintain, if it 
cannot add anything signif-icant to the meaning? As we have seen, 
Husserl does not dispute that acts of meaning are quite independent of 
perceptual and imaginative acts. IL-Ake Wittgenstein, he points out 
that we can 'understand the meaning of a definite description like 
"There flies that blackbird" without seeing or imayining its ref- 
erence25, and the same goes for general propositions like "Huma-7, 
happiness is transient" whose meaning is clearly independent of an,, -, 
illustration that I might supply. For Husserl however, the irituiL- 
ional 'emptiness' of such purely semantic intentions has what one 
might call an experiential incompleteness about it that seeks 'intuit- 
ional fulfilment' in terms of the same thought becoming embodied, by 
degrees, in synthetic acts of perception and imagination - Closely 
-ic echoing, as we shall see later, Kant's similar account of 'a--sthet. 
ment. ideas' in para. 49 of The Critique of Judg There is -, o such 
provision in the 'analytic' account however, except in terms of our 
increasing mastery of the use of a concept - "In use it is alive, " 
says Wittgenstein26. Thus the 'analytic' philosopher does not so much 
look at the world as 'look' at how we use words. 1t, would be wrong to 
think however that on the phenomenolugacal accGunt, the words simply 
'drop away' c;,. ice 'intu-Jt.. *Lc3-, iz, l fulf -L-Iment' is attained, since images, 
percepLions, and feeling, - are c-as shot through w-: I-th intentionality as 
their 'empty' Oounterpa -, ts. As Cowley L poants out: 
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v,, c-1 rl 'd ý---ýs we exoraýýs cr describe -t is inse, I parable from the 
viorl, di itself. Thus the disti-nct; ion between the fa. -t and the statement, thr. real. and the true, the state of afi-airs &nd our descy-iption of it, always tends to disappeor. Our experi-ence i- 
not sepai-able from our power to say, to express and to dde- 
scribe . 
27 
However, although images, as well as aspect-perceptionS, and emotions, 
are inescap. 
_,, 
ably 'thoughts' in this sense, as they are also for 
Scruton, 'thoughts' in the sense of 'empty intentions' are not images. 
Images do not intend their objects just as meanings, as thoughts do. 
To try to understand just how 'intuitional fulfilment' does in- 
tend its object, let Lis now attempt to see how the phenomenological 
answer to the question "Where does imagining take place? " differs tFrom 
the empiricist an, d 'analytic' accounts. Like the similar acts of per- 
ception and Feeling, 'Imagining something' in the phenoi-pienological. 
4 account i. s seen to be a 'fulfilling' act, the essence of whIch is that 
something should appear to us, if only partially -a 'presence' that 
IS I immanent in our field of awareness, although posited as absent or 
non-existent (as in the case of fictional 'worlds'). As Sartre says: 
The essential choracter of the mental image is a certain way an 
object has of being absent within its very presence. 28 
This imaginative 'presence' Is not however 'immanent' in the same way 
that a Humean 'image' is held to be (i. e. as itself an hypostasized 
intentional object) since at., eve. cy point it is turned outwards towards 
a free-standing Intentiona-i object, posited as either real. or imag. Jn- 
ary, and of which the imaginec; 'presence' represents a view from a 
certain viewpoint (N. B. I have already discussed the free-standing 
status of fictional objects on page 137. ) 1 can, for ex(ample, measure 
the height of this tree, feel the roughness of its bark, be moved by 
its beauty, or imagine myself doing all these things (e. g. as when I 
try to est Mato the height of the tree frcm memory); but what I canno. ý 
measure., feel, or 13e moved by, as Cowley points out29, i. s my image of 
the tree in the sense of a Humpar, 'representative perception' sirir-: ý 
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what I intend is the tree itself as seen or imagined e. g. 'from over 
here'. As we shall see later, this particular viewpoint will also 
implicate others as Ig raduall y build up a 'ful l' intuition. For the 
phenomenologist therefore, I know how my experience is, not by lob- 
serving I it intrGspectively as the' empiricists conceived, but rather 
through directly having it, as when I touch the tree, or imagine it in 
blossom when it has only just come into bud. What matters is not how 
I come to see the tree in this way (since this question, insofar as it 
presupposes an 'objective' world independent of the human mind, is 
"bracketed off"), but rather that I do see the tree in this way, ever 
more fully through a proliferation of appearance8 held together by the 
imagination. 
ol 
Thus, far-from belonging to a class of 'free-standing' objects 
inside our consciousness (which would be to render it logically pri- 
vate), the imaginative 'presence' is 'transparent' before what it 
intends, in the sense that any object, real or fictional becomes such 
an appearance when considered from a point of view. How e1se in fact 
could we experience any object, person or state of affairs except from 
a positional, and therefore partial viewpoint - though as we shall see 
in more detail later, such viewpoints may gradually come to encompass 
a much wider view than what is given in the initial experience insofar 
as we seek to 'picture' the object in its entirety - as when we hear 
not just a note or brief phrase of music, but the whole melody in 
which it is enveloped, as Husserl points out in The Phenomenology of 
I 
Internal Time-Consciousness30. The object itself (e. g. the melody), 
like the meaning towards which the 'empty intention' is directed, 
remains the same, although elusive, throughout - unlike my positional 
intuitions of it which may be changing all the time, as human con- 
sciousness in general tends to do, in virtue of its restless, con- 
St2ntly &-, nging standpoints. 
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Whether or not such an 1-imimanent awai-eness' can be rendered in 
public language (esr,, -ýcially as regards its affective and aesthetic as- 
pecLs) As another matter, and certainly insofar ass 'phenomenological 
description' is claiming to be a 'language' of direct access to first- 
person positionality, it is attempting the impossible. Nonetheless, 
insofar as the intentional object of the description is not logically 
private, the possibility of communication is always there, although in 
a way that may have to be intimated rather than stated insofar C-1-0 the 
statement stops short at the third-person 'empty intention' level. 
Now insofar as Scruton, in his various references to phenomenology3l 
seems invariably to be equating its view of 'presence' with that of a 
hypostasized mental image, then he has clearly misrepresented Sartre's 
thinking on the subject. For Sartre there is no such thing. Husserl, 
on the other hand, is perhaps more ambivalent, and indeed Sartre him- 
self at one point accuses him of such a lapse: 
We cannot admit that the image comes 'to fill in' an empty ccn- 
sciousness: it is itself a consciousness. It seems that in this 
theory Husserl was the victim of the illusion of immanence ... 
32 
However, in turning his back on phenomenology, Scruton does cut 
himself off from the rich account of 'intuitional fulfilment' as 
itself a mental act (adding not meaning but positionality to the 
underlying thought), which, I would suggest, is just what would give 
his own account of 'knowledge by acquaintance' the extra 'body' that 
it needs. Not that lintuitional fulfilment' is the whole stcry of 
'embodied thought' however, for as we shall see when we come to Kant's 
account of the 'aesthetic idea', not only further imaginative 'fulfil- 
ments', but also further, related thouqhts (along with their imagin- 
ativa 'fulfilments') are generated by the initial starting point. 
From a phenomenological point of v-i--,., v then, 'P)eperierice', whether 
perceptual, imaginative cr affective (and mostly, as we shall see, Jt 
is all three together) always entails the adoption oiý a posii-ional, -s 
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opposed to a merely conreptual viewpoint - 'positional' because it 
emanates from an eff. 'Oodied subject towards an independent object. As 
we have seen, unlike the meaning towards which the lempty intention' 
is directed (,, jhich is 'empty' precisely because it is a-positional, 
imageless and not an object of feeling), the object towards which the 
'intuitional fulfilment' is directed unwraps itself in space and time 
as we strive to realize an overall picture. This 'picture' or Isyn- 
thesis' is achieved in varying degrees of fullness as we 'walk around' 
the object, either in reality or in our imagination, or view it from 
different emotional standpoints, or again from the historical 'posit- 
ionality' of our class, culture and education - or, if it is some 
general theme, such as 'the transience of human happiness', imagining 
various ways in which it might be embodied (e. g. as Watteau 'pictures' 
it in The Embarkation to Cytherea). As such, it represents the ful- 
filment of the disembodi. e%-' 'em. pty intention'. As Sartre puts it: 
When I think of a cube by means of a concrete concept, I think of 
its six sides ano eigh'q angles all at once... I am at the centre 
of my idea, I seize ii iii its entirety at one glance... This is 
the reason why we can never perceive a thought nor think a per- 
ception. The two phenomena are radically distinct: The one is 
knowledge which is conscious of itself and which places itself at 
once at the centre of the object; the other is a synthetic unity 
of a multiýlicity of appearances, which slowly serves its appren- 
ticeship. 3 
Nonetheless, if for Hussei-I as much as for Wittgenstein, meaning 
is "untouched by the flux of our subjective picturing"34, then we 
still need to ask why and when 'intuitional fulfilment' is held to be 
necessary in order to understand the underlying thought of a descrip- 
tion - rather than simply being seen as a phenomenon which 
has a temp- 
orary and expendable role to play. Now clearly it can't be necessary 
in tha case of the those intuitions that merely serve to verify some 
definite description, since once we have 'read off' the relevant 
aspectsq the intuition has served it function and drops away. Nor can 
intuitions have more than a temporary Utility in those cases where ive 
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produce illustrative or COUnter-illustrative examples to test out some 
general proposi. tio. -,, since as Warnock points out (echoing Scruton's 
main objection Ito the 'cognitive' view of art): 
It is a necessary feature of an exam le or illustration that it 
should be theoretically dispensable. 
N 
Perhaps at this point, the evidence of language itself can come 
to our aid. Significantly, we do talk of 'experiencing', 'imagining' 
or 'feeling' the 'full force' of meanings, rather like being 
confronted with a Platonic archetype, as when we say "As I looked at 
The Embarkation to Cytherea, I felt- the full force of the transience 
of human happiness! " Never, however, do. we speak of 'knowing' the 
full force of something, except in an 'acquaintance' sense. This is 
because whereas the 'empty intention' is not the kind of entity that 
admits of degrees in terms of 'intensity' or 'fullness', the concept 
of 'experience' arguably ýn-es - as when we say "I knew it at the time 
I understood in a gencr3l sort of way e. g. the meaning of 'human 
happiness is transient') but only later, after experiencing its full 
force (when I looked at the painting, suffered the loss of a friend 
etc. ) did I realize/begin to re3lize what the expression intended. " 
We can't say anything more a-bout it than we could before, but what has 
changed is the position of our viewpoint of it as the meaning is 
'brought home' to us in varying degrees of 'fullness' - all of which 
is implied in the concept of 'realization'. As R. K. Elliott has 
pointed out: 
Typically, realization occurs owing to our experiencing for the 
first time some state of whose nature we are already able to give 
an account. We 'realize what it is' in the living of it. 36 
The 'order of learning' may sometimes be reversed howeverg as when an 
expcrience appears to us as strange and mysterious (e. g. Proust's mad- 
4 
eleine) and 'sends us off I in search of a mean . r. g. 
In fact, as far as 
aesthetic experience is concerned, týis seems more likely to oc%-Iur in 
L 
je C a, ý, S t_ , -ia serise, the the case of the visual arts and music 'ýL _, _ in o, 
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'imagining' has already been done for us, at leas"L., up to a point), 
whereas literature would seem more often to commence with an 'empty 
intention' which moves towards imaginative 'fulfil. rnent'. 
Now one way that vie might attempt to characterize experiences 
such as the above is to --ay that they relate to a class of description 
(which includes not only our descriptions of aesthetic experience, but 
also works of art themselves qua descriptions) which intimate what 
cannot be fully conceptualized - as when an expression like 'the music 
is sad' (as discussed in Chapter Two) intends a perceptual configur- 
ation that goes beyond the normal, publicly accepted extensional 
'horizon' of 'sad; or when The Embark2tion to Cytherea (as discussed 
in Chapter Five) evokes, in Kant's words, "a multitude of thoughts and 
imagestt37 around the central image of the painting which could not 
fully be conveyed by even the most subtle conceptual unravelling Ok- 
the thought that 'human happiness is transient'. Such descripti0fis 
may be seen as coming to rest in an experience of what have beer 
called 'emergent' or Itertiory' configurations38 - i. e. those aspects 
of the perceptual or imagined object that are not automatically 
revealed either by its familiar features or, in advance of the intui- 
tion, by the concept which it is seen to be 'fulfilling'. Of course 
as Scruton has pointed out, such descriptions may 'paronymously' enter 
accepted usage over a period of time, just as a poetic image once 
fresh becomes conventional. Once such usage has become fully convent- 
ional however, perception then becomes automatic, or what Ruby Meager 
has called "the mere habit- facilitated immediate recognition of qual- 
ities patently possessed by objects"39. As a result, the necessity 
for intuitional fulfilment disappears and along with it, of course, 
the possibility of its continuing to be an aesthetic 
description. 
Why is ilt, then, that there are occasions when an underlying 
thought can only be partially conceptualized C-And 
depends for its ccm - 
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pletion not on further attempts at conceptual analysis, but rather on 
an 'intuitive fulfilment' of what can only be hinted at by the words' 
In such cases it may be argued that it is because 'Ehe 'empty intent- 
ion', which can only take place at the 'lowest common denominator', as 
it were, of public, third-person agreement tha[ so precccupies Scruton 
(and not without reason! ), is necessarily an abstraction, excluding 
the mass of positional reactions, perceptual, affective and imagin- 
ative which our perception of such novel 'emergent' configurations 
carries in its wake. The 'analytic' account of such experience, inso- 
far as it is based on a view of the self -suf f iciency of (a-positional) 
meaning, fails to account for how the incomplete 'empty intentions' of 
our thinking, and especially our thinking about art, here need to be 
I 
'realized' in image, perception and feeling in just the way that Ryle 
and Wittgenstein, in their concern to rid language of the 'occult', 
deny. As a result, the bodily location oil our experience tends to be 
neglected and instead, we find ourselves beir-, g considered as abstract 
minds occupying some epi. ste mo logical region inhabited only by 'third 
persons' of which we are one. Of course Ryle and Wittgenstein don't 
deny that we fiave a body, but tend to treat it 'externally' in the be- 
havioural sense, rather than as a location of a point of view. Thus 
'aspect perception' is seen as essentially viewing something from no 
particular position under the 'empty intention' of a public des. --rip- 
tion which the image serves merely to verify or exemplify as we 'read 
o. ff' the aspects. 
However, it is characteristic of descriptions that express a 
viewpoint, particularly where the intentional Gbject has an 'emergent' 
character that, in Husserl's words, "it is essentiaj to orient (their, 
actual meaning to the occurrence, the speaker and Ll; ie situationt14O - f- 
i. e. the hearer MUSt attempt to pult. himself in that same position, or 
as near as possible, in order to Ire3lid--e' either (a) the novel , 
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extensional application of the words, as in 'the music is sad', or (b) 
the thought that can never be more than partially conceptualized a, %- 
the a-positional 'logical', level, such as when a landscape comes to 
represent some particular emotional mood. Whereas the 'empty intent- 
ion' on its own is limited to guiding our thoughts along the public 
path of consistency and entailment, 'intuitional fulfilment', on the 
other hand, works on the freer and inevitably more subjective prin- 
ciple of our taking up possible viewpoints, real or imagined, from 
which hopefully, the 'emergent' configuration will shape up. It is 
here that the much looser, or what Ruby Meager calls the 'velvet 
glove' criterion of 'appropriateness' comes into its own. Insofar as 
our sense of such 'appropriateness' depends on our powers of imagin- 
f 
ation, perception and feeling which we all. possess in varying degrees, 
then this is potentially an area of education and particularly of 
aesthetic education that we should be seeking to develop, alongside 
the 'rational powers' that go with our 'empty intentions'. 
Before bringing this account of 'intuitional fulfilment' to a 
close, let us now finish off with what we set out to do, which was to 
look at the unempirical Inormativeness' of Scruton's position. How 
then does Scruton answer the question 'Where does imagi. nin-g take 
pl&ce? I As we have seen, there is no doubt that Scruton rejects the 
'self-sufficiency- of meaning' thesis in relation to aesthetic descrip- 
tions. However, for all his empiricist emphasis on special access to 
the work of art via 'knowledge by acquaintance', he ends up presenting 
us with a disengaged, contemplative paradigm, in which our imaginative 
response to art is over-narrowly defined by the way that we are supp- to 
osed voluntaril Yý 'entertain' the aesthetic object in a highly con- 
trolled sort of way. Thus aesthetic description J. -s subject 
to the 
guiding rule of "entertaining as appropriate but unasserted", entail- 
ing the SUspension cf all our normal '--, eliefs and emotions, the invol- 
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untary-nature of which is cont -rasted with the supremacy of +%. he will in 
imaginative acts. 
Scruton's argument here is determined, at least in part, by ar, 
acceptance ol the semantic demand that the aesthetic object be unam- 
biguously a world unto itself -a world moreover that must become ex- 
pendable if it Js seen to coincide in any way with the real world 
towards which our beliefs and feelings are properly directed. I have 
already questioned whether the 'aesthetic' is as unambiguous a term as 
Scruton imagines, and shall return to this point in another chapter. 
Scruton's view also owes much to Wittgenstein's account of 'aspect 
perception', particularly insofar as Wittgenstein seems to take the 
kind of mental effort that we have to make to see the duck as a rabbit 
as paradigniatic of the imagination at work: 
Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is 
such an order as "Imagine this", and also: : Now see the figure 
I sit4l Uke th-i 
This is a view of the primacy of the 'voluntary imagination' that I 
have also already questioned in relation to aesthetic aspect percep- 
tion. 
Most important of all, however, is that in his concern to satisfy 
the 'third person' criterion demanded by 'analytic' philosophy, 
Scruton has failed to appfeciate what phenomenologists have rightly 
drawn our attention towards and what has been a main theme of this 
chapter - namely, that all 'knowledge by acquaintance' must presuppose 
bodily-positionality. Notwithsltl-anding this however, he does present 
us with a 'position' of sorts from which we may view the work of art - 
namely, from the perspective of 'Apollonian' distance which, although 
clearly of crucial importance to art, is by no means the only position 
available to us. As a result, 'embodi. -d thought' for Scruton tends to 
be something that is only embodied in the work of art itself and not I 
at all in the body of the viewer aitt-hough to be f(-3ir he does not 
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consistently maintain this position, as is indicated by the 1warmth and 
vividness with which he invariably describes his encounters with 
individual works of art, such as the Schubert sonata. 
Nonetheless, at a stroke, Scruton's criterion of controlled dis- 
tancing rules out whole 2reas of the wilder shores of the 'involuntary 
imagination' with its special relationship to (a) 'sympathetic' bodily 
responses, of which Sartre has rightly pointed out: 
The entire body participates in the make-up of the image... There 
are no feelings without a harmony of bodily phenomena42 
and (b) the 'secondary' associations of the 'empirical ego' which, de- 
spite the ever-present dangers of inappropriate and self-indulgent 
fantasizing, must nonetheless have a richer significance for the in- 
dividual concerned than that yielded by 'standard' public meaning. 
Moreover, the fact that many such associations shade off into more 
public 'secondary associations' as generated within a particular cul- 
ture or community (such as the association between 'forests' ano' 
'childhood' mentioned earlier), should warn us against operating vjiLlh 
too conventional a view of the concept of 'meaning' here. The dis- 
Unction between the 'primary' and 'secondary' meanings of a word must 
always, up to a point, be a grey area (as with the very similar, and 
related problem of where one draws the 'intentional horizon' around 
the work of art itself, that we shall be exploring in the next 
chapter). However, somewhere between the totally impersonal. meaning 
U4 of the 'standard case' of a word's usage and the q ite random associa- 
tions generated by chance encounters that it may have for someone 
(like the significance of the madeleine for Proust's Marcel), there 
would seem to be a more personal side to the concept of 'meaning' than 
ch may well be germane on occasions to our Scruton allows for, whi. 
appreciatlon of a work of art's significance. 
it is a further consequence of Scruton's stipulative position 
that the work of art itse-lf is seen to function paradi-gimatically in 
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terms of 3, haping and controlling our response, rather than exciting 
it43, which rules out the possibility that works of arlt. i,, iay, and in 
fact often are intended to provoke both kinds of response, -and that 
insight into the work may be achieved as much by the excitement of the 
'involuntary imagination' as by its reflective counterpart. In many 
cases moreover, reflection and excitement can stimulate each other, 
producing the kind of viewpoint that Nietzsche has evocatively 
compared to: 
that marvellous combination possessed by a noble wine, which at 
once heats the blood and induces meditation. 44 
There is no provision in Scruton's account then for what Ruby Meager 
has called: 
a power in the (aesthetic) object to invade our experience, 
rather than a- feature of the object to be noted duly by a refined 
exercise in intelligence. 45 
A properly empirical enquiry can't afford to be selective in this way, 
ignoring the wany-sidedness of the imagination's role in art, which we 
know 'from experience' may range far and wide around the central con- 
- and have no obvious limit in so doJ tent Mg. In fact, letting our 
imaginative response have a free rein and seeing where this takes us 
(just as we might wander around a city 'where the spirit guides' in 
order to discover its atmosphere) would seem to be just as much an 
essential condition for 'reflective' thought as the demand to rid our 
thinking, as far as possible, of preconceptions. 
Underlying the whole argument so far must be the assumption that 
works of art themselves are typically 'realizations' in visual, mental 
and musical images of underlying themes which are intimated but can 
never be fully conceptualized - as when the familiar thought that 
'human happiness is transient' becomes transformed by the imaginative 
and perceptual 'plenitude' and affectJv- 'intens-it,., ' of Watteau's . A- w 
painting, but not in a way that can be adequately 'put into words'. 
This is fpore- nr less the vieý, i put 11"ort-vard by Kant in para. 49 of the 
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Critique, where he suggests that it is a characteristic purpose Of al''L 
to 'represent' concepts and themes in the form of an ? aesthetic ideal 
which: 
cannot become a cognition because it is an intuition of the imag- 
ination for which an adequate concept can never be found. 46 
Kant particularly, but not only, has in mind here the attempt of the 
artist to 'represent' (or in the most successful cases, to 'express") 
those 'rational ideas' such as the idea of 'immortality' or the summum 
bonum which can only be hinted at by 'intuition' owino to their nou- 
menal nature - an aspect of the 'aesthetic ideal that I shall leave 
aside for present purposes. Thus for Kant: 
The poet ventures to. realize to sense, rational ideas of invis- 
ible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation 
etc.; or even if he deals with things of which there are examples 
in experience - e. g. death, envy and all vices, also love, fame 
and the like - he tries, by means of imagination... to go beyond 
the limits of experience and to present them to sense with a com- 
pleteness of which there is no example in nature. 47 
Such a view, of course, goes against Kant's earlier argument in flhe 
section on 'The Judgment of Taste148 that 'representation' in art be- 
longs to the sub-class of 'dependent beauty. However insofar as I 
want primarily to focus on Kant's 'phenomenological' presentation of 
the workings ol the 'aesthetic ideal, I shall leave aside his rich and 
complex argument that seeks to establish an essential link between 
such ideas and the concept of 'beauty'. 
Where the work of art comes into its own, then, is in its power 
or qeist, qua laesthetic idea', to intimate experiences that relate to 
the underlying thought which the thought on its own cannot completely 
reach. As such, it generates in the minds of the audience both a 
flood of further images, insofar as it: 
is a representation of the imagination, annexed to a given con- 
cept with which, J_, nf the free employment of the ii-9, agination, sucli .1 a muItitude ol partial represenLations are bOUnd up that no ex- 
pression indicating a definite concept can be found for it. 405 
and much ajore thought, insofar as it induces: 
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on its own account, such a wealth of thought as would never admA 
of comprehension in a definite concept. 50 
-. both imacies and thoughts being individually 'partial', but collect- 
ively aiming at the whole content of the 'aesthetic idea' -which con- 
tains the thoughts. Clearly the idea of 'emergent' configuration is 
at work here, in that an 'aesthetic idea' involves a 'manifold' of the 
imagination, the constituents of which have to be felt to cohere, 
which arises from the special pleasure involved in seeing the config- 
uration 'shape up', e. g. as when the details of Watteau's painting 
shape up into an image of transient happiness - although, as with aes- 
thetic response in general, the coherence can't derive from a rule im- 
posed in advance by the theme or concept being embodied, as this would 
bE! to reduce'it to the level of a more or less adequate illustration 
(or linstance), and hence would render it expendable. 
So what artually happens when we undergo such an experience? On 
the one hand, e2ch further thought (i. e. the 'empty intention') that 
the laesthetic J. deal provokes (e. g. the thought that 'one might dedi- 
-e to such cate one's life to the pursuit of pleasure as an antidol. 
transience') will itself seek further 'intuitional fulfilments' (i. e., 
images of pleasure) both within and, by implication, beyond the paint- 
ing. These in turn will lead to yet further thoughts and their 'ful- 
filments' and so on, as our reflections enter into the state of 'free 
play'. On the other hand, each further intluition generated by the 
above thoughts (whether it is an 'aspect-perception' perceived 'in' 
the painting, or a 'mental image' of something absent but implied) 
will implicate yet further images of what it 'gives on to' insofar as 
each individual image embodies only a partial viewpoint (i. e. from a 
particular spatial, temporal-, emotional or other such position). For 
example, in looking at Watteau's painting I might be drawn to see the 
bay through the eyes of one of the departing lovers, or actually .1 
-: 1 on bward the boat bound for Cytherea, and imagine m. yself setting sa. 
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give- myself up to images of that destination, voluptuouýs or senti- 
mental. This in turn might lead me to 'wander' aiiong related images 
of the classical past or my own past, engendering pangs of regret at 
the brevity of such happiness and so on. At the furthest 'horizon' of 
such 'harmonious free play of the imagination and understanding', we 
may' even find it hard to tell whether what we are aware of is a 
thought or an image, as the 'aesthetic idea' ripples ever wider out- 
wards. 
At this point one naturally wants to ask how we can ever know 
whether such a response is legitimately intimated by the painting. 
The short answer to this is that it must be a matter of very sensitive 
judgment for which no hard and fast rules can be given - for if one 
accepts the Kantian view of the 'inexhaustibility' of great works of 
art, there can be no specifiable limits, although equally, this does 
not mean that just ý! ny response goes. Here in fact, we may get some 
help from Husserl's argument that all such partial 'intuitional ful- 
filments' of the object as we may have will be intentionally ambiguous 
as between (a) our immediate consciousness of the appearance of some- 
thing at a particular point in time (e. g. that part of the melody that 
we are presently hearing) or space (e. g. the landscape seen from point 
'a'), and (b) its directedness towards the free-standing laeAhetic 
ideal as seen from this particular position. This idea it. -self remains 
elusively the 'same' throughout all our partial views of it although 
at the same time, it becomes increasingly implicated in each succeed- 
ing intuition - e. g. the 'whole' melody that we only 'hear' on reach- 
ing the last bar, or the 'whole' of Paris that is implicated in this 
view of a street cafe. Thus, although any particular intuitional ful- 
filment can only ever be a partial one, in virtue of its positionali-I. -y 
(i. e. the appearance can only be given 'from the front', 'from the 
side', 'at this moment in time' etc. ), it always contains imp1icitly 
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much more than is immediately given. As Husserl says of our temporal 
consciousness: 
Thu now-apprehension is the nucleus of a comet's tail of retent- 
ions referring to earl-Jer 'now points'. 51 
so that each moment of 'lived experience' contains within itself its 
immediate past (without which there could be no awareness of 'time'), 
which in turn contains the immediate past of that moment, and so on, 
back to the beginning and forward to the end of our temporal con- 
sciousness of the object. Thus, the snatch of music that we actually 
hear at any one time becomes increasingly modified and enriched as the 
rest of the melody before and after becomes implicated in it (just as 
of course, every, other part of the melody is being modified at the 
same time, which gives sorne idea of the phenomenological complexity of 
the process! ) - e. g. as when the simple melody on which Bach based the 
Goldberq Variations sounds quite different when we hear it once again 
at the end of ail the variations, from our first encounter with it at 
the beginning. 
The potentiality of partial intuition to intend synthetically the 
'whole' configuration in a kind of epiphany, whereby, in Husserl's 
words: 
Thoughts repose as if satisfied in the sight of their object 
52 
is quite the most remarkable achievement of the imagination, and also 
helps to explain (as was discussed on p. 138) why a Ivivid' image has 
little connection with 'one-to-one correspondence - the latter being 
an impossibility anyway, since real 'one-to-one' correspondence would 
necessitate hearing the melody 'all at once' as opposed to 'hearing' 
it implicated say in the last chord, or seeing the object from all 
points of view at once - another impossibility, despite the reckless 
attempts of some Cubist paintings to do just that! 
in responding to the 'aesthet. iQ idea' then, we gradually gather 
up all the partial viewpoints, spatjo-,, efnpo. T., qj, L emotional, personal 
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and cultural into an lemergenL' configuration that, in the case of 
great art, may move us to our depths. It is often said, as it is by 
Kant, that such works of art are 'inexhaustible' becaLlse no thought, 
however comprehensive, nor intuition, however synthetic, could yield 
fully the 'emergent' configuration in its totality. As Sartre says: 
The reader... knows that he could always go further in his read- 
ing, and that he could always create more profoundly, and this is 
why the work appears to him inexhaustible and impenetrable as an 
object. 53 
However, it would be a mistake to apply this 'inexhaustibility' crit- 
errion too stringently insofar as many enjoyable though 'minor' works 
of art would certainly wither away beneath the strain! 
To summarize then: (1) It would seem reasonable to assume that as 
'a matter of fact, most works of art 'represent' underlying theme3 and 
concepts in the Kantian sense, and that this is an e3sential part of 
their value, despite the attempt of the 'formalist' to dcwngrade this 
side of art by 'sticking to the letter' of the laesthetlcl. (2) When 
we ask someone to see a work of art under some general theme or 
concept, we are indeed trying to intimate something that cannot be 
'realized' by a grasp of the words alone - namely, our experience of a 
unique 'emergent' configuration from an embodied positional viewpointg 
which is where 'imagination takes place'. This notion of 'position- 
ality seems to be more helpful than 4.. Ihat of 
Scruton's more obscure 
use of 'knowledge -by acquaintance'. (3) Insofar as we have related 
the work to a concept or theme, we have not left the world of language 
. behind us, as long as we remember that the relation between the 
thought and its embodiment is not a tight one of fully determinate 
concept to expendable illustration, but rather the more intimate one 
of 'appropriateness' arising from the experience. (4) Although aes- 
thetic experience is, by its nature, too ,, ubjective for os to be able 
to specify some ideal viewpoint, we may nonetheless question our sense 
of 'appropriateness' by turning our 2ttention away fro, ii the aesthetic 
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object and towards the position from which we are vievjJing it. As 
Merleau-Ponty says: 
Reflection loosens the intentional threads that bind us to the 
world, and thus brings them to our notice. 54 
f 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: Is there a necessary 'horizon' to the work or art? 
- the intentional ambiquity of aesthetic response. 
In the last chapter, it was argued that the work of art typical]y 
'gives onto' an ever widening intentional horizon, implicating many 
thoughts and images that are not strictly given within its own horizon 
- i. e. within the manifest text of the novel, the ccmplete performance 
of a piece of music or the total appearance of the painting within its 
frame. Of course the power to evoke in this manner is not exclusive 
to works of art. As Osborne has pointed out, the thought of 'a bi- 
cycle built for two', over and above its primary meaning, may "throw 
the image of a past decade on the reader'. s mental screen"l. Apart 
from whatever private associations that objects of any kind may evoke, 
this is particularly true in all those cases where the idea in 
question carries with it a predictable range of publicly established 
'secondary' associations arising from a cultural background - for 
example, forests, ancient ruins, the sea shore, tower blocks and 
starry skies. Only too often with such familiar symbols, of course, 
the associative horizon appears in an automatic and stereotyped way - 
a conventionality much exploited by the cinema in particular. How- 
ever this need not preclude the possibility of a more contemplative 
less pre-determined response when, as in the case of works of art, we 
-owards us, intimations of a new and may feel, like a wind blowing t 
unfamiliar horizon that promises to take us beyond strictly convent- 
ional , pre-determined associations. 
The possibility Of objects and states of affairs other than works 
of art generating such evocativeness rules out, then, the presence of 
evocativeness as a sufficient condition for something to count as a 
work of art although wc may still accept Kant's insistence that the 
rever. 4,, e induced by the evocative image may be aesthetically relevan't-, 
ic responses OT and appropriate --, -nsofar as 
it counteracts the automat' 
L -o the prosaic percept'-ion and conventional assocýjation that blind ub IL 
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aesthetic aspect of things. Perhaps this should not worry us unduly, 
however, since where we find such contemplative states arising from 
objects and situations in real life, the non-artist is probabiy 
getting as near as he or she ever will to experiencing the free play 
of the imagination and understanding that the artist experiences in 
the act of creation. Furthermore, the ability of the teacher to help 
pupils experience such contemplative states for themselves and in so 
doing to go beyond habitual responses is clearly an important precon- 
dition for generating aesthetic creativity in the classroom. This, in 
turn, raises the problem as to how such contemplation, with its ess- 
ential ingredient of indeterminacy, can be encouraged to take shape in 
poetry, paint, movement, etc. without the child falling back on m. ore 
I 
conventional perceptual or mental images. Both influences may be seen 
at work, for example, in the following couplet written by a ten year 
old girl that I once taught, in which the conventional description of 
the first line is quite transformed by the evocativeness of the 
second: 
The sea is rough, the sea is calm, 
But I cannot hold it in my palm. (Julie Turner) 
However, the main problem that I want to tackle now is this: if, 
as has been argued, the work of art typically evokes more than it 
chows, then where, if at all, can we draw a line around the 'proper' 
object of aesthetic response that will both (a) preserve its dis- 
tinctive identity, and (b) retain its evocative links with the wider 
world? The problem arises because, as it stands, the work of art it- 
self would seem to be the intentional object of aesthetic response, 
and yet at the same time, the work of art also seems to be directing a 
quasi-intentional glance towards the worId that it is evoking -a 
glance that we arc-, invited to share. Thus on the one hC-Ind, the work 
itself may be experienced from different viewpointa, as when our eye 
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wanders around the landscape thUL constitutes the imaginary world olf 
Watteau's painting or savcurs its over-all structure; on the other. 
hand, the same painting may be seen as itsell giving a positional v4jew 
onto objects, emotions and states of affairs that might or do exist in 
the primary world. Between these two ways of approaching the work of 
art, a tension is set up insofar as attention to the first obscures 
the work's significance in relation to anything beyond itself, while 
attention to the latter leads to the apparent 'disappearance' of the 
work before what it intends since, as we have seen in the argument 
against the hypostasized image, it is not the image itself which is 
the object of our thought, but what it is an image of. 
Many aesthetic theories, including Scruton's, take this under- 
lying ambiguity to be self-contradictory, and therefore tend to come 
down on one side or the other. Since any theory that treats the work 
of art as a totally expendable carrier of meaning must cut the ground 
from under its own feet as an aesthetJ. -c 
theory, let us first look at 
the alternative position before examining whether this posited ambig- 
uity is, in fact, as disastrous as it seems. The alternative position 
then, which has considerably dominated aesthetic theory in recent 
years, seeks to limit our responses to that which is self -suf f iciently 
'ii-, ' the work of art itself. Such an 'autonomist' view comes in two 
basic guises - (a) The first version, originating in 18th century aes- 
thetics as exemplified by The Analytic of the Beautiful. section in 
Kant's Critique and deriving a new-found strength from 20th century 
abstract art, is of course the 'formalism' which posits 'pure' aesth- 
etic qualities as the autonomous and self-justifying goal of aesthetic 
response - the only kind of response worthy of that name. (b) The 
second version is more commonly associated with Jiteratur. - on account 
of the virtual impossibility of achieving 'pure' form with words alone 
- 
fo-A 
what could that be like, divorced from any significance, except 
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something like the babble of 'concrete' poetry? This version, then, 
argues that the work of art is constituted by a Isecondary world'. of 
the i. maginat2on, to be enjoyed just as much as aesthetic form 'for its 
own sake', and in no way to be confused with the primary world towards 
which our beliefs and emotions are properly directed, however much it 
may resemble that world. Kant, while not totally embracing this view 
himself, conveniently summarizes it in the Critique: 
The imagination ... is very powerful in creating another nature, as 
it were, out of the material that actual nature gives it. We 
entertain ourselves with A when experience becomes too common- 
place ... 
2 
There are basically two main objections that I want to advance 
against such 'autonomist' positions as the above, although both are so 
intimately 6onnectej-- that it is not easy to treat them separately. 
The first one, based on an appeal to our experience of art, is that 
the 'autonomous' account makes it impossible for us to take works of 
.1 
art seriously. The second objection is that the very idea of auto- 
nomous 'significant' form is a logical impossibility. 
(A) The arqument from experience - Here, the main problem for the 
'autonomist' argument, in both its versions, is that it cannot ulti- 
mately explain the seriousness with which many people take art over 
and above its hedonistic value -a problem that Kant, as we have 
seen, realized only too vvell when he abandoned the ' formalism' of the 
earlier part of the Critj.. que in favour of the far i-. iore catholic 'aes- 
thetic ideal. If all connections with non-formal considerations were 
severed, then it becomes very difficult to see how one could take what 
is left, i. e. 'pure' form, with any more seriousness than one would 
take e. g. patterned wallpaper. Insofar a3 this residue is seen to be 
the proper object of aesthetic attention, then ;. t would seem that the 
experience i,. iist soon becomne tedious not to mention virtual-ly unin- 
telligible -since, in the absence of any significance, what is there to 
quide us beyond the arblx-trary whims of the artist? This is not, 
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however, intended as a reductio ad absurdum of allegedly 'formalist' 
works of art, but only of the dogmatism inherent in any extreme appli- 
cation of Iformalistl principles. In some such cases it may be poss- 
ible that the apparently 'pure' aesthetic response is simply attribut- 
able to the hypnotic properties of certain combinations of colours of 
rhythms. In the main, however, I want to argue that very few works of 
art as a matter of fact may be seen to fall completely under the 
category of 'pure' (i. e. non-signifying) form. This is because, if we 
rule out the unadulterated hedonism of the type exemplified by 
HuysmanS I Des Esseintes, then it would seem that an unacknowledged 
metaphysical or quasi-religious aspect is hovering in the background 
of most 'formalist' claims, as it does more explicitly in Kant's 
adcount of the 'sublime'. Even Clive Bell, perhaps the most celebr- 
ated 'formalist' of all, from time to time toys with a 'meta- 
physical hypothesis, as when, in moments of intense contemplation of 
- form', he a- Isigniiicant serts that: 
We become aware of its essential reality, cf the God in every- 
thing, of the universal in the particular, of the all-pervading 
rhythm. 3 
Furthermore, despite the preoccupations of many 20th century painters 
with what Picasso has called: 
An art dealing primarily with forms2 and when a form is r-alized, 
it is there to live its own life4 
equally, many such painters, from Cezanne onwards, h9ve seen their 
work as reaching through to a more profound reality than that which is 
accessible to ordinary perception or abstract thoughtg as for example 
in the following comment of Braque on the genesis of Cubism: 
When objects shattered into fragments appeared in my paintings 
about 1909, this for me was a way of getting closer to the ob- 
ject. 5 
But then to admit this, which in Braque's case often involved 2 
celebration. of the objects and events of everyday lite, is to reintra- 
duce signil-icance into the work of art, thereby undermining the 'auto- 
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nuirdst' thesis, as Bell, like Kant, must have been only too well aware 
when he postulated his own Imetaphysical hypothesis'. 
Nonetheless, the limitations of the postulated 'formalist' hori- 
zon may be powerfully felt, in the case for example of much atonal 
music and non-representational art insofar as their evolution has been 
conceived of by the artist in terms of exclusively 'formal' consider- 
ations - as when serial and atonal music came about as a reaction to 
the 'exhaustion' of Western tonality by composers like Wagner and 
Mahler. Without the manifest concern of these earlier composers with 
fundamental human issues however, such music came to be experienced by 
many people as arbitrary and virtually unintelligible. Where such 
music does happen to move us in a serious and sustained sort of way 
I 
(e. g. Webern's 'Five orchestral pieces') then I should want to argue 
that this is only because, over and ýEbove whatever aesthetic pleasure 
'gurations of sound, they also we may take in these particular conf.. 
happen to evoke for us non-formal thou ght. -C), , emotions and images that 
may easily be mistaken by devoted followers of such music for a purely J 
formal response. 
This ambiguity of the 'aesthetic' horizon pursues us even in 
those seemingly 'pure' cases, as when we talk of the 'inner logic' of 
nevi musical developments like the twelve-tone row, since our use of 
, logic, here (Iike the similar formal employment of 'balance' and 
'p. coportion') inevitably borrows from our normal use of the term as 
Much as it also depends for its 'paronymousl extension in each par- 
ticular case on our less predetermined powers of aspect perception. 
Fugues, for example, have their own elusive kind of 'entailment'. As 
Wittqenstein points out of our experience of musi. c, in Culture and 
Value: 
If I say for instance: here it's as though a conclusion were 
being drawn, here as though someone were expressing disagreement, 
or as though this were a reply to ý-jhat came before, - mv under. - 
s %- ing of i'L presupposes my fa: -, iliarity with conclusicl, ), ex- standJ 
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pressions of agreement, replies. 6 
What the 'autonomist' argument also chooses to ignore here is that -the 
perceptual features which give rise to the experience of aesthetic 
form, such as flowing lines and receding planess, the hues and intens- 
ities of colours, the proportions of cubes and cones etc. USUally 
start off in life as features of something familiar in the primary 
world such as mountains, rooftops, buildings, horizons and the curves 
of t he human body - though the artist may expressively highlight, re- 
arrange or 'distort' them - techniques which, after all, are of the 
essence of 'abstract' art. 'Abstract' art in other words must always 
be an abstraction of some original perception. Without this link to 
the primary world or to some further, posited 'reality', then it would 
f 
seem impossible to take art seriously, nor would it seem possible to 
enjoy it for long, without getting thoroughly bored. 
I The second version of the 'autonomy' thesis, while escaping 1. -ýie 
charge of boredom, likewise entails the 'non-serious' view of art in- 
sofar as it inevitably leads on to the trivializing, popular view of 
art as entertainment pure and simple - as when we talk of a 'rattling 
good yarn'. In the Scrutonian version it may appear, of course, as a 
very high-level intellectual. pastime wherein we cultivate the 'enter- 
taining' of an 'unasserted' secondary world, but in the end hov. can we 
take this any more seriously than a good game of chess? 
Nonetheless, such appeals to experience as this, it has to be 
admitted, work both wa I ys. Great claims have been made for the ser- 
iousness of the 'pure' aesthetic response. Joyce, for example, refers 
in Ulysses to: 
The luminous, silent stasis of aesthetic pleasure. 
Bell's writing, like Scruton l, -:,, is full of, equally powerful appeols 
to 
experience to support the seriousness of his claims - as when he 
suggests that no one who has not experienced the full force of 'signi- 
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ficatiL form': 
can ever guess at the austere and thrilljný rzptures of those who 
have 6i. mbed the cold, white peaks of art. 
Could 'pure' form alone really sustain such a lofty response for long? 
Since all such experiential appeals tend to be inconclusive either 
way, let us now turn to the second objection, mentioned on page 166. 
(B) The logical argument - In both versions of the 'autonomy' 
thesis, for all their dependence on experiential appeals, the over- 
riding impetus is the logical one - i. e., if our response to the aesth- 
etic object goes beyond the horizon of 'significant form' or the un- 
asserted secondary world, then it must cease to be a response to the 
work of art qua work of art. However, before examining the logical 
pr. oblems to '-which this view gives rise (especially for the first 
version), it is worth pausing for a moment to consider the historical 
background to such a 'transcendent' claim insofar as this may shed 
some light on the powerful influence of 'formalism' in contemporary 
aesthetics. 
From this point of view then, the drive towards lautcnomy' along 
with the corresponding rejection of 'naturalism' that characterizes so 
much contemporary aesthetic theory may be likened in some respects to 
the way in which earlier philosophers like Locke saw a main part of 
their task as freeing scientific enquiry from the irrel. -vQncies of 
cosmology and theology. Thus for writers like Harold Gsbo-Ane8, lauto- 
nomist' aesthetics represents not a transient phase of cultural 
history through which we are now passing, but rather an increase in 
our understanding of what art is all about - i. e. of what is distinct- 
ively aesthetic. Such a 'transcendent' view seeks to find confirm- 
ation, as we have see, not only in the Tormalist' preoccupations' of' 
so much _"Oth _, entury Westarn art and also cross-culturally e. g. 
in the 
arts of Japan arid Africa, but also retrospectively in showing that the 
disti-netil ,.,, ely* aesthetic ,, ias been present in human artelactS SiFIC6 
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earliest times, though often obscured by more immediate and obvious 
functional and representational ends - Cis when a , ave painter despite 
his immediate concern to work some kind of 'magic' on the hunted 
animal, may have nonetheless been spontaneou3ly moved by the beautifUl 
curve running along the nelck of such a creature and expressed I[his in I 
his painting, which we may still feel three thousand years later. 
However, can we so easily separate the logical refinements 
leading to the 'autonomist' position from its more arbitrary origins 
in a particular phase of our cultural history, especially when such a 
position is also so heavily dependent on experiential appeals? In the 
last chapter, it was argued that any account of 'experience' must make 
reference to, the phenomenon of posit JLonality, and that this includes 
not only a spatio-temporal dimension but also an historical-cultural 
one9. Interestingly Scruton himself raises at one point the question 
of thee historical and cultural positionality of 'autonomist' aesth- 
etics, though only to dismiss it as of little philosophical interest: 
It can be argued, and to a certain extent persuasively I[hat the 
supposed intuition of an autonomist character ir. aesthetic 
ap'preciation is nothing more than the reflection of a transient 
historical bias in favour of one sort of attitude to art, which 
has no more right to be classified as the mode of aesthetic 
appreciation than any other. 10 
Though the historical location of 'autonomist' aesthetics would not in 
itself constitute a necessary objection to its 'transcendent' impe'LUS, 
nonetheless it ought certainly to have a bearing on the empirical 
side of the inquiry insofar as the 'autonomist' is searching for an 
experiential base to his theory in human nature, as Hume did for ex- 
ample in his account of an 'educated public' and as Bell does in his 
account of our capacity to feel laestlict[ic emotion'. For Scruton's 
avowedly 'empiricist' aesthetic the historical location ought to be of 
more than passinq intereSt. In his article 'Aesthetic Ins-trument- 
alism', Diffey is qUite explicit that over and above any logical 
grounds : 
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4C (the) commitment to aesthet. Lc autonomy is something histori ally located, something manifest in an attitude to art that has been 
gaining in st-ength since the 18th century to a- position of 
dominance today. 11 
This is not the place to enter into any lengthy speculation as to why 
this should be so, but if the above objections to the 'autonomist' 
I ew thesis are justified, then there is no doubt that asthe autoqoMistLfilters 
V, 
down through our educational system, the arts will come to be seen by 
many people as increasingly peripheral to our serious needs. 
Of course writers like Scruton and Osborne don't deny that non- 
aesthetic beliefs, emotions and values may as a matter of fact be 
powerfully present j. n the way that we sometimes respond to works of 
art. However their presence is seen rather as, at best, an essential 
preliminary to the aesthetic response proper where they simply wither 
away. Thus, as Osborne points out in Abstraction and Artifice in 20th 
Century Artl2, much of our ability to detect the formal structure even 
of veicy 'abstract' painting, must necessarily be dependent on our 
first recognizing any representational element that is present however 
minimally - e. g. as when our purely 'formal' pleasure in a gracefully 
curving line is inevitably modified as regards the emphasis and impact 
of the 'emergent' aesthetic qualities, upon our recognizing that it is 
the curve of a naked breast or torso. 
Just how vie are -'Lo put ap. ide this non-aesthetic aspect remains 
something of an enigma however, as does the requirement made by 
Cubists like Juan Gris that we are to see e. g. a Cubist 'guitar' not 
in any way as a distorted real guitar, expressively reconstituted, but 
rather as a 'purel aesthetic object in its own right. Seen thus, 
whether the Iguitarl ( 4L-f one can still call it that) is the central 
fr-p-ture of the work or, as is more often the case, part of a larger 
1 emergent' configuration, then in the end it becomes merely a 
dispens- 
able peg on which to hang the garment of 'pure' form. 
But how, one 
wonders, could Lhe lemergent' aesthetic confinueation stay 
the s3lme 
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once we excludad any kind of nuii-aesthetic significance from it? As 
Wittgenstein has pointed oul. -, the dependence of formal configurationo 
on expressive and representative elements is such that they cannot be 
separated without drastic modification of the former, as when a 
picture of a smile when turned upside down ce3ses to be a smile - so 
the formalist thesis must be wrong: 
Two schools: 
(1) "What matters is the patches of colour (and lines - S). 11 (2) "What matters is the expression on these faces. " 
In a sense these two don't contradict one other. Only (1) 
doesn't make clear that the different patches have different 
importance, and that different 
, 
alterations have totally different 
effects: some make all the difference in the world. 
"A picture Must be good even if you look at A upside down. " 
Then, the smile may not be noticeable. 13 
Thus Kandinsky's often quoted remark that he discovered the pos-sib-A. - 
I 
ity of 'non-representational' art through accidentally seeing one of 
his pictures on its side and being thrilled by it14 is misleading, to 
say the least. 
Furthermore, once we have recognized the guitar (or the smile) as 
SLIch, how, one wonders, could we compel ourselves not to see it in any 
way as a guitar, however much its appearance may be expressively 
modified -a guitar moreover that may distinctively evoke much else, 
expressing perhaps the pleasures of caf6 life, the charms of music or 
even the transience of human happiness? In this respect, it is not 
just that we h. ave been conditioned, as Osborne has argued15, by a 
cultural tradit;, on deriving from the Greeks that happens to view art 
as paradigmatically representational, ut pictura poesis, but rather 
that every sign (be it symbolic, iconic or expressive), however mini- 
mally present in the work of art is, necessarily, intentional - 
pointing towards, expressing or evoking what it signifies. Thus, even 
if we were able to detach ourselves from any non-aesthet. ic signifi- 
cances in the work of art and view what was left as a totally self*- 
sufficient configuration, then we wolold really just be looking at 
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culoured patches, squiggles and blotches which would literally be 
insignificant, though perhaps of passing curiosity value - certain"Ly 
'significant form' would be a misnomer here. 
It would seem therefore that either 'pure' form is covertly sign- 
ificant, or else unintelligible - though as I have already suggested, 
most works of art with 'formalist' pretensions really fall into the 
former category. The confusion here seems to have arisen because 
'significance' in art has too often been simply equated with the 
aspiration towards one-to-one correspondence - the least fruitful of 
all aesthetic goals, as Plato was the first to point out in his crit- 
ique of 'mimesis'. Thus, the many other ways in which works of art 
can intend something beyond themselves was, theoretically at any rate, 
I 
overlooked, though in practice it was precisely these rich avenues of 
e. g. symbolism, evocativeness, expressiveness and abstraction that the 
modern movement so successfully explored. As Herbert Read points out, 
though it is rather stating the obvious: 
Exactitude is not truth is the thesis of the whole of the modern 
period in art. 16 
The second version of the 'autonomy' argument, on the other hand, 
clearly escapes the charge of insignificance insofar as it is held 
that the work of art signifies an imaginary world. However, as I have 
argued earlier, insofar as this imaginary or 'secondary' world is held 
to be lunasserted' 'in any way, then this makes it exceedingly diffi- 
cult to take the work of art seriously - unless that is, a relation- 
ship can be established between the 'secondary' and 'primary' worlds 
in virtue of the ambiguity of the imaginary object which is the theme 
that I intend to explore in the second half of this chapter. 
One final objection remains to be made againot the Iformalist' 
position. Insofa,, -- as 
the artist himse-If is indi I fercrit towards the 
objects and states of affairs that he portrays in his work except in- 
sofar as thcjr shape offers hJLm a chance to exploit certain ae, -, 'L-. hetic 
174 
possibilities, then this indifFerence towards the primary world be- 
comes actually objectionabIe - compared with the reverence, for ex- 
ample, with which Van Gogh approaches a humble chair. Yet if, on '. -he 
other hand, we can see e. g. Cubist still-lifes not only as breaking up 
the familiar world into exquisite crystalline structures, but also as 
celebrating in a novel and expressive way the simple pleasures of 
everyday life - the caf6, the meal, listening to music etc. - then the 
problems of insignificance and indifference to the primary world dis- 
appear, but only of course at the price of abandoning the extreme 
'autonomist' position. 
Though at times the most hardened lautonomists' seem to waver, as 
in the case of Osborne's interesting suggestion in The Art of Appreci- 
I 
ation that we may be able simultaneously to see the work of art as 
both 'abstract' and representational at one and the same time, in the 
end, as Elliott points out in his review of that book: 
He makes concessions to the critics of Formalism , but powerfully 
reaffirms its essential spiri. t. 17 
The same might also be said of Scruton, who starts off with the firm 
intent to avoid any position in which "aesthetic interest will become 
-an entirely autonomous and unrelated section of human activityvil8, but 
ends up with a powerful defence of the second version of the 'auto- 
nomy I thesis. Thus, as we have seenl9, like Osborne he allows an 
enabling role for'our knowledge of the work's content and cultural 
context, but only as a prelude to entertaining it as an unasserted 
secondary world. 
Nowhere, then, is it considered that the concept of the 'aesth- 
eti c' might itself be seen as systematically ambiguous - causing us 
both to look inwardly towards the hor-i-con of the work's formal values 
and the 'secondary' world that it displays to our immediate gaze, arid 
yet also outwardly towards what the work thematically intends within 
the horizon of +4-he primary world - j,,, Ist as we may try 'Lo understand a 
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person as an autonomous being inhabiting the world as viewed by us, or 
try to seto the vjorl. ý, ' "through their eyes", and in fact it is exceed- 
ingly difficult to separate the two. In arguing for the systematic 
ambiguity of the aesthetic object, however, it must be emphasized that 
this is an ambiguity that is irreducible in either direction, be it 
towards the dogmatism of the 'autonomist' or the insensitivity of the 
'cognitivist' position towards which 'analytic' aesthetics tends. Of 
course insofar as the aesthetic object does signify, then as with any 
other sign it cannot be the same as what it signifies - except in the 
special sense that I shall come onto later, that the IxI intended may 
seem on occasions to enter into the sign and perhaps for a brief, epi- 
phanous moment take possession of it. However, unlike conventionally 
iconic and expressive signs (such as 'children crossing' signs, smiles 
and frowns), and also unlike the expendable aide de memoire mental 
images of memory and illustrative thinking, the work of art qua image 
may also be viewed as an object of interest in 41-ts own right - i.. e. 
not just for what it intends, but as an intentional object in it, _, 
self 
(the painting of Paul, as opposed to Paul himself). As Merl. eau-Pority 
says of the role of the perceptual image in art: 
The picture and the actor's mimicry are not devices to be 
borrowed from the real world in order to signify prosaic things 
which are absent. 20 
If 'borrowing from the real world' were seen to be the prime function 
of art, then of course such a view would be subject to all Plato's 
f amiliar objections as to the pointlessness of mimetic art understood 
as aspiring to one-to-one correspondence. 
It is of the essence of the aesthetic object, however, that what- 
ever it intends as its subject matter, and however closely its appear- 
ance may approximate to itq nonetheless it must always -involve some 
transformation of our conventional view of the intended Y, however 
1 
minimal. This creative feature of all aesthetic objects will StiJLI 
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not justify the 'autonomist' case however, since 'creativity' under- 
stood as imaginative transformation must itself always be intention- 
ally ambiguous. Aesthetic transformai, jon, however radical (c. g. 
Mondrian's tree), must always be a transformation of something. Thus, 
while the aesthetic object must always bring to light some new aspect 
of the intended IxI, it must nonetheless s'Lill refer to the intended 
IxI in some way, or it could not count as 'transformation' of that 
'x',, This clearly applies to those works of art that evoke an absent 
primary world, as Dickens evokes the world of the Victorian child, 
while at the same time presenting us with a transformation of that 
primary world into something more heightened and unified, aesth- 
etically and dramatically, than would ever have been found in the 
I 
ori ginal. It would also apply to those non-existent worlds like Alice 
in Wonderland which, however fantastic, MLISt always borrow their 
material from the primary world (which in this example is also the 
world of the Victorian child), though dramatically rearranging it. 
At the very heart of this posited ambiguity lies the enigmatic 
status of the work of art as 'imaginary object' - and which, for pre- 
sent purposes, I shall take to be synonymous with the 'aesthetic 
object'. It is the reality of this 'imaginary object' which would 
appear to be the most fundamental presupposition of Scruton's account 
of the imagination, in the sense that to know something imaginatively 
'by acquaintance' must presuppose that we are in the presence of some- 
thing more than just an 'empty intention'. It is to the experience of 
this 'imaginary object' Wittgenstein refers when he says that: 
the flashiný of an aspect on us seems h3lf visual experience, 
half though, 
' temp- though such a way of talking always carries tý., ith it the greateoL 
tation to posit 'private' mental objects, independent of the thought. 
Nonetheless, even for Wittgenstein, there i. s an underlying ambiguity 
cl k, in our ta)k 2bOLIt imagination, as in '-he following cOmment w1here he 
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seems to be implying that the iýule of the image in 'aspect perception' 
is both a something arid a nothing: 
'Seeing as.... ' is not part of perce, S ,)ti on. And for that rea on it is like seeing and again not like. 22 
Insofar as the posited 'imaginary object' may be seen as an intent- 
ional object in its own right, though not to be confused with what it 
intends (which is what leads to the hypostasization of the image), it 
would seem to resist the attempts of 'analy, '. -ic' philosophers like Ryle 
and Ishiguro to reduce it to a bare thought - just as 'much as it also 
resists the 'autonomist' attempt to deny its intentional connections 
with the primary world in virtue of its significatory function. In 
this respect, the having of an image - is clearly inseparable from in- 
'tending what it is an image of. 
Having thus examined in the first half of this chapter some of 
the shortcomings of the posited horizon which the lautonon, ist' would 
place around the aesthetic object, let us now return once again to 
that horizon entailed by the 'analytic' account of the imagination in- 
sofar as it argues for he total Itransparency' of the image before 
what it intends - the image being like Wittgenste; M's ladder that we 
throw away once having climbed it, since it is only regarded as an 
alternative way of 'picturing' the same thought. Thus Ishiguro, for 
example, says of the perceptual image that: 
If I can be said to see anything in a picture or photograph, it 
is only objects or persons and not images or portraits of objects 
and persons. 23 
But if the ambiguity of the 'imaginary object' is accepted, then this 
is only half the story. The problem with this account, as with 
Ryle's, is that, whether we are dealing Wi'Lh mental or perceptual 
'imaginary objects', then, insofar as the irtended obj ect is posited 
p04 as absent or non-existent, even though our thougM-s ii! ay be inting 
'in the right direction', we find ourselves in the strange position of 
imagining nothing at all, which is, in fact, identical with what Ryle 
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calls 'pretending to see'. We may observe this, for example, in 
Ryle's uneasy formu'Lation that: 
Roughly, imaging occurs, but images are not seen. 24 
Now, apart from the obvious problems that this creates for the 
'analytic' position in giving an account 'perceptual' images - of the 
offered us by painting, cinema, the pl2stic arts etc., there are per- 
haps two main reasons why a formulation such as Ryle's doesn't sound 
quite right - the first being on experiential grounds, and the second 
deriving from the Ilogical grammar' of 'imagining': (A) The first 
problem is simply that of the recalcitrant vividness of the 'imaginary 
object' itself, over and above the vividness with which it enables us 
to evoke that which is absent or non-existent. That this was a major 
problem for Ryle is illustrated by a paper that he gave to the 
Colloque de Royaumont in 1961, in which he looks once again at the 
notion that when someone is 'hearing a tune in his head': 
he must be in fact thinkinq how the tune goes... without its being 
played and without humming it... But what stopped me was that I 
4 did not know what more to say on this notion of thinking how the 
tune qoes. For a man can say, even with an air of surprise "It 
was almost as if I really heard the notes". The kind of thinking 
in which he was engaged was so lively and had such a degree of 
resemblance with the real thing, that it led him to compare the 
notes which he had simply thought, to heard notes, with however, 
this crucial difference that the notes in thought viere only notes 
in thought, but were not heard at all... It is because of this 
concept of quasi-sensory vivacity of auditorily imaginej notes, 
among other things, that I was sure of not having succeeded in 
finding my way. 25 
As such, this 'quasi-sensory vivacity' may be seen as a remarkable 
empirical feature of the human mind, a capacity more developed in some 
people than others, which cannot be fully squared with the logical 
demands of intent-ionality. Thus, though the intentional object of my 
thoughts may be e. g. an absent or ideal, but never actually performed, 
performance of the closing chords of a Beethoven quartet, the chords 
that ring out in my imagination may, in some cases, have sufficient 
presence to stand in for the actual performance. To insist that such 
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an experience is still only to be regarded as ' the ý LiSojdýht of how the 
tune goes', or worse still, 'pretending to hear it. , 
is to stretch our 
concepts of 'thinking' and 'pretending' far beyond what we normally 
understand by them - though in passing, it should also perhaps be 
pointed out that the music example is rather a special case insofar as 
it is also, at least in part, a memory image. As such it may owe a 
good deal of its vividness to the reactivation of the emotions that 
were evoked at the time of hearing the original performance. In the 
same way, as Cowley rightly argues in A Critique of British Empiri- 
cism: 
To imagine an infuriating situation that arose yesterday is 
actually to be angry all over again, not just to remember one was 
angry. 26 
(Bý It is riot only on experiential grounds, however, thit it is nece- 
ssary to argue for the 'presence' of the limaginary object' over and 
above what it intends. In order to imagine the 'world' evoked by a 
piece of literature, to 'see' those aspects in a painting that are not 
strictly given by its positional appearance, or 'hear' in our imagin- 
ation the closing chords of a symphony or the sound of Braque's 
guitar, something must be present to us over and above the thought, Rr 
we could not distinguish between thinkinq and imaqinj-nq. To imagine 
something in its absence or non-existent, then, cannot be just to 
think about it but in some sense to perceive it in the guise of an 
analogue which, in the case of the aesthetic limaginary object', would 
seem to be an essential precondition for realizing the work in the 
kind of 'fullness' outlined in the last chapter. It is in order to 
make this necessary distinction between the 'empty intention' and its 
'intuitional fulfil-ment' that Husserl rightly argues that in the case 
of both the 'inner' perception of imagination and 'outer' percepti. on: 
It is of the essence of perception that something shou- 
in it. -27 
ld appear 
Thus to rec-Aliz*e the poJint of a request I ike Wittgenste-irils, "Now see 
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the figure like this"28, a grasp of the inttended thought alone will. 
not guarnntee the requisite sense of appropriateness unless one 
actually apprehends e. g. Olga's face in Picasso's cubes, or the 
'transience of human happiness' in The Embarkation to Cytherea. This 
is, of course, the lynch-pin of Scruton's argument. 
Now, clearly, the response of 'pretending to see' won't do at all 
here. We would certainly not be complying with the request to see 
Olga in Picasso's painting if we only pretended to see her when in 
reality all we saw was a jumble of cubes! There are limits to our 
powers of self-deception and the full absurdity becomes only too 
apparent when we 'pretend to see' the 'transience of human happiness' 
in The 'Embarkation to Cytherea - though perhaps this type of 'pre- 
tencel is practised more often than we realize by pupils who are 
simply eager to please their teacher. There is, however, another and 
more acceptable sense of 'pretending to see' which may occur in the 
follow-JiLng type of si. tuation29. Sometimes, a teacher may be, for ex- 
ample, reading a vivid passage of poetry to the class while seeing 
vividly 'in his mind's eye' the poem's content - e. g. Porphyro's 
ffie 
vision of Madeline at her prayers, bathed intmulti-coloured moonlight 
that floods down through the stained glass in Keats' St. Aqnes Eve. 
Upon looking up at the row of aces before himq he observes nothing 
but blankness. The children are not imagining the content of the poem 
at all, nor even going through the motions of pretending to see what 
h'e sees. He therefore puts on an act and pretends himself to see what 
is, in fact, vividly present to him, 'Looking up at the high casement 
window and then down at the enchanting figure beside the bed, adopting 
what he takes to be the amazed expression on Porphyro's face, and so 
on. However, though all this mimicry may legitimately be described as 
1pretend-ing to see', its real aim is precisely to produce in the 
pupils the very mental image of the poem's content which Ryle reqards 
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as unnecessary. As with Socrates' view 01' the philosopher as teacher, 
it is thus that the ooetry teacher acts as 'midwife' to 'the children's 
imagination - though, as always, he is up against the involuntary s-*Lde 
of imagination, particularly where powerful emotions are concerned, 
which I have already discussed and shall return to. 
Can the 'analytic' philosopher, then, distinguish between the act 
of thinking of Y in its absence, and imagining it? In her paper on 
Imagination Ishiguro seems to suggest that the distinction both can 
and can't be drawn - perhaps echoing the remark of Wittgenstein's 
quoted at the bottom of page 177 of this chapter. Thus, on the one 
hand a degree of autonomy is granted to the image in those kinds of 
cases like the one where I remember someone's face but only later 
remember that it is the face of an old friend. In such cases, the 
thought e. g. of the face alters, but the image remains constant30. 
Again, she seems to accept that our understanding of a verbal 
description does not guarantee that we will. be able to 'picture' the 
absent Ix' or see that aspect in the paintling that we are invited to 
see3l. Ishiguro regards this as a purposive activity that we need to 
cult i vat e. Indeed, at the end of the article, she goes on to set the 
very highest store by it: 
The skill - this exercise cl the imaqination - which enables one 
to be susceptible to seeing various aspects, or stop oneself from 
being captured by one aspect one sees - seems as important as 
training oneself to reason. 32 
Insofar as this is linked in Ishiguro's. paper with the view that: 
in the case of seeing images or aspects there is an added element 
of something beyond our control, of being an experience probably 
governed by causal factors we do not understand. 
33 
then it is very much in 1-ine with the view advanced in earlier chapt- 
ers of this thesis concerr. ing the involuntary side of the imaginaticn. 
On the other hand, like reflections in mirrors and unlike pictures 
that have a material base in paint and canvas, she holds that images 
only have an intentional existence which thus enab"Les her to advance 
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the view that: 
Mental images... can b, ý said to be 'in the same grammar' as our 
concept of mental images, because... they have no existence apart 
from the awareness of the person who is imagining the ob- 
jects. . . 
34 
and a little later: 
the 'grammar', or the logical features, of expressions or con- 
cepts can be ascribed to objects that fall under them only if the 
objects have no identity independently of our thoughts about 
them. Thoughts, images,... aspects, ... are primarily intention- 
al. 35 
Here, then, it does indeed look as if Ishiguro completely assimilates 
the mental image of IxI to the thought of it, thereby contradicting 
her earlier example of the imagined face that we only later 'put a 
name to'. Thus we are once again back to the familiar argument that 
it is not the image to which we ascribe aspects, but what it is an 
image of. In thinking of the sun, for example, "I do not see an 
orange image, " she says, "but an image of an orange object"36. Thus 
1 seeing' mental images is differentiated from the 'seeing X as Y' of 
the positionally located perceptual image, insofar as: 
In the case of mental images the X's disappear, as it were, and 
we are just left with the activities of 'seeing as yi. 37 
But what sense can we make of such an 'activity'? In order to talk of 
1 seeing' at all, however parasitically, there has to be somethi! jq 
which is present to us over and above the thought, and which is the 
image of IYI, even though it is the IYI itself that we intend. To 
Ualk of '. seeing as Y' (and note how we make an involuntary pause be- 
tween 'seeing' and 'as YI when we speak it, in order to fill in the 
obviously missing gap), sounds just as odd as Ryle's formula, since 
all we can really mean by it is that we are thinking of 'Y' without 
seeing it in any way at all - what Hussorl describes as an 'empty in- 
tention' J, -n 
fact. If this is all there is to lir-, iagining', then the 
distinction between imagining 'x' and thinking of it must surely 
collapse. 
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Once again we need the notion of the ambiguity of the 'imaginary 
object' to rescue us from this impasse, for it may be quite possible 
to be thinking of Y but seeing 'in our m. ind's eye' what we recogn. JL Jze 
to be an analogue which both resembles, however minimally and evokes 
further images and thoughts of the absent Ixt which we necessarily 
cannot see. For this to be possible, there is no question but that an 
image must appear. As Sartre argues: 
it is evident that the mental image must also have a material, 
and a material which derives its meaning solely from the intent- 
ion that animates it. To see this clearly I need only compare my 
initial empty intention with my mental image of Peter. At first 
I wanted to produce Peter out of the void, and then something 
loomed up which filled my intention. 38 
What this 'stuff' is which bears the aspects of the imaginary ohject 
, is really a question for the kind of speculative psychology in which 
Sartre engages in the Iatter half of The Psychology of Imagination. 
Sartre in fact, for whorg 'c, --, nsciousnessl is synonymous with a pure and 
I empty' intentionalUy di. -ifected towards the world (a position which 
closely resembles the 'analyLicl view of Imeaning), attributes the 
material out of which tl', Ie imaginary object is made to our conscious- 
ness) of the body: 
the entire body participates in the make-up of the image. 
39 
Thus, in looking at a Braque still-life, we may not only come to 
imagine a many-sided evocation of the visual aspects of cafe life, but 
also be led to 'hear' the sounds of animated conversation and strumm- 
ing gUitars, 'feel' the warmth from the stove, 'smell' the tobacco 
smoke and 'taste' the bowl of fruit - insofar as all these aspects are 
hinted at as contributing to the overall 'atmosphere' embodied in the 
painting. 
However, the question as to exactly what this 'stuff' is composed 
g4 of tvhich mu-kes such acts of the iM2 ination possible need' not concern 
us here. For present purposes it is sufficient to say only that its 
- b. - presupposed in order. to explain how such imogining us t existence mu 
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is possible, in much the same way that a 'rationalist, psycho-linguist 
like Chomsky fi-nds himself having to presuppc. -, e a 'biologically 
founded' innate Ilanguage acquisition device' in order to account for 
how language is possible in the first place. 
What really concerns us here is that insofar as it is accepted 
that the mental image does appear then, contrary to Ryle and Ishiguro, 
it does not constitute a separate category from the perceptual images 
of painting and the plastic arts and therefore it may be seen to share 
their intentional ambiguity. What can we say about this posited 
'mental image' without falling back on a Humean type of account? On 
the surface, it does look rather Humean as in Husserl's remark that: 
However far an imaginative presentation may lag behind its 
object, 'it has many features in common with it, more than that, 
it is like this object, depicts it, makes it real ly present to 
us. 40 
However, it is crucially important to gra . sp that this "laggi. ng behind" 
of the imaginary object is not to be understood in the -; 3me sense as 
that of the hypostasized 'mental image' - i. e. as an inescapably less 
vivid replica of the intended IxI than our actual perception of it 
would offer. Rather, I would suggest that it may be best understood 
as the mental counterpart to the perceptual images that we encounter 
in painting, cinema, drama, music etc. As has already been pointed 
out, the perceptual images offered to us by these art forms, to a 
greater or lez--ser degree, go some way towards doing oul- actual 
imagining for us, in the sense that our perception of such images - be 
they iconic, expressive or evocative, partial or multi-positional, as 
in Cubist painting - acts as a springboard, enabling us to 'picture' 
absent or non-existent worlds. In this respect, as has already been 
argued, the amount of detail in t-he image bears little relation to its 
vividness, C-: A-- in Jaapaneese prints v,, here two or three lines may power- 
fully suggest a whole landscape. As Sartre points out: 
In 4-h, -, act of consciousness the represonLative elor-nent and the 
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element of knowledge are united in a synthetic act... This is the 
reason why extremely poor and curtailed images, images which are 
reduced to a few --patial determinations, can nevertheless have a 
rich and prof(. -und meaning. 
41 
From this point of view, the aesthetic imaginary object is not like 
Wittgenstein's expend-able ladder because, without it, it would be 
impossible to evoke the kind of imaginary world that was discussed in 
the previous chapter. As Sartre points out in contrasting word and 
image: 
In its meaning, a word is but a land-mark: it presents itself, 
awakens a meaning, and this meaning never returns to the word but 
goes out to the thing and is dropped. In the case of a physical 
image, however, the intentionality constantly returns to the 
image-portrait. We face the portrait and we observe it; (It is 
this observation which becomes the quasi-observation in the case 
of the mental image); the imaginary consciousness of Peter is 
being constantly enriched ... 
42 
I 
We are now in a position to see how the connection between the 
mental images evoked by literary works and the perceptual images 
offered us by the visual arts is, in fact, a very close one. For 
example, some paintings, especially very 'abstract' ones like the 
Cubist presentation of music or caf6 life, merely hint alt an evoked 
world, placing heavy demands on the viewer to realize what is inti. - 
mated - which, as I have already suggested, may include the whole 
gamut of imagined sights, sounds, smells, tastes and touch, not just 
the visual dimension. In the same way, some literary descriptions, 
such as the following couplet from Milton's L'Alleqro: 
Such sights as youthful poets dream 
On summer eves by haunted stream 
by their very openness send the reader's thoughts and imagination off 
into an almost limitless reverie such as Kant describes in his account 
of the 'aesthetic ideal. The blank Chapter XXXVIII in Tristram Shandy 
in which Sterne invites the reader to compose his own description of 
the widow with whom Uncle Toby has fallen in love is perhaps an overly 
extreme exa. mple of this! 
Thei-e are other pai. -tings and "Literary works, however, which 
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achieve their effect in the opposite way through amassmg a vvealth of 
detail and thereby leaving much less room for ou-L imagination to go 
off on its o-. ýjn - as in Botticelli's Primavera which contains, among 
other things, over 150 identifiable species of wild flower native to 
Tuscany, or Dickens' description of the fog settling on London at the 
beginning of Bleak House which likewise achieves its effect through a 
prodigal accumulation of detail, though, as with the Primavera, each 
particular detail is subordinated to the overall, cumulative 'emerg- 
ent' configuration. 
Of course, whatever 'imaginary object' does rise up before us in 
such cases will require some justification by reference to the work of 
art itself as the intentional object of our response. If one goes too 
far beyond this horizon, then there is a draining away Of legitimacy - 
the work receding away from us like an out-going tide. This accounts 
for the tremendous authority that any 'autonomist' can command in 
calling for a return to the work of art itself. However, though the 
work must, to a greater or lesser extent, direct our respon-ces or it 
would be redundant, as Scruton never tires of telling us, this is not 
at all the same thing as exerting total control over them. How could 
it do that? To say, for example, as an 'autonomist' like Miargaret 
McDonald does, that: 
What Jane Austen tells of Emma Woodhouse eXhiaUstr, Emma Wood- 
house 43 
is either trivially true, in virtue of the stipulative identifica'Lion 
of the imaginary object with what is explicitly given in the text, or 
else quite inadequate as an account of the complex imaginary person 
that we build up. For example, there -i-- no mention of 
Emma eat-ing 
- does that mean that 6ve cannot legitimately breakfast in the text, but 
i, magine that 3he ever ate breakfast? Clearly our image of Emma Wood- 
house projects far beyrýnd what is immediately given in the t. --xt. In 
muCh the S: ame'way, as Ray Elliott. has po. Lnteu out to me, a rabbit', --') 
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foot disappearring of f the edge of a coml. Ic strip is legitiriately per- 
ceived by even the voungest child, not as a disembodied foot but as a I 
fast disappearing rabbit! 
In this respect, the lautonomist's' insistence on the self-suff- 
iciency of the work of art as itself the container of our responses is 
obscure, insofar as it fails to make clear how, in describing the 
work, I am describing my own experiences and feelings about it. It 
also fails to take into account the very varying demands that works of 
art, as a matter of fact, make on us with a view to realizing the 
lemergent' horizon implicit in whatever image that they immediately 
present to view. As a result, a very interesting evaluative question 
never gets askcd by the 'autonomist' (nor it might be added by many 
other aesthetic positions), which is this: what can the work of art 
reasonably ask of the reader, viewer or listener? Without doubt, Some 
works of art, especially of a very 'private' kind, ask too much, while 
perhaps it might be a criticism of other works of art that they don't 
ask enough of us, like T. V. '-)o, -, ip opera. -. There are also thos. - works 
of art which may demand much of the reader or viewer, as in the case 
of the Milton couplet above and virtually all Japanese hai. ku, but 
where we don't feel that too much is being asked of us. This is of 
course a pfoblem with which most teachers of arts subjects are all too 
f amil iiar. What can w. - reasonab expect 
in the way of an imaginative iv L 
response to speci f ic works of art from pupils, given their level of 
m aturity, experiential background etc.? As Sartre says of the reader: 
the work exists only at the exact level of his capacities; while 
he reads and creates, he knows that he can always go further in 
his reading, can always create more profoundly ... 
44 
Leaving aside this question for the moment, however, let us now 
return to the original problem of where, if at all, we may draw 
the 
horizon around the imaginary object, given its posited ambiguity. It 
is something like this ambiguity that Sartre seems to have 
in mind 
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when he refers to the essential dharacteristic of the mental. image as: 
a certain way an object has of being absent Within its very 
presence. 45 
Thus, in considering the mental image of a pair of beautiful white 
hands: 
Desire posits an object which is the affective equivalent of 
those hands: something transcendent, something which is not my- 
self, is given as the correlative of my consciousness. But at 
the same time... I am invaded by the knowledge that this something 
stands for Itwo hands,. 46 
Although it may seem a rather 'untidy' solution to the problem, 
offending the principle of 'Occam's razor', it does begin to look as 
though we have to accept the presence of a double horizon in our 
dealings with the imaginary object - according to whether we are 
attending to (a) the immediate appearance of the image itself 
_qEa 
intentional object, i. e. Sartre's 'affective equivalent' (wherein also 
its aesthetic- features lie insofar as they belong to the surface 
appearance of Lhe image), or to (b) that far wider and in some cases 
almost limidtless horizon onto which the imaginary object intentionally 
gives, and which is composed of a synthesis of positional viewpoints 
generated by the initial- appearance of the image. 
Though both horizons tend to eclipse each other, according to 
which one we are attending at the time; and though the thought is 
different in both cases insofar as in the first case we are thinking 
of the object as an image and in the second case our thoughts are 
directed towards what it is an image of - nonetheless, the movement 
between these two modes of attention may increasingly come to enrich 
both horizons. For example, we see 'through' The Embarkation to 
Cytherea to a proliferation of thoughts and images concerning the 
'transience of human happiness', but the pai. nting does not or need not 
'--; -, rtre's ment, ý! 'mage of the thereby 'disappear', any more than does E. v 
pair of hands. Rather we return to the painting with new eyes, and 
irp, ag- of the painting ma-v send us off again towards the then the a-I 
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primary world intended by its theme - although of course jt is the 
work of art as intentional object which must be allowed to direct the 
scope of this broader horizon, which different works of art do, as has 
been argued, in varying degrees. 
However, the movement between the two Inorizons does not stop 
there, for in moments of concentrated imaginative attention, the hori- 
zons may merge, if only briefly, when the absent or non-existent 'xI 
seems to enter epiphanously into the analogue, much as the god was 
thought to enter the statue in early forms of religion. Thus Sartre 
describes it: 
this spontaneity, this 'intention towards' Peter, causes this new 
phenomenon to flash forth, which is comparable to nothing else: 
the consciousness of the image. This consciousness represcntS a 
mental form. When consciousness assumes this form it gives rise 
for a moment to a stable appearance, then the form, carried by 
the current, disintegrates and vanishes. 47 
Such a 'mental form', which in Sartre's view is formed out of the con- 
sciousness of our body, escapes the charge of being a 'beetle in the 
box', because our ability to perceive it depends not upon introspect- 
ion alone, but in the first instance upon the thought that summons it 
up as a quasi-perceptual analogue for the absent Ix'. The 'stuff' of 
which it is composed resists the 'analytic' charge of 'privacy' not 
just on experientiCal grounds, but because the existence of the 'stuff' 
is an a priori presupposition without which we could not account for 
limaginJing' as a Mental act distinct from 'thinking'. As Scruton 
points out, having mental images is what we mean by imagining, and in 
talking of our images we naturally use the public language of per- 
ception: 
Indeed all our ways of referring to images seem to suggest an 
element of experience over and above the constitutive thOUght... 
When a man refers to an image that he has, he desCribts it in 
term-s of a genuine experience, the publicly observable form of 
which is familiar to us all: he will describe his visual image of 
X in terms that are equally appropriate to the experience of 
seeing X. He will imply that having an image of X is in some way 
like seeing X; if he does not acknnwledge this, then we say that 
he has not understood the concept of an image. 48 
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I would only add to this that insofar as the image arises from a dis- 
tinct kind of mental act bent upon realizing 'Lhe absent or non- 
existent IxI, then it has the dual status of being both analogue and 
sign which is what entails the two horizons distinguished in this 
chapter. It is this feature of the imagination that underlies the 
ambiguity of the 'Ckesthetic'. 
0 
191 
References in Chapter Seven 
1) OSBORNE, HAROLD 'The Language Metaphor in Art', in Journal of 
Aesthetic Educstion Vol. 18, No. I (Spring 1984), p. 13. 
2) KANT, IMMANUEL Criti. que of Jud_qment, translated by BERNARD, J. H. 
(New York and London, Hafner Publishing Company, 1966), para. 49. 
BELL, CLIVE Art (Londong Arrow Books Ltd., 1961) P-72. 
4) Quoted in READ, HERBERT A Concise History of Modern Paintinq 
(London, Thames and Hudson, 1961), p. 78. 
5) MULLINS, EDWIN Braque (London, Thames and Hudson, 1968), p. 55. 
6) WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG Culture and Value translated by WINCH, PETER 
(Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980), p. 52e. 
7) BELL, CLIVE op. cit. 
-, 
p. 42 - 
8) OSBORNE, HAROLD, Aesthetics and Art Theory (London, Longmans, Green 
and Co. Ltd., 1968), p. 185. 
9) See this thesis, Chapter Six, p. 146. 
10) SCRUTON, ROGER Art and Imaqination (London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 
1974), p. 20. 
11) DIFFEY, T. J. 'Aesthetic Instrumentalism', in British Journal of 
Aesthetics Vol. 22 (Autumn 1982), p. 345. 
12) OSBORNE, HAROLD Abstraction and Artifice in Twentieth Century Art 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 10. 
13) WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, 
Psycholoqy2__and__ Reliqious Belief, edited by BARRETT, CYRIL 
(Oxfoi-d, Basil Blackwell, 1967), pp. 34-5. 
14) Quoted in READ, HERBERT op. cit. p. 190. 
15) OSBORNE, HA'%HOLD Aesýhetics and Art Tb--ory (London, Longmans, Green 
and Co. Ltd., 1968), Introduction. 
16) READ, HERBERT op. it. p. 44. 
192 
17) ELLIOTT, R. K. review of OSBORNE, HAROLD The Apt of Appreciation, 
In British Journal of Aesthet A-cs Vol. 12 (Winter, 1972), pp. 751- j 
82. 
18) SCRUTON, ROGER op. cit., pP. 41-2. 
19) See this thesisq Chapter Four, p. 103. 
20) MERLEAU-PONTYý MAURICE The Primacy of Perception (U. S. A., North- 
western University Press, 1964), p. 164. 
21) WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG Philosophical Investigations, translated by 
ANSCOMBE, G. E. M. (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1963), IIxi, p. 197e. 
22) WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG. op. cit. 
_, 
IIxi, p. 197e. 
23) ISHIGURO, HIDE 'Imagination' in ProCeedinqs of the Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume XLI, 1.967, p. 48. 
24) RYLE, GILBERT The Corcept of Mind (Middlesex, Penguin Books 'Ltd., 
1966), p. 234. 
25) RYLE,, f GILBERT 'Phenomenology versus The Concept-of-Nind' in Collected 
Papers Vol. 1 (London, Hutchinson, 1971) P-194. I have here iised the tr- 
anslation to be fo, -ind 
in COWLEY, FRAZER, A Critique of British Empiric- 
ism (London, MacMillan, 1966) pp. 206-7. 
26) COWLEY, FRAZER op. cit. 1, p. 207. 
27) HUSSERL, EDMUND Logical 
_Investigations, 
Volume II, translated by' 
FINDLAY, J. N. (London, RouLledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 860. 
28) WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG op. cit., IIxi, p. 213e. 
29) 1 am grateful to Ray Elliott for this example. 
30) ISHIGURO, HIDE op. cit.., p. 51. 
ý1) ISHIGURO, HIDE op. cit., p. 52. 
32) ISHIGURO, HIDE op. cit. p. 55. 
33) ISHIGURO, HIDE op. cit., p. 53. 
_ýAt-, 
p. 49. 34) ISHIGURO, HIDE op. 
35) ISH1GUR-0, HlDE op. cit., pp. 53-4. 
36) 1SHIGURO, HIDE op. rit., p. 50. 
37) ISHIGURO, HIDE op. cit., p. 50. 
193 
38) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL The Psycholoqy ofthe Imagination, translated by 
anon. (London, flathuen and Co. Ltd. 9 1972)q p. IB. 
39) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL op. cit. 7 p. 157. 
40) HUSSERL, EDMUND p. 728. 
41) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL op. cit., p. 10. 
42) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL op. cit., p. 23. 
43) MACDONALD, MARGARET 'The Language of Fiction', in MARGOLIS, J. 
(Ed. ) Philosophy Looks at the Arts (New York, Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1962), p. 191. 
44) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL What is Literature?, translated by FRECHTMAN, B. 
(London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1950)q p. 32. 
45) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL The Psycholoqy of the Imagination, translated by 
anon. (London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1972), p. 81. 
46) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL op. cit., p. 81. 
47) SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL 02- Cit-ý P- 1000 
48) SCRUTON, ROGER op. cit., pp. 103-4. 
194 
CHAPTER LIGHT: Aesthetic education and the problem of 'oý;. iectivjtyl. 
For aestheti. c education, the most important j. mplicati. on to be 
i drawn from the 'experiential' thesks advanced so far, is this - 
teachers of arts subjects need to be concerned not just with what 
pupils and they themselves say abOLIt works of art (and the aesthetic- 
ally perceived environment in general), but also with the accompanying 
states of mind wherein the realization of the work through image, 
aspect and emotion takes place. They should be concerned for example, 
with the type of case where two pupils both manage to identify certain 
forms of music as 'sad', or certain kinds of poetry as 'slick' or 
'sentimental' on the basis of features in the work that they have 
learned to identify - yet while one of them feels the sadness or the 
I 
false note of sentimentality, the other feels nothing at all. Simil- 
arly, the same two pupils may both have understood at the level of art 
'empty intention' that Blake's Tyqer is about some superhuman energy 
that can barely be restrained by its creator - yet while one of them 
sees 'in his mind's eye' some bright 2nd fabulous creature being 
moulded by the hands of a god, or even imagines himself as this 
creature struggling to get f ree or as the god shaping or restraining 
him, the other pupil, though he may think these thoughts, imagines 
noi, hing, or perhaps, at best, simply a conventional tiger. 
For 'exper. iential' aesthetics, such mental images, aspect-per- 
ceptions and emotions are not simply desirable 'extras' to a public 
core of meaning that can survive without them. Rather, following the 
line of Kant and Scruton, the ultimate intelligibility of agreements 
in aesthetic judgment must itself depend upon the possibility of 
agreement 11i experiences of this kind. As ScrUton put it: 
The man who does not understand aeý3thet]-- description is the man 
who has no f3miliarity With the experiences 'that -4t. is used to 
express. 1 
Seen thus, aesthetic education would appear to be making a far greater 
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demand upon pupils than other areas of the curriculum where only 
agreement in judgment is aimed at - not necessarily more intellect- 
ually demanding Of COUrse, but demanding of other qualities such as 
the power to perceive, imagine and feel beyond what is obviously given 
by conceptual rules and 'everyday' perception. It is here, as has 
been argued, that the 'positional' realization of aesthetic meaning 
rests. 
What distinguishes aesthetic discourse on this argument is the 
intimate way in which our reports of such experience also aim at 
public judgments of the aesthetic object itself. Thus, if I claim 
that 'the music is sad', then I do not just see myself as reporting on 
some idiosyncratic experience as the early Empiricists assumed, but 
I 
rather reporting on an experience of the music itself - or rather of 
the intentional 'emergent' object that this particular combination of 
sounds has served to bring about. As we shall also be seeing in more 
detail later, this argument also presupposes that it is not just a 
'feeling' that is involved here (the early Empiricist view), but an 
'educated feeling'. Of course the 'sadness' is not 'in' the music in 
the same way -that e. g. the key of B flat is, and must therefore depend 
fer its realization on my powers of aspect perception. However, it 
often happens in such cases that we do not feel that we are speaking 
for ourselves alone (as we would if it were merely a 'judgment of per- 
scnal preference), bulk, rather on behalf of a posited sensitive and 
knowledgeable audience whose agreement we invite. Nonetheless, in 
inviting the pupils to hear the 'sadness' in the music that we can 
hear, we cannot be making the same kind of demand that the science 
teacher makes in inviting his pupils to verify for themseIves the faCt 
that water normally boils at 1001C. Rather, it is pýý, xt of the unusual.. 
'logic' of' aesthetic discourse, as Kant realized better than anyone, 
that wle do attempt to ground publicly valid judgments of objects on 
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peculiarly private feelings and responses - thereby making them most 
vulnerable to the sceptic. For the sceptic, sui-h 'judgments' will 
, than arbit inevitably appear as no morc t1rary fiats, arising either from 
the idiosyncratic make-up of the Kantian 'empirical ego', or from the 
equally contingent 'coll. ective subjectivity' embodied in the simple 
majority decision of a group, as discussed by Hamlyn in his paper on 
Objectivity2. 
Although a degree of objectivity must therefore be presupposed 
and defended in all such cases, this does not mean that we necessarily 
value aesthetic objectivity for its own sake - far from it in fact. 
It has been an underlying assumption of this thesis that the real 
value and richness of the aesthetic form of life lies in the pheno- 
menological, rather than in the epistemological arena - i. e. in the 
having of what we feel to be appropriate experiences of works of art, 
rather than in the pursuit of truth in the field of aesthetic judg-- 
ment. Of course in the sense that not just any experience of a work 
of art will count as an 'appropriate' one, an underlying iationality 
must always be presupposed, such as the one that Scruton posits in his 
notion, already alluded to, that to justify our aesthetic descrip- 
tions: 
may be to justify an experience and not a belief. 
3 
We would have to be exceptionally unimaginative and literal-minded, 
for example, to reject out of hand the claim that the cathedral may be 
seen as a crouching lion. On the other hand, there are limits. How- 
ever vivid our imagination, we should certainly look twice at someone 
who claimed to see it as a crouching frog! 
A degree of objectivity must therefore be established for the 
claims of 'experiential' aesthetics in order to ward Off 'the sceptic 
charge - f%-Ir if they were shown to be arbitrary, then 
the richly evoc- 
ative claim that the cathedral appears as a crouching lion would have 
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to be put on the same level as the absurd claim that it appears as a 
crouChing frog, and we would end up talking nonsense. However, vl: e 
must be very careful to separate the issue of establishing aesthe; -_ic 
education as a rational activity from the issue of what we most value 
about it. The importance of this distinction may be illustrated by 
the example of Hirst's argument in his article Literature and the Fine 
Arts as a Unique Form of Knowledqe4. Thus, on the one hand, Hirst is 
quite prepared to concede that the real value of art may lie in its 
experiential dimension, while the concern of the curriculum legit- 
imator with the pursuit of objectivity: 
may well. be the least interesting, indeed the least important or 
valuable, aspect of the arts. 5 
'- a view that is quite compatible with the position that I just 
advanced. On the other hand, like a latter-day Plato challenging the 
poets to defend themselves against their exclusion from The Republic 
(on his terms of course! ), Hirst demands that the apologist for aesth- 
etic education demonstrate its 'scientific' objectivity -a thesis 
that is clearly incompatible with my own insofar as I have argued, 
following Kant, that the 'aesthetic' (in both its narrow and wider 
senses, discussed in the previous chapter) can never wholly be 
captured by any predetermined rule. 
As we shall see later, it is not beholden on aesthetic education 
to meet such an absolute notion of 'objectivity' in order to demon- 
strate its educational value. If the 'experiential' thesis is to meet 
the sceptic's challenge therefore, it need not and in fact cannot be 
at the price of accepting any thesis, such as Hirst's, that demands 
hard and fast criteria for aesthetic truth. This is beCaUse any 
attempt to posit such 'rules' would be breaki-ng the one rule that, 
above a] I others, no theory of aesthetic education ct-An afford to 
ignore - namely that embodied in Kant's caveat that: 
There can be no rule according to vjhich anyone is to be forced to 
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recognize anything as be-La, utiful. 6 
Although Kant, as much as Hirst, is concerned to establish the uni- 
versality of aesthetic judgments, it cannot, for Kant, be at the price 
of by-passing the experience since, as for Scruton: 
the feeling of the sub 1ý ct, and not a concept of the object, is its determining ground. 
Furthermore, insofar as Kant argues later on in The Critique, that: 
We may describe beauty in general (whether natural or artificial) 
as the expression of aesthetic ideas8 
we may extend his caveat to cover our ability to realize the embodied 
'aesthetic ideal - in line with the arguments advanced in chapters Six 
and Seven of this thesis. Thus, our ability to realize Watteau's 
particular embodiment of ' the transience of human happiness' as much 
as our ability to feel the gracefulness in the music (and for Kant, 
the 'rational ideas' of freedom, the summum bonum etc. intimated by 
thi. s 'gracefulness), can never be given automatically by appeal to a 
conceptual rule or conventional act of perception, but must depend on 
our ability to produce the apprcpriate mental image or to see imagin- 
atively the emergent aspect. 
To go against Kant's caveat, as I shall show in detail later, 
would be to try to compel the aesthetic form of life to be something 
that it is not. The real question facing us, therefore, is not 
whether aesthetic appraisals such as the above need to be objective or 
not, since the very intelligibility of all aesthetic discourse must 
presume this. Rather, it is whether a claim can be made for an aesth- 
etic rationality that is both sufficient to refute the sceptic and 
which takes heed of Kant's caveat -a claim, in other words, that 
seeks to fit rationality to art, rather than, as in Hirst's case, art 
to rationality. Before examining the possibility of such a claiii-, 
further, let us first take a closer look at the two alternatilve theses 
already mentioned - namely (a) the sceptic's view that all so-ca'L"Led 
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'aesthetic judgments' are reducible to 'judgments' of personal prefer- 
ence - which would seem to rule out any possibility of laesthetic 
education', for what would there be to educate? (b) the view th2 t 
there are discoverable and fixed criteria for aesthetic truth, such as 
Hirst and Best, in their different ways, hope for - which would cer- 
tainly make an 'education' of sorts possible, but could it ever be 
described as an 'aesthetic' education? 
The sceptical thesis - The commonplace, sceptical belief that 
'beauty is in the eye of the beholder' (first encountered in Chapter 
One in the guise of the 'radical subjectivist' position) has entered 
almost as uncritically into modern-day Iverificationist' philosophy as 
it has hitherto entered into popular wi-sdom. Ayer, for example, makes 
the claim that: 
There is no sense in attributing objective validity to aesthetic 
judgimeots, and no possibility of arguing about questions of value 
in aestheticO 
The continui. ng ascendancy of this belief, deeply rooted even in many 
teachers (although their practice must necessarily deny it) and cer- 
tainly among older pupils, must go a long way to explain much of the 
ambivalence with which aesthetic education is viewed, since on this 
assumption, any attempt to develop aesthetic appreciation in pupils 
must seem quite artificial - tne imposition by fiat of the teacher's 
whims or the interest3 of the dominant social class. We may see this 
aSSLIMption at work in the following passage, typical of its kind: 
It must be understood that the so-called cultural heritage which 
made Europe great - the Bachs and Beethovens, the Shakespeares 
and Dantes, the Constables and Titians - is no longer communic- 
ating anything to the vast majority of Europe's population... It 
is bourgeois culture and therefore only immediately meaningful to 
that group. 10 
While not disagreeing with the first part of this statement as a 
likely although depressing empirical claim, let us note for the moment- 
that the widespread acceptance of the above type of argument creates 
all racute problefii for arLs Leachers in Lvio crucial areas, namely 
(a) 
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the aesthetically rich area of multi-cultural education, which must 
come to be seen as particularly arbitrary JJ, nsofar as no Itranscendent' 
viewpoint is allowed for, and (b) those areas where there is a notable 
gap between the 'established' arts traditions to which the passage 
refers, and the popular culture of the pupils. Music is perhaps the 
most noticeable example of this divide, although such a state of 
affairs has not always been the case. 'Classical' composers frequent- 
ly drew on popular melodies for inspiration, as Brahms, for example, 
drew on gipsy dances. However, to put e. g. current 'rock' music or 
Indian dance on to the curriculum simply in order to appease the 
sceptical argument could only result in succumbing to it - for it can 
always be objected that no pupils need an education into something on 
I 
which they are already unquestionably the leading authorities, namely 
their own personal preferences. 
The most obvious objection to the sceptic's bland conflation of 
aesthetic judgment with what Kant ca-Iled the 'judgment of pleasure' is 
that it crudely places aesthetic pleasure on a competitive level with 
all other pleasures, as expressed in Bentham's famous maxim that: 
All things being equal, push-pin is as good as poetry 
- surely a clarion call to all those philistine pupils who -prefer 
arcade games to aesthetic education! However, the main objection to 
the sceptic's maxim, put forward with characteristic common-sense by 
Hume, two hundred years before Ayer reiterated it, is this: 
But though this axiom, by passing into proverb, seems to have 
attained the sanction of common-sense; there is certainly a 
species of common sense, which opposes it... Whoever would assert 
an equality of genius and elegance between Ogilby and Milton... 
would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if he 
maintained a mole-hill to be as high as Teneriffe... The principIc 
of the natural equality of tastes is then totally forgot. 
11 
The sceptic's position, in other words, assumes a totally passive, 
non-intentional account of aesthetic experienceg taking no account 
whatsoever of the object of that experience. However, not all 
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involuntary responses to works of art are of this 'mechanical' kind. 
The sceptic here ignores what Hume and, even more so, Kantq realizod 
only too well - namely, that we do dist-i. nguish responses of a freer 
and more disinterested type in virtue of the fact that they cannot so 
obviously be explained away by causal psychology but seem to be 
grounded in the nature of the object itself. Of Course, a description 
of the object is not the same thing as a description of my response to 
it - despite Scruton's obscure suggestion that: 
It is the look of the picture that provides the elaboration of my 
thought. 12 
Nonetheless, as R. S. Peters has demonstrated for the emotions in 
general13, there is an intentional as well as an involuntary side to 
'all aesthetic experience. Not just anythinq can count as an aesth- 
etic response, and this is typically reflected in the kinds of reasons 
that we frequently offer for such responses - reasons that would be of 
no concern to us at all. if we were merely concerned to report a per- 
scnal preference. For example, having put myself into a receptive and 
att. entive mood such as Kant and Scruton describe, I may find that I 
cannot help hearinq a quality of sadness that seems to me to come from 
the music - but this in no way precludes my reflection on aspects of 
the music, including my background knowledge of conventions etc., that 
might seem to support the appropriateness of my response. If the 
sceptic continues to deny that there may be such occasions when I con- 
sider myself to be responding to the work itself, with no ulterior 
motive, then he must deny my personal autonomy in such matters - the 
very thesis that he is trying to defend. Let us now turn to the oppo- 
site thesis, which seeks to ground such reasons in discoverable, 
-functional. criteria quite independently of any lexpe- 4 ence' of truth -- J- 
the work of art which we may or may not have. 
al thesis - On this view, there exist, at least 
in principle, criteria -by which vve may Judge the trut; i or falsity of d1 .1 
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ir. lorks of art themselves, or of the (aesthetic judgments that we make 
about them. The perennial attraction of the 'prop, -Asi tional I thesis is 
that it seems to promise a secure justification of aesthetic educ- 
ation, thereby enabling it to compete on equal terms, with any other 
areas of the curriculum. Thus the recent Gulbenkian Report, The 
Arts in Schools, affirms that: 
The aesthetic, the religious and the moral realms are quite as 
powerful as... others at conveying knowledge. 14 
On this argument, someone ignorant of the aesthetic domain might still 
accept its educational value, much as he would accept the importance 
of physics even though he knew nothing about it, providing that he was 
convinced that to leave it out would be to deprive pupils of a unique 
kind of knowledge. Before examining the dubious premise on which this 
admittedly popular view is based, let us first look at some examples 
of this thesis which, for convenience, may be divided into three main 
categories - namely that of: (a) the 'formalist' who takes the view, 
consciously, or implicitly, that aesthetic judgments are truth-funct- 
t4 ional; (b) the 'cognitivist', whom we have already me .n 
Chapter 
Four; and (c) the believer in art as a 'unique form of knowledge' - 
the latter two being distinguished also by the fact that they want to 
establish the work of art itself as a proposition. I shall attempt to 
characterize all three versions by how they might appear on the 
shelves of a school libr2ry. 
In the 'formalist' libraryq alongside shelves of art books and 
literature would be a shelf of books that we consulted in order to 
gain knowledge about artistic taste. On this shelf, we should find, 
among others, the works of those 18th Century aestheticians who 
attempted to isolate and lay dcliv., ri defin-JUve 'rules' foi7 good taste - 
carried to an extreme by r-`-Eierl5, vjho ol fered no less than fifty such 
I ru I es'. It was in pf- rt a reaction to such works as these that 
prompted Kant to start writing The Criti que_uf Judq nient' Also, on 
203 
this particular shelf, one might find the works of all those critics 
who, while espousing the importance of personal rei: 'ponse, are nonethe- 
less not averse to delivering ex cathedra judgments, as does Leavi-s in 
his celebrated opening to The Great Tradition: 
The great English novelists are Jane Austen, George Eliot, Henry 
James, and Joseph Conrad. 16 
(In reality, of course, the strength of critics like Leavis . 
1ies 
precisely in their powers of personal response rather than in their 
misplaced attempts to lay down aesthetic canons. ) 
On the shelf above would be a similar collection of texts dealing 
with the creative side of art, wherein we would read about the 
attempts of artists to isolate the 'laws' that govern such things as 
pqrspecti. ve; proportion and colour, the principles of 'Cubism', 
rhetoric, poetic diction, sonata form and the like. Now, important as 
the pursuit of such goals has been for the development of art, as 
least as regards the development of artistic convention, nonetheless 
as we saw in an earlier chapterl7, any attempt to elevate such 'rules' 
to the status of truth-functional objectivity must inevitably be self- 
defeating. This is because it could only lead to our valuing a work 
of art simply as an instance of some pre-determined rule (Kant's 
'judgment of perfection'), which would run quite counter to Kant's 
caveat - not that such 'rules' are entirely arbitrary howcver, as we 
shall see. 
In the 'cognitivist' library on the other hand, there would be no 
special shelves at all for art or literature. Since the 'cognitivist' 
thesis, as examined in Chapter Four, effectively reduces works of art 
to collections of iion-aesthetic propositions, either explicit or 
-he world, we should find tklhc-. t we thought of as art and implied, about tI - 
literatuie p3iýce'Lled out among the non-fiction shelves such -as those 
of history, - psychology and social studies. In this library then, v; e 
would go to such books pi-imarily for their illustrative power, a,,: -, 
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Engels read Balzac for insight into the economic structures of 19th 
Century FrancelB. Howeverg in such a LA t -, brary, 'ar" books' would be in 
constant d(-: xnger of disappearing off the shelves insofar as more 
effective text--books were found to replace them -a central part of 
Scruton's case against the 'cognitivist' thesis, as we saw in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. 
By contrast, in the 'Hirstian' library, art books might sit more 
securely on the shelves, but what would they be like? Here, alongside 
the shelves of science text books, history text books and so on, the 
pupil would come across a shelf containing what looked like novels, 
poetry, and so on, but which in reality contained yet another kind of 
text book - namely, an 'art text book'. To these books he would turn 
I 
when he wanted to acquire 'artistic knowledge', for they would 
contain: 
Artistic statements, stating truths that cannot be communicated 
in any other way. 19 
Furthermore, insofar as Hirst must therefore exclude from the aesth- 
etic shelves any attempt to communicate works of art in any other way, 
these shelves would also have to exclude vigorously any books of 
critical commentary, exegesis and the like - and even books of art 
reproductions, since all reproductions imply the statement, 'This is 
what the original looks likelf 
For Hirst, such 'knowledge' is distinguished both by its content 
and the form in which it is expressed. (a) The content, although ver- 
ified against criteria that are internal to the aesthetic domain, is 
nonetheless to be understood on analogy with the content that we are 
used to finding in the statements of mathematics and phy3iCS: 
In my use cf the term, 'knowledgel -JS functioning exactly as when 
we say that we knoý, w that 2+2=4 or tha t water boils at 100oC. 
20 
(b) Although the 'forms' of music, painting, poetry etc. are not 
obviously --species of 
'language' in the sense that they lack the 
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logico-grammatical- structure in which we normally frame judgments, 
nonetheless, insofar as: 
A sequence of notes, a particular metaphor, or particular shape, 
may have a use in art parallel to that of a word in ordinary dis- 
course2l 
and provided that there exists some publicq aesthetic 'symbol system' 
within which such elements combine to form statements that may be 
judged true or false, then art may be seen, "in the fullest sense", as 
a language in its own right. If we find this hard to grasp, we must 
remember that: 
Languages may be as variable as, say, games and nevertheless 
remain languages for all that. 22 
Before examýning these premises, let us first briefly note what 
Hirst's thesis is not. As we have seen, it is not to be confused with 
the 'cognitivist's' pursuit of non-aesthetic truth-claims in art - 
although like Scruton, Hirst recognizes the dependence of works of art 
on'a background of other types of knowledge, on analogy with the de- 
pendence of physics on mathematics. Nor, insofar as Hirst is cow- 
cerned with aesthetic trut-h rather than value, is it to be confused 
with the Ilormalist' concern tc establish what makes a work of art 
good from the aesthetic point of view. As has been pointed out, Hirst 
is not concerned with aesthetic judgments as such, and their contrib- 
ution to 'aesthetic knowing', but rather with the work of art asa 
itself a proposition. Finally, he is not concerned, as are aesth- 
eticians like Kant and Scruton, with establishing the validity of what 
we say about how we experience works Of art, but rather with what 
works of art themselves say, unmediated by any response other than the 
epistemological one as to whether what they 'say' is true or false. 
At first glance, Hirst's thesis seems most attractive. Not only 
does he attempt a justification of aesthetAc education on intrinsic 
grounds, but his view that works of prt offer us untranslatable signi- 
ficances might be seen as coming very close to what has been arqued 
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for in Chapter Six of this thesis. On clost-Ir inspection however, one 
problem emerges wi. t! -. increasing insistence - namely, Hirst's manifest 
failure to characterize in any positive kind of way, the kind of 
criteria that he has in mind. What are aesthetic statements supposed 
to be about for Hirst, if they are distinct from all other kinds of 
statement? All we hear is that: 
No particular character... is being suggested other than that they 
are essentially artistic. 23 
Per'naps the closest that we get to anything more specific than this is 
when Hirst, at one point, seems to suggest that works of art are self- 
referring: 
It is not at all clear that works of art are... about something 
that exists beyond themselves. 24 
Seen thus, Hirst's position might seem to be approaching that of pure 
'formalism' - but what then would the work of art _qýa 
statement be 
sayinq about itself? It might be saying something about its own form, 
but then as Elliott has pointed out25, this would be redundant since 
the work already shows its own form. Nor can it simply be stating 
that it exists, since this is already presupposed. So what is left? 
Much of this obscurity can be seen to arise from Hirst's premise 
that works of art are themselves a special kind of language, insofar 
as they: 
are complex units and can certainly be understood as having sub- 
elements which have iiieaning in their use. 26 
Certainly works of art, like sentence. s, can be 2nalysed into their 
parts and also be perceived as unities, but then, as Elliott points 
out27, so too can hammers and motor cars. Beyond this formal analogy, 
the claim comes to look increasingly tenuous. Works of art certainly 
don't have an obvious subject-predicate structure - which one would 
have thought a minimum qualification for something tc count as o 
language -- and to compel them into puch a mould can make for insuper- 
able difficultics as in the case of music. where the anallogies beti, -een .A 
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grammar and musical form ofteii seem very superficial. The ma-in 
objection to Hirst, however, is the powerful argument advanced Ly 
Scruton, among others, to show that Ithe 'untranslatability' thesis is 
quite incompatible with the linguistic premise, insof2r as transl, --ft- 
ability is of the essence of 'natural language': 
For translation is a possibility as soon as there is an inter- 
pretation, and all natural languages are inherently interpreted 
... Truth introduces the idea of equivalence, and hence of trans- 
latabili. ty. 28 
Hirst's linguistic premise would therefore have to assume the possib- 
ility that in principle, any number of works of art could make the 
same artistic statement providing that they satisfied the same 
artistic truth criteria. Works of art would thus come to be seen as 
'instances of some set of general lartist-ic truths' and thus Hirst's 
version of the 'untranslatability' thesis would collapse. Worse than 
this however, insofar as works of art, like mathematical statements, 
are held by Hirst to be self-referring, then their truth would preSLIM- 
ably have to be of a tautologous kind - which raises the distinct 
possibility that all artistic statements might be replaceable by the 
sir. iple statement of identity, 'a work of art is a work of art'. It 
seems unlikely that this is the kind of 'objectivity' that Hirst has 
in mind for aesthetic knowledge. 
Ho-volever, providing that we can show Ithat a limited amount of 
actual agreement between people will be sufficient to ward off the 
sceptic's challenge, then do we really need to concern ourselves at 
all with the details of Hirst's argument, beyond acknowledging its un- 
doubted influence in certain quarters, such as in the recent Gul- 
benkian Rep ort29? This might of course make it more difficult to 
justify the inclusion of aesthetic education on the curi-iculum in 
* 14 terms of Hirst's general criteria for a iberal edw--ationl, but as 
Elliott has argued, the whole connection between demonstrating that 
some Curriculum area is a unique forrri of knowledge eind its being a 
208 
valued act-ilvity is a dubious one, since: 
All that can be validly argued is that if nothing else is valued 
more, the form should be included it. the curriJcujum. 30 
Clearly there are aspects of the aesthetic domain to be valued more 
highly than the achievement of universal agreement, such as the culti- 
vation of openness and receptivity towards the work and, above all, 
the richness and vitality of the imag- ion's various activities J nat 
which are central to lexperienti. al' aesthetics. In deed, as we have 
seen, Hirst admits as much himself. 
Of course such experiences may, on occasions, be of a revelatory 
nature, intimating truths as was argued in Chapter Six, that cannot be 
fully conceptualized. However, the value of such reve'Lations lies in 
the imagin ative realization of the work's meaning, rather than in the %. 0 
truth values of whatever propositions we m, --, iy extract from the work, or 
that are given explicitly, as in their titles. Thus in the case of 
Watteau's Embarkation to Cytherea, it is not the truth of the pro- 
position that 'human happiness is transient' that is revelaLory - in 
fact that is a rather unremarkable commonplace. What is revelatory is 
the realization of the thought that the painting serves to awaken in 
the viewer's mind. Of course insofar as any work of art contains a 
meaning in this way, then the bare meaning itself (i. e. the 'empty 
intention') will always be translatable, and this is reflected in the 
way that much aesthetic discourse is devoted to putting the meaning of 
a work of art 'into our own words'. This is possible because, qua 
'empty intention', there is no more to any proposition that its 
meaning, which is independent of any particular way in which it is 
expressed. What cannot be translated, however, is the work of art's 
particular realization of this meaning, since the imaginative POSiLL- 
ional view that it seeks to bring about Lý; jth the aid Of the vicwer's 
imagination is not the sort of thing that can be translated. Rather 
,. n1- 4i macgin- it can on y ', )c grasped at Ithe. 'acqu _ancel level when our 
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ation literally 'puts us in the picture'. The difference between the 
thought that 'human happiness is transient' and Watteau's embodiment 
of the thought may therefore be seen 2S something like the difference 
between 'prose' (which is translatable), and 'poetry' (which isn't) - 
see footnote. As with all arguments in 'experiential' aesthetics 
however, the educational value of such experiences as this can only be 
self-evident to those who have experienced them for themselves. Since 
it is not the main purpose of this chapter to justify the inclusion of 
aesthetic education on the curriculum, but rather to explore how best 
we may resist the sceptic charge, let us now leave the arena of 
curriculum ideology and complete our examination of 'propositional' 
aesthetics by turning to that aspect of it whose influence has been 
most baneful for aesthetic education. 
As we saw in Chapter One, in relation to 'objectivist' aesth- 
etics, if the 'propositional' version of the claim that e. g. 'the 
music is sad' is correct, then as with the claim that it is in the key 
of B flat, the sadness must be an objective feature of the music quite 
independently of the listener's mental state. Best, for example, 
states that: 
If I make an artistic judgment it is incumbent on me, i1 chall- 
enged, to substantiate it by citing not my subjective feelings 
about it, but objective features of the work of art itse'Li . 
31 
Insofar as it follows from this that the first-person response has no 
real home in the 'propositionalist' account, then despite the court 
that writers like Best play to such responses in principle, the very 
core of 'experiential' aesthetics is delegitimized at a stroke. As 
was argued in Chapter One, there would appear to be no real reason 
why, on Best's account, a pupil should not simply accept the legiti- 
Footnote: This distinction, of course, cuts across the conventional 
one made between 'poetry' and 'prose'. By 'poetry' here I include 
'non-prosaic prose' such as Donne's Sermons, and exclude 'prosaic 
poetry', such as the 'poetic work, 91 of 'William McGonegall. 
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macy of aestheti. c judgments at second-hand, e. g. in those cases where 
he generally trusts the judgments of his teacher. After all, this is 
quite legitimate JLn other areas of knowledge, such as science. Best 
would most certainly deny that such a 'second-hand' acceptance could 
have any educational value, but insofar as this possibility does seem 
to follow fromi his argument, then one may quite fairly say of the 
'propositional' thesis what Marcuse says of 'vulgar' Marxist aesth- 
etics: 
The schema implies a normative notion of the material base as the 
true reality ... and a devaluati. on of the entire realm of subject- ivity takes place, a devaluation not only of the subject as ego 
coqito, the rational subject, but also of inwardness, emotions 
and imagination. 32 
Of course, apart from the 'radical subjectivist', no one, least of all 
Scruton, is denyinq the necessity of relating our personal responses 
to a public background, especially where questionable matters of in- 
terpretation are involved. But In the end, whereas for Scruton 
one must have the personal response 'Co realize the point of an aesth- 
etic judgment, for Best it would seem sufficient that we r,! --rely 'read 
off' the public features of the work while referring to our background 
knowledge of conventions, regardless of whether or not our personal 
response is in any way in harmony with the public appraisal. Thus, a 
pupil who thinks that the Mona Lisa is an extremely poor painting, to 
take Best's example, is seen by Best to display not so much a "Lack of 
sensitivity and openness to the work (which would be central to a 
Kantian accusation), but rather: 
simply has no understanding of what constitutes good painting. 
33 
Now this may well be part of the problem, but nonetheless, it would 
a V4 S seem that what we are left with l. ew of 'personal response', like 
that of the 'mental imagel, as a redunddrit appendage to the public 
meani-ng - the standard 'analytic' view in fact. 
Since a good deal of my own thesis, following Kant and Scruton, 
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has been devoted to dejending such areas of personal response from the 
exceo-ses of lanal. yt:. c' philosophy, I shall not here go over the same 
ground, but rather seek to show the contradictions that must arise 
when a 'propositionall aesthetic standpoint is applied I in an educ- 
ational setting. On the 'propositional' view thený pupils could in 
principle learn the meaning of works of art, simply by learning to 
'read off' the relevantg publicly accepted features, much as they 
learn to make judgments about ordinary perceptual features of the 
world to the point where the process of recognition becomes virtually 
automatic - that 'the music is sad' therefore becomes as indisputable 
as that it is in the key of B flat, quite independently of the pre- 
sence or absence of any 'experience'. 
Now admittedly this might in one sense be possible. In-sofor as 
aesthetic education must presuppose a cultural and linguistJc back-- 
ground among its pupils, then 'objectivity' of a kind may be sL-Ld to 
enter into it - (a) as regards the initiation of pupils into ale-sthetic 
conventions, which might seem to support the 'formalist' argument for 
aesthetic objectivity, and (b) as regards any backgrOUnd knowledge 
concerning the work's content upon which its intelligibility may 
depend, which might seem to support the 'cognitive' thesis. One could 
not, for example, expect pupi-Is to read or write poetry without at 
least some idea of wh--t poctry was. As Hume says: 
Though poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be con- 
fined by rules of art. 34 
Nor could one hope for a very meaningful response to e. g. Picasso's 
Guernica without an understanding of such concepts as 'atrocity' and 
'civil w, --)r' and some familiarity with the course of 20th Century 
h"Istory - although in all such cases, we must be careful to dis- 
tingul-sh between interpretative judgments that are straightforwardly 
related to If irst-order' teatures of the work (e. g. 'This is a sonnet 
I bec; 3LIse it has 'ourteeii lines'), and eUb'Lhetic judgment, -; proper ýc. g. 
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'The music strikes me as sad), which must ariise from a personal 
response. 
In the case of aesthetic forms and conventions then, it might be 
possible, in a very limited sense, for a pupil to learn with some 
degree of accuracy e. g. to pick out examples of 'sad' music in virtue 
I of his knowledge of the conventions that, in Western music, link the 
expression of sadness with minor harmon. -i-es, slow tempos and certain 
discords such as the 'blue' notes of jazz - even though he were com- 
pletely blind to the experiential side of the music. On the 'propo- 
sitional' argument, as we have seen, he could even be thinking quite 
cheerful thoughts as he correctly picked out the 'tragic' elements in 
Schubert's last A major piano sonata! Nonetheless, could such a 
'music-blind' pupil reaIly be said to 'see the point' of such ex- 
pressions as 'the music is sad', however accurately he were able to 
identify the posited 'objective' aesthetic attributes in the music? 
In sofar as his interest in the music could only extend to trying to 
identify individual pieces aj Anstances of some general rule, then he 
would clearly not see the point, since as Kant has argued, no rule can 
compel us to see something aesthetically when we don't see it, i. e. in 
the 'experiential' sense. Therefore, insofar as the pupil (or 
teacher) did conceive of aestheLic education in terms of the mastery 
of discoverable rules alone, then in the absence of 'experiential' 
confirmation, such 'rules' could only appear as based on quite arbi- 
trary Principles e. g. what on earth is 'sad' about minor chords, 
apart from their conventional force? Aesthetic activity would thus 
come to appear as peculiarly pointless in his eyes except perhaps as a 
kind of game, like a musical qu; Lz. A similar feeling of 'pointless- 
ness' would presumably also arise in those c: ases mentioned e2rl-ler, 
where the pupil simply accepts at second-hand, e. g. out of respect for 
the teacher, the validity of particular aesthetic judgments. 
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The -same objection applies equally to 'cognitis-vist' emphasis on 
the knowledqe content of the work of art. Aesthetic education on th-: s 
view thus comes to be seen as an activity which develops in pupi-",, g, 
the ability to weigh up the accuracy with which the landscape, 
portrait, novel etc. portrays objective features in the world, rather 
I than in terms of a transforming and non-prosaic 'presence' such as 
has been argued for in the two preceeding chapters. Such a philistine 
view of art as aspiring to the 'objectivity' of one-to-one correspond- 
ence must i. nevitably make aesthetic education seem as pointless to 
pupils as it did to Plato when he ridiculed 'mimetic' art in The 
Republic. If the 'propo-sitionalist' attempts to overcome this problem 
of the seeming redundancy of art, as Hirst does, by positing the know- 
ledge content of art to be of a 'unique' kind, then, even though we 
don't exactly know what this 'knowledge' would be like, what we do 
know is that, insofar as it demanded universal agreement based on the 
application of conceptual. rules, then it would go egainst Kant's 
caveat just as much as the 'formalist' and 'cognitivist' versions of 
the thesis. 
However, if the 'experiential' argum%-Int is accepted - namely, 
that the validity of aesthetic statements is not automatically given 
by our grasp of a conceptual rule, nor in acts of 'everyday' per-- 
ception - then the inability of pupils to see the point of such state- 
ments cannot simply rest on a failure of understandingg which is how 
the 'propositional' thesis would have to explain lapses in aesthetic 
judgment. Rather, for 'experiential' aesLhetics, such failure would 
be attributable to one or other of two very similar sources, namely 
(a) what Wittgenstein has called 'aspect bli-ndness, 
35 
-a blindness to 
-4 hetic Jescriptions a whole class of meanings whose extended. us. -. n aestl 
can only make sense if the 'emergent' aspects to which they are used 
to refer 'shape up' in the imagination, as when we ask the pupils 
(or 
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they ask us) to try and see the 'gracefulness' in the dance or the 
'crouching lion' in the cathedral; or (b) our ipjbility to prcduce 
appropriate mental images in respon. se to aesthetic descr;, ptJi-ons, as 
when we fail to imagine 'in our mind's eyel -Qjlake's. Tyqer. 
In fact, as we have seen, these two functions of the imagination 
are very close insofar as both involve the production of images from 
thoughts about something (though of course the thought itself M2Y 
sometimes take time to dawn, as when we stand before a painting trying 
to figure it out). As Wittgenstein remarks: 
The concept of an aspect is akin to the concept of an image. In 
other words: the concept 'I am now seeing it as.... ' is akin to 
II am now having thi s image 1 . 
36 
Thus we reallly do need to see 'in our mind's eye' Blake's 'tiger' (and 
not just. a conventional one, either), in order to realize the concept 
of unleashed energy that the image embodi. es. Simply thinking of it as 
an abstract possibility will not do. In the same way, to grasp the 
claim that the cathedral appears as a crouching lion, we must see it 
for ourselves. As with Blake's poem, this must always involve more 
than simply grasping the plausibility of the 'empty intention' while 
the actual cathedral to which we turn our eyes still looks like the 
familiar 'everyday' cathedral that it always has done. Equa-I ly how-- 
ever, in order to reassure the literal-minded, such imagining always 
stops short of seeing the cathedral actually turninq into a crouching 
lion, since that would more correctly be described as an hallucin- 
ation! Somewhere between these two extremes lies the imaginative 
realization of the idea - involving a proliferation both of further 
thoughts, such as those of 'majesty' and 'repose', and a rush of 
further images arriving to 'fulfil' these thoughts such as was A. 
explored in Chapter Six when we were examining Kant's account of the 
'aesthetic idea'. 
The kind of 'aspect blindness' or 'image blindness' that thwarts 
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our ability to grasp the significan-ce of aesthetic descriptions such 
as the above, is not then a 'blindness' that coulld be sorted out, as 
the 'propositional' thesis viould suggcst, simply by clarification of 
the terms involved, nor even by simply look-Ing again at the object to 
see if there was anything perceptible that we might have missed. For 
this reason, Isesthetic education' in the 'experiential' sense would 
I 
seem to be of all- the areas of the curriculum the least amenable to 
any arbitrary imposition 'from above', despite the sceptic's charge. 
However, it may also carry with it the unfortunate and undesirable 
effect of making pupils who find themselves unable to respond in the 
imaginative way that has been suggested feel like insensitive out- 
siders from a charmed circle. This is a consequence that aesthetic 
educators should be aware of and seek to avoid at all costs. 
However, what of Wittgenstein's remark that it makes sense to 
order someone to imagine or see IxI in 'y37? This makes sense as 
long as we remember that there can be no element of compulsion in 
ordering anyone to imagine something - i. e. by appeal tc. an obvious 
concept'ual. rule or evidence that is staring us in the face. In trying 
to persuade the pupils to hear the sadness in the music, the teacher 
can no more compel his pupils to feel the sad aspects of the sounds or 
to produce the image of someone tragically stumbling that tr. e music 
scems to suggest than he can e. g. compel his pupils to love one 
another out of a sense of duty. Insofar as the 'propositional' 
thesis, in any of its forms, does assume that the pupil can be com- 
pelled to hear the music as sad by an appeal to the 'rules', then it 
Must be wrong. Lot us now, therefore, turn to our third thesis. 
The 'Psycholoqiýaj Objectivity' thesis - This version, as we have 
seen, promises to offer an account of 'Easthetic objectivilt. -. y' distinct, 
from both the sceptics. acceptance of arbitrariness and the absolutism 
of the 'propositionalist', in virtue of the 'special access' to viorks 
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of art that we may gain when we are in a certain frame of mind, char- 
acterized by disinterestedness and receptivity. Although there are 
important differences in the various versions of thiss thesis - most 
notably in the conflict between Scruton's 'analytic' demand for the 
third-person accountability of our aesthetic descriptions, and the 
I more phenomenologically oriented pursuit of 'psychological object- 
ivity' common to the writings of Hume, Kant and Sibley - nonetheless, 
what they all have in common is an attempt to separate the question of 
the rationality of our aesthetic appraisals from the question of their 
certainty In this respect, Scruton speaks for them all when he says 
of the 'subjective' element in his own account, that: 
This does not mean that aesthet-ic descriptions are merely arbi- 
trary oý 'subjective, having no more validity than preferences 
for certain kinds of food: we must separate the concept of ob- 
jectivity from that of truth. 38 
Even Kant, who presents the 'strongest' version of this thesis in his 
pursuit of a 'universal voice' as a 'regulative demand' of reason, 
nonetheless is also the author of the crucial principle that has been 
the leitmotif of this chapter - namely, that the 'judgment of taste' 
cbn be demonstrated neither deductively nor inductively, but that the 
best we can hope for is the agreement in experience of others: 
The judgment of taste itself does not postulate the agreement of 
everyone (for that can only be done by a logically universal 
judgment because it can adduce reasons); it only LERý41_es this 
agreement to everyone, as a case of the rule ir, respect ol, " which 
it expects, not confirmation by concepts, but 2ssent from others. 
The univerS21 voice is, therefore, only an iejea... It may be un- 
certain whether or not the man who believes that he is laying 
down a judgment Of taste is, as a matter of fact, judging in con- 
formity with that idea ... He can be quite certain of 
this for him- 
self by t1he mere consciousness of the separating off everything 
belonging to the pleasant and the good from the satisfaction 
which is left; and this is all. for which he promises himself the 
agreement of everyone.... 39 
This passage suggests thaL although we clearly hope for Universal 
assent to our aesthetic judgm. ents, we 2re not defeated -if 
thi-s appears 
to be unrealizable in practice. The criterion of 'psychol-ogical ob- 
jectivi'L, /' here being advanced pre-supposes an ideal state of disinter J 
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estednes3 which, like the extreme critical sparit presupposed by 
Habermas' 'ideal speech situatioW40, may be makino impossible dernands 
upon us. Since we can never, therefore, be certain that our judgments 
or the dissent of others are made in such a spirit, then the best that 
we can hope for, kant seems to be saying, is that if we reasonably 
believe in our own spirit of objectivity when we make them, then they 
may be justifiable - and this will be further confirmed when we find 
that others) agree in having had similar responses, although as Sibley 
says, such agreement may be: 
more like a concentrated scatter than convergence on a point. 41 
The obvious advantage, however, of making such 'disinterestedness', 
reinforced by the 'disinterested' agreement of others, a criterion for 
I 
the legitimacy of our aesthetic judgments is that such legitimacy does 
not thereby make these judgments mandatory on others. 
Before exploring this possibi-lity further however, let us first 
turn to Scruton's version of the th. -sis which, as vie have already 
mentioned, denies legitimacy to the kind of phenomenolog-lcal.. reports 
on which the above account seems to come to rest (even though his own 
account seems to lean heavily on such reports). For Scruton, wearing 
his 'analytic' hat: 
The onI4 facts about experience are facts about the experience of 
others. 2 
The special reliance that the phenomenological type of account places 
on the direct, first-person reporting of how the world appears to our 
individual consciousness is therefore ruled out on the 'analytic' 
grounds that whatever meaning they possess must be at the public, 
third-person level, since 'meaning', as we saw in Chapter Six, is not 
something tha t can be said to Uclong to anyone. This oF course is why 
meaning j_tsel f is apositiona'i, which is what distinguishes it-from the 
positional em bodiment 3f meaning in i mage, aspect and emotion. 
At the 
same ti. me however, Scruton is also committed to the view that: 
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In aesthetics you have to see for yourself preciselLy Letýause what 
you have to 'see' is not a property: your knowledge that an aes- 
thetic feature is 'in' Lhe object is given b,, the same criteria 
that snow that you 'see' i t. To see the sadness in the music -, rid 
to know that the music is sad are one and the same thing. 43 
In other words, insofar as the 'aesthetic object', as di. 3tinct from 
the 'everyday', first-order presence of the 'work of art', is an 
intentional one, our realization of the thought in image, aspect and 
emotion and our sensing that this thought (i. e. that 'the music is 
sad') is appropriate, are given in one and the same breath. 
As we saw in Chapter Two, Scruton's attempt to harmonize these 
two conflicting demands led him to postulate a 1weak' acceptance con- 
dition based on the argument from 'paronymy'. This attempted (a) to 
satisfy the d, emand for third-person accountability by retaining the 
normal intensional construction of the words that we use in aesthet-L Jc 
descripUons, SUch as 'sad' in 'the musi. c is sad', on the lanalytic' 
grounds that: 
The only clear explanation of what the terms mean in their aesth- 
etic u-se is to be given by referring back to their ordinary 
use. 44 
(b) to ensure a key role for subjective response by making the accept- 
ance condition depend on the subjective dawning of an extra-linguistic 
experience such as gives rise to the novel extensional application of 
the terms involved, in particular cases. The music strikes me as 
fying it as sad in 'sad' (quite a different response from merely identi-I S- 
virtue of established conventions) just as the cathedral strikes me as 
having the 'presence' of a lion. In neither case, however, will a 
grasp of the normal meanings of ', ad' or 'lion' alone be of much help 
to a third person who is trying to see the point of their application 
in these instances; nor are they obviously given by their primary ob- 
jects, i. e. the sound of tho music or Lhe sight of the large stone 
building over there. An -act of imagination is, therefore, required 
wherein the music dawins as 'sad', or the cathedral dawns 'as a -'Lionl- 
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although we must not forget that, as Wittgen3tein says c), 'aspe&- 
perception' in general: 
Here it is difficult to see what is at issue is It, -he fixing of 
concepts. A concept forces itself on one. (This is what you 
must not forget. )4-') 
Even when. the experience does dawn however, the meaning of 'sad' and 
Ilion', as we saw in Chapter Six, remains the same after as before - 
thereby enabling Scruton to meet the 'analytic' demand. Now however, 
what was hithorto only intell-igible but obscure (i. e. the abstract and 
therefore obscure thought that the cathedral is like a lion) comes to 
be realized in image, aspect and emotion and hence its appropriateness 
agreed to - although as ScrUton says Of Such aesthetic claims, they: 
need not have truth conditions in the strong sense, and to 
justify'them may be to justify an experience and not a belief. 46 
The central problem now, however, is this - how can we speak of 
'justifying an experience'? As we saw in Chapter Two, the main justi- 
ficatory load in Scruton's account is born, not by the publi. c fneani. ng 
of 'sad' or Ilion', but rather by their novel, extensional application 
arising from the experience. But how can we get beyond this to a 
public claim? This is the problem that dogs Scruton's account of the 
imagination throughout, as surely as it also dogged the aesthetic 
theories of Hume and Kant. In Scruton's case, the problem arises be- 
cause, as it stands, our decision to apply the public mew-iing in a 
novel way seems to have an air of incorrigibility about it which may 
override any appeal to public norms. As he himself admits: 
a man can be reasoned out of a critical interpretation in a way 
that he cannot as a rule be reasoned out of the perception of an 
aspect, and in a way that he can never be reasoned out of the 
perception of a secondary quality. 
47 
So how can we intelligibly speak cif a 'justified experience'? It 
cannot be nl--, jected aga--nst r-,. e that such an appraisal fails to tally 
with the 'objective' character of the object$ because that is just 
I10 
4- 
what is qt issue. How can anyone challenge the fc-ct that t'-e musi- 
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strikes me as sad? It might of course be objected in a very untypical. 
case, e. g. in a mult'i -cultural cla3sroom, that a pupil does not under- 
stand 'sad' in the sense that we mean it; or perhaps in the case o, 
more 'opaque' terms like disagreement over whether a Bruckner symphony 
is 'monumental' or not4B it might be shown that I had dwelt only on 
some aspects of the term, such as its architectural implications, to 
the exclusion of others, such as its implications of weightiness and 
solidity. It might also be objected, which is more often the case, 
that I do not appreciate the musical conventions that typically relate 
to the expression of 'sadness' - as when I find that a cheerful Indian 
'raga' strikes me as mournful, owing to my cultural limitations49. 
Howev--r, providing that I can show that I do have the requisite lin- 
guistic and cultural background, and that I can demonstrate e. g. that 
I am not in the middle of a personal crisis where I see everything as 
sad., then according to Scruton's argument from paronymy, my word must 
be law50 because, as we have seen, it is the extensional construction 
that gives it its point, rai-her than the publicly agreed intensional 
construction. I can hear the sadness in the music, and although I atay 
produce supporting arguments, my ultimate trump card will always be 
the ad hominem appeal - you just have to hear it this way, and if you 
can't, YOU must be lblindl In uhis respect, even to begin to justify 
one's own experiences viould be as pointless as the claim to know that 
one is in pain, discussed by Wittgenstein in a celebrated passage in 
the Philosophical Investiqations5l. *So can legitimacy of any kind 
enter into such appraisals, or are we still stuck ultimately at the 
incorrigible but aesthetically uninformative level of the 'judgment of 
personal preference', thereby ruling out the possibility of aesthetic 
education? 
What I think has to be recognized first is thalL the commun-ic- 
ability of all aesthetic appraisals, contra Hirst, must start off 
in 
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e on an ad hominem basis, the only basis on which an 'experiential I 
aesthetic can found itsel ,. But granting this, there is no obvious 
reason why, contra. Scruton, the phenom. e. nologi-cal reporlts which form 
the basis of our ad hominem appeals should be illegitimate, if such 
appeals turn out to be successful - especially where a third person 
has arrived at the same or a similar conclusion to ourselvesq inde- 
pendently. My experiential discovery that the music is sad means 
something to me, and if someone else says "Yes, that's just how I feel 
too", then how can it be meaningless? In actual fact Scruton seems 
almost to be saying just this himself in his account of the lasyrnp- 
totic' way that our 'paronymous' usages gain public recognition. 
At this point, the sceptic may still object that the other 
person's experience may be different from mine. Now ins-ofar as it is 
unlikely that my positional synthesis of images and aspects could ever 
be identical with anyone else's, then he is probabil-y right beCaUse 
mental events in the 'positional' sense do beloLia to the individual , 
by contrast with the impersonal, public meaning. But the concept Of 
'agreement in experience' need not depend for its legitimacy upon e. g. 
you having exactly the same mental image of Blake's tiger as mine (for 
that would be impossible), as long as our two reports continue to 
co! iere as we explore them further - P.. g. we may both agree in having 
very 'bright' images of the tiger, althouqh my tiger may be leaping, 
whereas yours may just have landed or be prowling about. All these 
variations may be quite acceptable however, as long as they cohere 
with our general impression of pent-up energy struggling to release 
itself. 
Once having established the possibility of agreement in exper- 
ience howevor, there is still the quest4nn as to whether the appraisa'L 
is appropriate to the work of art or not, since as we have seen, an 
inter-subjectively agreed judgment, as much as a subjective one, m-. y 
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be just as prone to arbitrariness, even though, as Scruton points out: 
When I react to a work of art I also think or- it as an appro- 1 52 prLate object of my reacti-on. 
At this point therefore, we have to look at the kinds of reasons 
advanced for or against the appraisal for although, as we have seen, 
there can be no ready-to-hand norm to which we can referý nonetheless, 
not just anythinq can count as an appropriate image, aspect or emotion 
as Best would be the first to point out. For example there may be 
many ways that we can imagine Blake's tiger, but we certainly couldn't 
imagine him, as perhaps very young children might on hearing the poem, 
as a cuddly little pet, wi-thout destroying the idea of demonic energy 
that seems so central. to the poem. The same would apply to the 
I 
example of seeing the cathedral as a crouching frog, discussed on page 
197 of this chapter. 
Where we are concernod with cases of appropriateness that are 
internal to the work of art, i. e. such as the artist, con, poser or 
author himself has to consider and which are central to any aCCOUnt of 
aesthetic pleasure - e. g. the 'fittingness' of the cor anglais' timbre 
for the Swan of Tuonela - again, while there is room for disagreement, 
not just anything would do as an alternative - e. g. a flute might have 
worked as well, but not a baritone saxophone. Furthermore, some such 
disagreements may well be insoluble without resorting to total arbit- 
rariness. For exam ple, someone habituated to the vivid and expressive 
colouring of Picasso's paintings in the 1920s may fail to see the 
appropriateness of the monochrome colouring in Guernica. He may think 
it too distanced and stylized where vivid colours might better have 
displayed the anguish. A protagonist of the painting on the other 
hand, might point to the shades of black and grey as supremely ex- 
pressive of anguish, perhaps seeing in ir alsO an -ironic echo of 
the 
'black and white' photographic reporting of war. But the possibility 
of two such competing views co-existing, far from destroying the 
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rationality of aesthetic discourse, may rather underline its vitality. 
It is true, of course, that David Best make, - a similar point#. 
Both a conviction that it is possiblc in principle to resolve 
problems and conflicts, and the persistence in practice of 
problems and conflicts, are essential- for the coritinued prog-ress 
and even existence of any area of enquiry. 53 
However, whereas Best always presupposes in principle that there is 
only one correct view without which even the very notion of 'disagree- 
ment' would be incoherent, I would argue that such a presupposition is 
neither necessary nor desirable in order to establish the rationality 
of aesthetic discourse. Surprisingly, Scruton at one point comes 
close to agreeing with Best, when he argues against the notion of 
'emergent' aesthetic properties on the grounds that: 
different emergent 'properties' can depend on precisely the same 
set of first-order properties54 
leading to what he sees as the impossible situation of: 
incompatible critical judgments ... entirely based cn the same set 
of first-order features of the work of art. 55 
However in some cases, perhaps more often than we realize; a L, ýork of 
art may seem to alternate between two incompatible aspects, as when we 
see a Renoir now rich and glowing, now vulgar and 'chocolate box', or 
a Sibelius symphony now mysterious and powerful, now like film back- 
ground music to a Western - yet none of these responses seems arbit- 
rary, although of course qua positional experience, we couldn't hold 
both aspects at the same time. As Dr. Johnson points out with charac- 
teristic common-sense: 
We have less reasons to be surprised or offended when we find 
others differ from us in opinion, because we very often differ 
from ourselves. 56 
More imporLantly., however, while -we imust -undoubtecily help pupils 
to understaod the public traditions on tjh-ich the i nte. ] Ii gi ýri I ity of 
the particu'lar work of' art depends, ime also have another obligation to 
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encourage them honestly and carefully to report their personal re- 
sponses, for in the end it is 
. 
upon these that the 'judgment of taste' 
depends, once all the problems of interpretation have been run 
through. As Sibley points out in discussing this very JLssue: 
In any case, at first-order level so to speak, it . Nill sti,, -I 
be 
the critic's duty firmly to give his own honest and careful 
opinion, for only thus can a genuine concensus emerge or fail 
to. 57 
Can we hope for any more than this on which to base the 'object-- 
ivity' of aesthetic education? Certainly it must be a precondition of 
any 'objective' claim that our attention be directed towards the 
'aesthetic object' and not to any extraneous object such as an arbit- 
rary association or personal interest that we may mistake for it, as 
iri Hume's example of disliking a work of art because we are envious ef 
its author. The problem for this more flexible version of 'object- 
ivityl, however, is that in a sense., there is no aesthetic object - at 
least not in the same sense as there. is a primary object of paint on 
canvas or sounds in the key of C major. This is because, as we have 
seen, insofar as it is an 'emergent' object which arises out of the 
primary material, it therefore depends on our own powers of percep- 
tion, imagination and emotion for its realization. As Sartre says of 
our aesthetic perception of the natural world (reflecting the vast 
metaphysical gulf that exists between him and Kant): 
It is Lve who set up a relationship between this tree and that L)jt 
of sky. Thanks to Lis, that star which has been dead for 
millenia, that quarter moon, and that dark river are disclosed in 
the unity of a landscape. 58 
It would be better then to describe the object of our aesthet-*Lc 
attention, as we have done in Chapters Five and Six, as an 'intent- 
ional object', in4, ending not the 'objective' world of science 
(which, 
anyway, iis --n ab ctr2Ction 
fro, ", i experience) but rather how the world or 
the work of art appears to us from a position of ac33thetic disinter- 
estedness c-nd receptivity, as a corsequence of' L,., hich vje find ourselves 
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hearing the sadness in the muoicq se-ei ng the lion in the cathedral, Or 
feeling the transi. ence of human happiness expr, -ýssed in Watt-cau's 
painting. However, whereas normally we can see the primary features 
of an object regardless of the state of mind that we are in (e. g. we 
rarely have any difficulty seeing the large grey building as a cath- 
edral - and even if we do, the matter is easily settled), it would 
seem, on the contrary, that the intentional. aesthetic object normally 
only appears J-n its fulness when our mind is in a state of openness 
and receptivity. I say 'normally' because there are times when a work 
of art forces itself upon us even though we may have deliberately 
closed our minds to it - as when a philistine pupil, despite his re- 
sistance to what he regards dismissively as 'high-culture', is none- 
theless moved by some lines of Shakespeare. In such cases, it is as 
if the work of art itself has forced the pupil to take up a position 
of 'psychological objectivity' towards its presence - as when, even in 
sad times, some music can still rouse us. 
Insofar, therefore, as we are describing what freely appears to 
us in this state of 'psychological objectivity', then pace Best, does 
it really matter whether or not the sadness is actually in the music 
or the lion-aspect in the cathedral, so long as others with whom vve 
share a similar 'public' background also find themselves crming to 
have the same or similar personal responses? 
Let us therefore now turn to the underlying conditions that may 
facilitate this kind of 'objectivity,. These may, for convenience, be 
divided up into two main kinds - namely, those to do with the 'psycho- 
logical objectivity, of our state of mind, and those which relate to 
our backgrOUnd competence: 
(a) fc,, --holoqical objectivity 
I am genuinely describi. ng an experience that 1 have had. 
(ii) 1 genuinelY believe thent what I am now experiencing arises 
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from my paying a disinterested attention to some object, rather than 
that the object sim--Iy mirrors my arbitrary preferences and preocup- 
ations. It is this condition that helps to provide a guarantee 
against Ruby Meager's charge that: 
Imagination will work on any ideas that float into our minds, however rem ate f rom actuality they may be ; and lef t to itsel f 
will develop them almost inevitably on lines congenial to wish- fulfilment and fear-fulfilment. 59 
(b) Backqround competence 
share a linguistic and cultural background of which both 
the work of art and the pupilo with whom I am discussing it form a 
part. This condition might seem to raise particular problems for aes- 
thetic education in a multi-cultural. classroom - although we should 
also remember that many of the richest developments in art (contra Sue 
Braden's dogmatic assumption as to the 'discrete' nature Of 'Culture,, -, ' 
discussed earlier in this chapter) have come about through interaction 
between different cultural traditions, such as the influence of Japan- 
ese prints on 19th Century Euiýopean art, or that of African art on 
20th Century painting and music. (I note that Dav. -J-d Best has also 
made this very important point. 
60) It would seem 
therefore that a cultural tradition, like linguistic usage, can rarely 
isolate itself from outside influence, as Wagner'3 Meistersinqers 
eloquently demonstrates. 
-iVa' L'ough sustained and varied I have CUll Led sensitivity th- 
experiences of works of art. This, in turn, depends: (a) on ifly abil- 
ity to put myself into a frame of mind of openness and receptivity as 
a consequence of my 'disinterestedness' - although it is a 'disinter- 
estedness' that also requires that I be imaginatively susceptible and 
emotionally respcnsive (a point that is often MlSL,, nderstood by thcse 
comme, -itators who equate Kantian 'disinterestedness' with 'detachmý! ritl 
despite Kant's own insistence that the determining ground of the 
'Judgment of taAe' lies in 'the feel -ie subject', (,! ); (b) on 
_a 
oFU 
227 
ouf aculties being in good worki. ng order and there beii-ig optinium 
physical conditions for aesthetic perceptiong such as that the concert 
hall has good acoustics, or the paintj-ng, adequate light. While it is 
clearly not possible to specify such optimum conditions for aesthetic 
perception as it is for normal, everyday perception, there may none- 
theless be an analogical relation. As Hume says: 
In each creature there is a sound and a defective state; and the 
former alone can be supposed to afford us a Lrue standard of 
taste and sentiment ... in like manner as the appearance of objects 
in daylight, to the eye of a man in health, is denominated their 
true and real colour... 62 
This is refined in the writings of Kant and Hamly, 163 in the view that 
all forms of objectivity must be rooted in forms of human sensibillity 
operating under normal conditions. 
I 
Now what stands out from this set of criteria is that the cultiv- 
ation of phenomenological reporting, disinterestedness, and the acqui- 
sition of a linguistic and cultural background, are all educable, as 
Hume and Sibley argue at length in their respective and similar 
aCCOUnts of an aesthetically educated public. The questionable area, 
however-, is that of aesthetic sensitivity, described by Hume as: 
that delicacy of imagin2ti. on which is requisite to convey a sens- 
ibility of those finer emotions. 64 
Can it be educated, or not? 
Education in art appreciation assumes the former; t-, i.,:,,, 4-ory may 
suggest the ', -atter65 
says Sibley enigmatically. Clearly the possibility that it can be 
educated, at least in the vast majority of pupils, must be a sine qUa 
non for aesthetic education. However, before aesthetic educators rush 
out to verify such a claim with some large-scale research project on 
pupils' responses, I would suggest tha4. - they would do even better to 
concentrate their main attention on the i'ole of the good arts teacher, 
rather than on the limitations of the pupils. 
Since this will be the theme of my next chap%. -, er, I shall put the 
228 
quesLion temporarily to one side except as regards one CrUC4al point 
which is this - insofar as he concept of aestheic 'sensitivity'. or 
'taste' is essentially related to the concept of 'aesthetic judgment, 
(in which I include the 'judgment of taste'), it may be seen as part 
of the wider question as to how judgments of any kind can be taught. 
Certainlyq no capacity for making judgments can be 'taught' in the 
sense of providing pupils with a 'rule book' for going about it, since 
the 'very ability to follow a rule adequately already presupposes an 
act of judgment that one is carrying on in the 'same' way, as Wittgen- 
stein went to such lengths to point out66. If the acquisi. tion of a 
capacity for judgment is like anything, then it would seem to be more 
like getting a 'nose' for something: 
Ask yourself: How does a man get a nose for something? And how 
can this nose be used? 67 
As such, it may well have its o. -Ligins in the unlearned, natural re- 
sponses of early infancy, as was discussed in Chapter One. it', WOUld 
be mislead'Ing, however, to think as the early Empiricisl s did that 
aesthetic judgment amounts to no more than a simple feelinc; for some- 
thing, that human beings just happen to have, for on this view, as 
Scruton points out, 'taste' becomes: 
an isolated and inexpliC2ble segment of human psychology, and it 
is simply a curious but philosophically uninteresting fact, that 
human beings enjoy some things (such as tragedies, str-Uviberries 
and fine weather) and recoil from others. 68 
The point of Wittgenstein's argument, as we S2W in Chapter One, 
is that although tie must presuppose such unlearned starting points in 
order to explain how any learning can get off the ground, nonethe- 
less, the arrival of language and with it rationality and the aesth- 
etic form of life, suggests that such responses may be considerably 
- because our powers of aesth. - educated and therefore extended. This iIA 
etic judgment do not just consist in a passive, 'mechanical' response, 
as the early Empiricists thouqht, but rather in an activiýj which may 
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be developed and refined. As Wittgenstein says: 
The origin and the primitive form of the language-game is a re- 
action; only from this can the more complicated forms grow. Language -I want to say - is a refinementi 'in the beginning 1was the deed'. 69 
In this respect, it would be better to call 'aesthetic judgment' not 
just a 'feeling' but rather an 'educated feeling' in the way that it 
combines natural with learned responses. As David Best says in his 
recent book: 
It is important to recognize (a) that the natural responses and 
t4 ways oil behaving are the roots of the arts, language and ra on- 
ality, (b) but also that the arts, language and rationality give 
an enormous range of extended possibilities, of feeling, respond- 
ing and behaving. 70 
How then, is a capacity for making such judgments to be passed on 
to pupils? Not, as we have seen, by teaching them a set of 'rules', 
because it is the act of judgment itself that gives any rules their 
application - but rather, as Wittgenstein suggests, by being in the 
company of a good teacher with wide experience of the aesthetic 'I ouq 
of lifel, and thereby picking up his 'educated feel' for it: 
Can one learn this knowledge? Yes: some can. Not, however by 
taking a course in it, but through 'experience'. - Can someone 
else be a man's teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time 
lie gives him the right tie. - This is what 'learning' and 'teach- 
ing' are like here. - What one acquires here is not a technique; 
one learns correct judgments. There are also rules, but they do 
t he rr. not form a system, and only experienced people can apply 
right. Unlike calculating-rules. 71 
In the light of Wittgenstein's account, it is therefore essen- 
tial, as we have seen throughout this thesis, to distinguish the fully 
r. ealized judgment that e. g. 'The music is sad', from the two following 
types of response: (a) Mechanically following a rule - As we have seen 
in the case of the tone-deaf pupil who can still, within limits, 
correctly identify even quite complex aesthetic categories of music, 
it is quit--- possible to follow a rule c. -crrectly without 'seeing 
its 
point' - As Sibley points OLIt: 
A man who failed to real-ize the nature of cesthetic concept-,... 
might X by assiduous application Ij and ob-ervation pýcovi, -'e 1) .11 
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himself with rules and gener-olizations; arid by inductive pro- 
cedures and intelligent guessing, he might frequently say the 
right things. 72 
One wonders how much of what passes for 'aesthetic education' in our 
schools is a3ong these . 1ines. Here, the pointlessness of such an 
exerci-se may be underlined by the reductio ad_absurdum that the 
teacher could even make up a quite absurd rule, such as 'A] J music in 
the key of C major is tragic', and the luckless pupil would still 
follow it to the letter without knowing any better; (b) Habitual judq- 
ments - whi. ch would include all those involved in our unreflective, 
feverydayl perception, 'stock' emotional responses and all 'automatic' 
judgments of approval and disapproval. In fact all such responses are 
only by courtesy called 'judgments' insofar as their 'force' derives 
not from an 'educated feeling', but from the force of habit. No act 
of 'realization' can therefore be involved, although it must have been 
there at one time in our early stages of learning about the world 
before the habit was fully formed. 
However, before trespasbing further into the terrain that 1 hope 
to be exploring in the next chapter, let us now return to those con- 
ditions for 'psychological objectivity' outlined above. I would argue 
that if these conditions can be satisfied, then we will achi. eve about 
as much objectivity as we need in order to defend the richness of acs- 
thetic activities from the sceptic's charge that it is all quite 
ar bitrary. Despite Kant's suggestion at one stage in the Critique73 
t hat we make the attempt to create a un a. versal aesthetic community in 
the absence of an existing sensus communrs, I do not think that we can 
really ask for much more than what Sibley has described in -',. he 
follow- 
ing terms: 
A realm of objectivity might be made possiblu by some 
limi ey 
(not vjidnopread) actuall agreement including some settled and vir- 
tually indisputable cases, together with a perhaps eltaborate and 
hard to describe procedure that- offers the possibility by envis- 
ageable ways of attaining wider agreement. 
74 
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This state of affairs seems close in fact to the one that already 
exists within the aesthe'Lic realm, so perhaps we should rest c. -ntent 
with it and concentrate our energies instead on the more valuable a-,, ea 
of personal response - especially since to ask for any more than what, 
Sibley outlines might land us back in the 'objectivity, of the 'pro- 
positionalist' thesis. 
Addendum 
One problem now remains. Although it has been argued that the 
aesthetic form of life can tolerate much divergence of value and in- 
terpretation without losing its underlying rationality, what of major 
disagreements about the nature of art itself? This too may be amen- 
able to Sibley's account of 'aesthetic objectivity' outlined abcve. 
I 
Thus Kant's insistence, in paragraph 49 of the Critique, that any work 
of art worthy of the name must possess qeist m1ght seem to be about as 
near to an indisputable prescription as one can get. On the other 
hand, what of the disputed relevance to the concept of 'art' of the 
be. ). jefs and personal associations that we bring with us? 
I have myself argued earlier75 that there are occasions on which 
our beliefs may have aesthetic relevance - as in the case discussed of 
the two people looking at the National Westminster tower block where 
a neutral, belief-free perspective seemed to be out of the 
question, and (b) the aesthetic perceptions of those concerned seemed 
to be inescapably modified by the beliefs that they held. I have also 
argued for the aesthetic relevance Of Our beliefs in Chapter Seven, on 
the grounds that to exclude them totally would make it impossible to 
take the concept of 'art' seriously, and also on the grounds that the 
whole concept of the 'aesthetic' is systematically ambiguous anyway. 
None of these arguments, however, provide anything like 9 conclusive 
refutation of the 'formalist' position that they deny. 
In the same way, I have followed Kant -*Ln his acl-lount of laesth- 
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etic idea---', and also Sartre, in arguing for the Possible relevance of 
personal associations -a particularly important area for the pedagogy 
of aesthetic education insofar as one of the most effective ways of 
engaging pupils in works of art is by encouraging them to respond with 
their own personal history, as we saw in the -,,, xample of the tcacher's 
approach to Wordsworth's Lucy in Chapter Five76. The proviso, of 
course, is that such responses must depend for their legitimacy on the 
fact that they arise as a result of our openness to the work of art. 
Thus, if in such a state, I look, for example, at a TUrner seascape 
and find certain memories of seaside holidays as a child welling LIP, 
then this may be aesthetically relevant if it helps me to grasp what 
is being aesthetically expressed in the painting. On such occa3icns, 
I 
what we may take to be a totally idiosyncratic response may be less 
idiosyncratic than we think. In general, it might be argued that my 
own experience of 'x' is aesthetically relevant if it helps me to see 
the lxl that is embodied in the work of art. As Proust says: 
In reality, every reader is, while he is reading, the reader of 
his own self ... The recognition by the reader in 
kis own self of 
what the book says, is the proof of its veracity77 
-a view that- is flatly contradicted by Bell's 'formalist' credo that: 
To appreciate a work of art we need bring nothing with us 
from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity 
with its emotions. 78 
While my own thesis has argued for a much wider and more piece- 
meal interpretation of aesthetic relevance, I think that once again, 
as with disagreement over individual works of art, we may also have to 
accommodate differing views as to where we place the horizon around 
the work of art. In this respect, the only Lwo posited 'horizons' 
that must be excluded are: (a) the sceptical one, on the grounds that 
the arbit. r2-ry horizons of personal preference aCtLually exclude 
the 
work of art, thereby making nonsense of any attempt to educate aesth- 
etically; (b) the propositional horizon, which is 
drawn so tightly 
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around the primary significances of the object that it makes it im- 
possible for its 'emergent' identity to appear, thereby making educ- 
ation in an aesthetic sense impossible - insofar as by 'aesthetic' we 
mean something that must necessarily involve a 'personal response' in 
the sense in which Kant and Scruton understand it. 
0 
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CHAPTER NIME: How is the experience of art to be communicated? 
On the teachinq of artssubjects. 
If works of art functioned simply to bring about the realization 
of untr2nslatable 'embodied thoughtsIg then, once the works had been 
placed before the pupils, the classrooms in which aesthetic apprec- 
iation took place would be characterized chiefly by one outstanding 
feature: silence - undisturbed, contemplative silence on the part of 
both pupil and teacher alike as the perceptual, mental and affective 
parts of each person's imagination set about their synthesizing task. 
As Sartre says of literature: 
The literary object, thouqh realized through language is never 
given Jn language. On the contrary, it is by nature a silence 
and an opponent of the word. 1 
For all 'that some works may seem to yield their 'emergent' qual- 
iti. es directly to us in this 'silent' manner howevor, it is nonethe- 
less clear that much aesthetic appreciation is devoted to highly 
verbal, analytic inquiry JA -rito what works of art mean. 
'is the poem 
about love - or death? ' the teacher asks provocatively, in order to 
alert the pupJI to possible ambiguities and ironies in the text. At 
the same time, essential background knowledge is filled ir. as the 
teacher explores how far the work of art is a reflection of its times 
or a dissenting comment upon them. Aesthetic and other culture-re- 
lated conventions are identified and related to the preoccupations of 
the communities. in which they arose - as, for example, the Japanese 
haiku is related, among other things, to the art of calligraphy &ýid a 
religious concern with the 'timeless moment'. Moral, psychological, 
ideological and other kinds of 'lessons' are drawn from the work, 
in 
an attempt to show its continuing relevance to the present 
day - as 
when Hamlet is interpreted as ss Marxist fable signifying 
the decline 
of feUdaI. Li-, P-, or whe, n Leavis sets out to shotý 
how novels within the 
Igreat tradition' : 
are distinguished by a vital capaci'L-'V foi: experience, a kind of 
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reverent openness before lifeý and a Inarked moi-al intensity. 2 
In short, all Sýjch talk is directed towards the varying ways in 
which the work h2s an exemplificatory role in relation both to aesth- 
etic conventions and to the world at large. But what, then, of the 
pupils, experience of the work of art, with which this chapter 
commenced - that first-person adventure into the 'world' of the work 
which, though it may add nothing to its meaninq as discussed above, 
may nonetheless be regarded as necessary to 'bring home' the meaning 
to the pupil in image, aspect and emotion? How is the teacher to 
alert pupils to this aspect of the work, when nothing significant, 
strictly speaking, can be said about it beyond the ritual aesthetic 
commen-place thaý each pupil must 'see it for himself'? In trying to 
answer this question, the danger to be avoided (as we saw in -relation 
to the lantinomy of taste' in Chapter One) is taking an over-frag- 
.. 4- mented view of the work of art as artif-icially divided -up Jnt-o trans- 
latable, interpretable statement and untranslatable 'gerierator of 
experiences'. vie may see Fuc: h a division at work, for example, in the 
following uneasy formulation advanced by the poet-aestheticiang Pýul 
Valery: 
Transmettre un fait - preduire une emotion. La poesie e-st un 
compromis, ou une certaine proportion de ces deux fonctions. 
3 
It is but a short step from this type of dualistic view to an accept- 
ance of the fragmentation between aesthetic judgment and personal ree- 
sponse such as was discussed in Chapter One -a fr2gmentation that in 
turn paves the way both for the doctrinaire 'objectivist' view of 
aesthetic education and its equally doctrinaire 'radical subjectivist' 
counterpart. 
For an 'experientialist' like Scruton however, aesthetic 
education can only take place insofar as at least a modicum of ! tI2, Ltj 
holds between the pupils' grasp of. the third-person meaning of the 
4 --aning as the -. vork comcs to work and his per5onal rCUGIL_ýQtion of that , 
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IL envelop' hirf). In this vi. ew of the aesthetic language-game, neither 
the perscnal response nor the bare meaning of the work (i. e. its 
'empty intention') can survive on their own since (a) any personal 
realizat-ion of the work without a grasp of the underlying thought that 
identifies it would be a logical impossibility, while equally, (b) the 
thouqht on its own, without the realization, would be aesthetically 
null and void, whatever else it might be - for without such realiz- 
ation, as Scruton has argued, the pupil could not be said to have 
really 'seen its point' in relation to the aesthetic object. 
Thus, on the one hand, Scruton would certainly have as much 
contempt as Best for the teacher who dwells only on what he takes to 
be the untranslatable 'presence' of the work at the expense of even 
attempting to articulate anything of the underlying thought - as in 
Best's example of the dance teacher who proclaims that-, 
'Dance is such a subjective matter that there is nothing that can 
or should be said about it. '4 
Such a teacher not only courts the inconceivable Sartrean 'illusion of 
immanence', but in its wake, mys, ýifies the aesthetic form of life lor 
the pupils - that is, if they don't ridicule it, as the students of 
the above dance teacher did, according to Best, when: 
as their dance performance, (they) sat on the floor eating 
crisps. 5 
Books on Ichild-centred' education are notoriously full of such mysti- 
fying aphorisms as: 
(the poetic) function is not Lo say but to be. 
6 
Seen thus, the works of art's apparently private and esoteric char- 
acter will not only invite random and self-indulgent responses, 
but 
far worse, will seem to confirm the unfortunate philistine pupil's 
conception of himself as an insensitive outsider to a charmed circle. 
On the other hand, however, the teacher who dwells only on 
I 
I of the ork to +-t, o reading off' or decoding the significances 
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exclusion of drawing attention to its 'emergent' identity, not only 
runs the obvious ril,, Lýk of over-int-Lellectualizing it at the expense of 
imaginative and affective responses, but will also tend to reduce the 
I text I in the pupils' eyes to the level of an expendable text-book - 
and often an unnecessarily obscure one at that, when set beside the 
teacher's explanations. 'Well, if that's all the author's trying to 
say, ' the pupils think, 'why didn't he say so in the first place! I 
Of course it is part of the teacher's job to Ifill in' the work's, 
background for his pupils in as interesting a way as possible - as 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The real problem which 
confronts him, however, is that of how he is to combine this kind of 
interpretative talk with alerting his pupils to the unfamiliar and 
'emergent' presence that he himself experiences in the work - for in 
the end, it is upon the possibility that such experience can be 
intimated or communicated and then gain the 'experiential' assent of 
the pupils, that the case for 'psychological objectivity' rests (Lis 
was discussed in the last chapter). How, then, does the arts teaCher 
who is sensitive to these issues go about his task? Let us commence 
an answer to this question by turning first to the earliest stages of 
childhood, for it is here that we are most likely to find the source 
of that 'feeling' which for Scrus-on, in common with most other aesth- 
etic theorists, is th. - sine qua non for the attribution of aesthetic 
descriptions. 
If the Wittgensteinian argument outlined in Chapter One is 
correct - namely, that the learned responses of the aesthetic 
form of 
life (i. e. our ' educated feelings") must presuppose an unlearned 
start in--poink- in the reactions of early childhood, a view strongly 
'*-ý tj 
endorsed by Sibley7 and Best8 - then clearly the parents and 
teacherc 
of very young children must endeavour to judge correctiy what seem 
to 
be the chi-Id's OLNn proto-aesthetic responses, for these must be th- 
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1ccus for any aesthetic educatim. In this respect, the instinct of 
the lr--. hild-centred' approach is right. What, then, does the parent or 
teacher look for? As was suggested n Ci apter One, he 1 ooks for any 
seemingly pleasurable and, where appropriate, imitative responses to 
such stimuli as rhythmic clapping, singing, expressive gestures, 
bright and gaudy colours etc. along with the child's own attempts to 
produce proto-aesthetic objects such as when he scribbles patterns in 
the sand that fascinate him, plays endlessly with the sounds of words 
and, later, discovers his own ability to make dance-like movements and 
invent simple but vivid and original stories. As Sibley say3: 
I 
It is at these times, taking advantage of these natural interests 
and admirations, that we first teach the simpler aesthetic 
words. 9 
By recognizing, encouraging and extendiiig such responses (which, 
of course, presupposes that the parents themselves have some familiar- 
ity with the aesthetic form of life), 'acsth--4. -, ic education' wiLl tend 
to develop naturally as a matter of course, like . 
1earning to talk. 
However, it is in the failure to extend such responses that the rigid 
'child-centred' teacher frustrates the course of aesthetic education, 
for while the child's early reactions provide the natural and only 
po3sible starting-point, nonetheless, as Best is one of many to point 
0 Li tý,, : 
The arts, . 
languag. -- and rationality give an enormous ran e of 
extended noSSibili-ties of feeling, responding and behaving. - I- 
Equally however, the parent or teacher who attempts to extend the 
child's aesthetic horizon without regard to what he. naturally responds 
to and enjoys, can only create confusion and self-doubt in the child's 
mind and sow the seeds of subsequent adolescent alienation from the 
arts. 
In fact, teachers of any ago--range nefd to tako tipe above factors 
into aCCOUnt, especially if it is the case that th9 language-game of 
aesthetics riever completely replace, -, such natural iespon, -)cs even 
243 
though it vastly extends their scope, as Malcolm reports 1"Jittgenstein 
as saying: 
Not mereely is much of the first language of a child grafted onto 
instinctive behaviour - but the whole of the developed, complex 
employment of lanquage by aduJt speakers embodie3 something re- 
sembling instinct-11 
If this is indeed the case, which seems likely in view of the 
'feeling' side that underlies all. acts of judgment, then part of the 
answer to the teacher's problem of communicating the 'embodied 
thought' may well lie within the pupils themselves, analogously, for 
example, to their latent logical or mathematical competences. This 
would suggest that one powerful way of helping pupils to '3ee the 
point' of aesthetic judgments and descriptions would be the teacher's 
employment of 'Socratic' methods to 'draw them out' - as when, in 
looking at Hokusai's The Hollow of the Deep Sea Wave., the teacher 
draws their attention to the presence of Mount Fuji, and certain waves 
in the foreground of the print, but leaves it up to them to notice the 
aesthetically surprising way that the mountain's shape is echoed in 
one of the waves, making the mountain appear like a frozcn wave and 
the wave like a moving mountain, or even tho more startling denial of 
our normal conceptions of 'movement' and 'stillness' that such an 
impression intimates. However, the pupil's natural capacity to feel 
and recognize such aesthetic aspects can only taký-- him 3o far, and 
certainly some familiarity with Japanese culture will extend the 
possibilities of what can appropriately be seen in the print - for 
behind its more obvious aesthetic aspects lie rich 'embodied thoughts' 
relating to a Zen Buddhist view of the opposition between motion and 
stillness, storm and calm, reconciled by the underlying idea of 
flowing tqjith natural force- as embodied in the fisherman's 
boat 
running -vAfi the tide. 
Now here, the ineffective or dull teacher wo-old simply itemize 
all these points in much Lhe same e., ay as a laboured touf 
ist's guide, 
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or the dreary French Que Sais-je? guides to literature that &ALfully 
.1 
chronicle the artist's life, the works, the stylie, the in'irluences, 
without a hnt, of the 'magic'. 'Notice how the triangular shape of 
the mountain resembles the triangular shape of the Ljave, l he might 
intone. 'This exemplifies the traditional concern Gf %-Ijapanese art 
with motion and rest. ' 'So what, ' think the pupils. 'What's so 
special about that? Of course waves move and mountains don't. ' 
Spotting the similarities in shape would then have little more 
interest for them than those puzzle pictures to be found in some 
children's comics where one has to spot the animals hidden away in the 
drawing - an occupation more suited to e. g. relieving the tedium of 
childhood illness that to any enterprise that could be called 0 
'educative'. In the hands of such a teacher, the work of art remains 
an inert object. 
How, then, does the teacher who is 'on form' differ from the dull 
teacher or the teacher who is simply having an 'off' day? Clearly he 
must, at some point, realize, or have realized the work fc-. - himself - 
although this could not be a sufficient condition for effective 
teaching, for it may be equally true of some dull teachers. What he 
does display, rather, is the ability to reproduce in his pupils some- 
thing of the living experience that he himself has had of th, -, work - 
sometimes as a result of reproducing it again in him3elf but not 
necessarily, for he may rely simply on his memory of an earlier exper- 
ience. Sometimes, though far more rarely, he may actually come to 
realize the work for the first time during the lesson, which can be a 
most startling experience. Throughout the performance, however, his 
talk, in Sibley's words: 
often serves to support his judgmenLS in a special way: it helps 
us to see what he has s--enl2 
- althouqh -here, it is important to distinguish 
(a) Sibley's minimal 
8CCOUI-it Of personal response as disc ussed in Chapter 13 Onel i from 
(b) 
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the act of imaginative Irea. lization' outlined in Chapter Six where-in 
the pupil, like the teacher, brings the work to life for himself in 
the form af a synthetic 'imaginary object' (i. e. the intentional 
object of the response) that gradually brings together many partial 
viewpoints (i. e. in the shape ol images, aspects and emotions). Al- 
though, as we have seen, such viewpoints cannot add anything to the 
meaning of the teacher's aesthetic description but rather 'fill it 
out I and 'bring it home' to the pupil, nevertheless, during this 
process, as Kant points out in his consideration of the 'aesthetic 
idea'14, further thouqhts will also be generated, leading in their 
turn to further 'fulfilments' in image, aspect and emotion. 
Such viewpoints may also be seen to fall into two more general 
categories: namely, (a) those that arise when the teacher endeavours 
to take pupils 'inside' the work, enveloping them in it, as when, for 
example, he attempts to get them to see Handet from Ophelia's point of 
view, or to participate in the movement of the lovers towards the boat 
in Watteau's Embarkation to l-'Ytherea; (b) the more 'distanced' k4l-nd of 
viewpoint that the teacher may andeavour to evoke, especially when he 
is seeking to get the pupils to come to an artistic verdict on the 
work, when he encourages them to stand back from the living object 
that they have brought into be-ing and to survey it, at a distance, as 
a synoptic whole. Thus, in looking at Turner's The FiqhtiER Temer- 
alre, for example, the teacher may attempt to envelop his pupils in 
t'he Ivuorld' of the work not, initially, be getting them to feel-, as an 
'edUCated' art lover might, its over-all 'threatening' atmosphere, but 
rather by inviting them to 'hear' the lapping of the waves and to 
'feel' the sea breeze indicated by the, fluttering flag. then, more 
ambitiou-sly, he might try to help them to imagine f-rom start to finish 
the slow, sad progress of this once proud ship on its final journey 
to 
the breaker's yard - all of which, it could be argued, 
is intimated by 
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the painting, even though all that can literally be seen is a 'frozen' 
visual image of bwýts on a river. As Philostratus, w1iting in the 
third century A. D. , says of such an imaginative realization: 
When you entertain a notion of Zeus you must, I suppose, envisage him along with heaven and the seasons and stars as Phidias in his 
day endeavoured to do, and if you would fashion an image of Athene you must imagine in your mind armies and cunning and handicrafts and how she leapt out of Zeus himself. 15 
- all of which would, in various ways, be intimated in a 'successful, 
portrait of the goddess. Similarly, as we saw in Chapter Six, a music 
teacher may encourage the pupils to try to hear all the variations 
that are echoed in a final theme, as in Bach's Goldberq Variations, 
even though all that is audible at any one moment -;!. s just a snatch of 
the therne itself. 
From such imagining, the 'formal' aesthetic aspects of the work 
may also dawn - sometimes gradually, sometimes suddenly - as when the 
vastness of the sky and the great plane of the sea in Turner's 
painting 'shape tip' into an awesome configuration framing the ghostly 
presence of the Temeraire and the 'Satanic' tug. To see this for 
himself, however, the pupil will most certainly need to stand back 
from his earlier envelopment in the work, for only in this way can 
such as over-all 'emergent' configuration arise. 
However, it is not only with the proliferation of further appro- 
priate images, aspects) and emotions that such a teacher is concerned 
but also, as we have see, with the proliferation of further appro- 
pI riate thoughts.. Thus The Fiqhtinq Temeraire, in its dramatic 
rendition of the shift from sail-power to steam, evokes many further 
thoughts (along with their 'fulfilling' images) - some of them more 
public, like thoughts about the advent of the Industrial Revolution 
and its conflict with romanticism; others ,;,, ore personal, like thc 
-hin the pupil with h'Ls own associations that may be awakened will 
acquaintance with ships and rivers. As we --aw in Chapters 
Seven ard 
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Eight, there can be no specifiable 'horizon' to such responses beyond 
a ge. -, eral demand that they be, in some way, germane to what iS ir, -- 
timated by the work, and this specification will depend in turn upon 
some agreement being reached with others who are familiar with the 
pa-inting and its background. More than this v,,, e cannot and should not 
expect, not only because of the unavoidable presence of culturally- 
related and more personal perspectives, but also because of the often 
pointed out inexhaustibility of such works. 
Apart. from getting the pupils to think about the work's meaning, 
however, such a teacher's main concern is to try to get the pupils to 
experience what, as a result of his long experience, knowledge and 
love of art, he has himself experienced (or is experiencing) as an 
I 
'educated' response to the work - as we saw, for example, in the case 
of the poetry lesson on St. Aqnes' E--ve in Chapter Seven). 6. It is not 
that he will necessarily feel entirely defeated if they don't come to 
see it this way, for as we saw in I[Ihe disculssion on 'psychological 
objectivity' in the previous chapter, our belief in the legitimacy of %J 
our own judgments does not thereby make them mandatory upon others. 
Nonetheless, if pupils never came to share his experience of art, this 
would have to imply a failure of some sort, either in his teaching or 
iri his own aesthetic development. 
Insofar, then, as such a teacher's descriptions seek to convey 
something more than can ever be wholly captured by the 'everyday' 
rule-governed operations of language , the power of such 
! descriptions' 
to achieve this end may be seen to lie both in their rhetorical 
features and the expressiveness with which such descriptions are con- 
veyed. It is this aspect of the teacher's talk that underlies 
Scruton's se-emingly obscure remark (discussed in LM)aptcr Two) to the 
effect that: 
certain aesthetic descriptions are non-descriptive in that they 
express not beliefs buL rather 'aesthetic experiences'. 
17 
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Sometimes, suc'n 'aesthetic experitnces' may even be conveyed by an ex- 
pres-sive gesture alone, as -Ahen a great work of art fills us with awe 
and we find that e. g. a grave nod is the best that we can manage in 
the circumstances, as in Wittgenstein's example: 
I should like to say - "These nctes say something glorious, but I 
do not know what. " These notes are a powerful gesture, but I 
cannot put anything side b 
explanation. A grave nod. 
d side with it that will serve as an 
As regards the teacher's actual talk it is often characteristic of the 
aesthetic language game, in the absence of ready-to-hand rules, that 
is phrased in a persuasive way, as Wittgenstein points out: 
Here it occurs to me that in conversation on aesthetic matters we 
use the words: "You have to see it like this, this is how it is 
meant"- "when you see it like this, you see where it goes 
wrong. " 
9 19 
Sometimes, such persuasiveness may involve (and here, I draw on 
Sibley's very useful synopsia of different persuasive approaches20) 
the teacher's own use of poetic imagery for its evocat;, ve power. I 
remember, for example, having a most vivid experience of Arnold's 
Scholar Gypsy as a result of a teacher describing it to me as 'one of 
the great qreen poems of the English language, 21 - almost singing the 
word 'green' -as he said it. At other times, the teacher may draw on 
contrasts, comparisons and personal associations which may be related 
to the pupils' own background knowledge and experiences, as in the 
case of the le! 3son on Wordsworth's Lucy described in Chapter Fi-ve22. 
Again, there is no reason why a 'first-order' exegesis alerting pupils 
to details that they might otherwise have missed should not passover 
in their minds into a vivid awareness of the work's emergent identity. 
Thus, a teacher may aim to intimate the 'tragic feel' of Julius Caesar 
through detailed discussion of the different motives of the conspir- 
ators, the moral ambiguities of their arguments, Caesarls combination 
of ruthlessness and naivety etc., and then, at some point, 
the poign- 
ancy of the drama as a whole strikes the. pupils and they are moved - 
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but moved ina way, that would not have been Possible telithOLIt t', he 
teacher's prior discussion. At other times, as Sibley points OL! 4, -. ina 
way which reminiscent of Scru-Iton's argument from 'paronymyl: 
The use of the aesthetic term itself may do the trick; we say 
what the qualiýy or character is, and people who had not seen it before see it. 2-5 
More often, we draw the pupils' attention to 'first-order' features of 
the work like the use of flattened thirds and sevenths in jazz, 
and relate these directly to the emergent aesthetic feature, in this 
case, the 'blues'. All these approaches, and more, are available to 
the teacher in his attempts to communicate the desired acquaintance 
with the 'embodied thought'. 
It is not only with words, however, that the teacher may succeed 
I 
in this enterprise. As Scruton powerfully argues, echoing Wittgen- 
stein's remarks on 'expression' in 
_The 
Inves- tic, 13ti ons, a teacher or 
pupil or anyone else who attempts to communicate a genuine aesthetic 
experience will naturally tend to do so in a manner which is in itsel f 
expressive of the experience - i. e. as regaards, gesture, tone of 
voice, TaCial expressions etc.: 
The subject will describe the object of his feeling in terms that 
can themselves be construed as an expression ol feeling. It is 
significant that he describes the painting in a certain tone of 
voice. 24 
.,, we 
'betray' our anger as much by our angry tone of In the same wa, / 
voice as by what we say. Furthermore: 
When one expresses one's feelings one does not only do something 
beC2use of the feeling, one also puts feeling into what one 
does . /---) 
For example, in tryinq to convey the lyrical freshness of The Scholar 
Gypsy, the teacher almost 'sings' t-jhat he has to say. Or again, in 
trying to convey the ItragicQlly stumbling' aspect rf the opening 
the very postur-ee of the triplets jr, I-Ichubert's piano sonatta, 
teacher's body will tend to adopt, however minim a1ly, those very 
features. 
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The effect of such expressiveness upon the pupils, as Platlo was 
perhaps the first to point out, is essentially pý mimetic one - i. e. 
the geSturez3 and expressions are followed empathically in the 
audience's own behaviour, and so the p2sitioýLal realization is brought 
about: 
I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer... 
imitating one of the heroes who is is grief, and... delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating h-L- 4s 
breast, feel pleasureq and abandon ourselves and accompany the 
representation with sympathy and eagerness. 26 
The ever-present danger however, as Plato goes on to point out, is too 
much loss of distance - as, for example, when a teacher's presentation 
of a work becomes too histrionic. When this happens, the pupils may 
riot be so much enveloped by the work as swamped by it, as they might 
by a real life. state of affairs - that is, when they are not merely 
embarrassed by such an approach. 
In general, then, the kind of 'understanding' that the pupil 
gains from 'entering 1-nto' the work, needs to be counterbalanced by an 
equal capacity for withdrawal from such engagement in or(, er that lie 
may make the attempt to survey the work as a whole. The teacher's en- 
couragement of this latter enterprise may also be seen to be necessary 
insofar as it is an aifn of aesthetic education to encourage pupils to 
form reliable aesthetic verdicts on the quality of the woek viHich, in 
turn, must be set against a background of comparison. with other works 
within the genre. From this 'detached' perspective the wurk must 
necessarily take on the character of an object of judgment as well as 
the subject of a range of experiences to be 'lived through'. Howevef, 
this aspect of aesthetic education has not been a main concern of this 
thesis. Moreover, at every stage, the possibility of reaching such 
'ranking' verdicts must'. presuppose the pu, pils' possession of a sub- 
jective understanding of the work. 
In all those cases where the teacher fails to communicate, at the 
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very least, a foretaste of acquaintance with the ei,, iergent 'embodied 
thought', then one or other of two equally undesirable consequences 
will tend to follow. Either the pupils become alienated from the aes- 
thetic form of life, rejecting it because they don't believe that 4t 
exists; or else the more faint-hearted may attempt to simulate appro- 
priate responses - much as one forces a laugh at a joke one does not 
understand. Insofar as such simulated responses are linked with 
powerful but aesthetically irrelevant mo %'lives like a desire to come up 
to the required standard (i. e. to be good at the subject), it may be 
hard at times for the pupi. 1 himself to tell whether his own response 
is genuine or not - as when he forces his imagination to accommodate 
what he sees to the teacher's description - perhaps convincing h-luiself 
I 
that he really sees what, in fact, does not emerge for him at all. 
To deal with such problems, which are variously related to lack 
of imagination, poorly developed perceptual powers and an I t. y to 
feel, the effective arts teacher needs vall the powers of judgmeW- that 
he can muster in order to be able to detect those subtle and of ten In- 
describable differences in behaviour that may indicate whether a 
pupil's response is genuine or not - powers that may be closely allied 
to his ability to discern the genuineness of expressions of feeling in 
wo, eks of art themselves. Here, once again, we must refer back 
to 
Wittgenstein's re-mark, already quoted in the previous chapter: 
Is there such a thing as 'expert judgment' about the genuineness 
oi expressions of feeling? ... Correcter prognoses will generally 
issue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of man- 
kind. 
Can one learn this knowledge? Yes; some can. 
Not, however, 
by taking a course in it, but through E2ýý, ri enEe.. -What one 
acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct 
judgments. 27 
The experienced teacher will know, for example, whether 
the 'silent' 
response mentiOned at the beginninq c-f this chapter 
d? notes rapt 
attention or merely an adoption of a puýýe of 
though tf ulnesýs- in order 
to mask the absence of aesthetic 
In the same way, the lover, 
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learnsý by the subtlest of hints, to discriminatc between Lhe re. - 
sponses of love and flattery or p-ity. Without such powers, it is 
difficult to see how anyone could make an effective arts teacher. 
It must be said, however, that the teacher's ability to discern 
such simulated responses is rarely a simple matter. Such behaviour 
comes in a variety of forms, ranging from that which suggest-0 some 
degree of realization on the pupil's part which he either exaggerates 
or plays down, to that which masks a complete absence of ýny aesthetic 
realization whatsoever, even though he may be able to give 2 verbal 
account of the underlying 'empty intenlCion'. As Ishiguro says, in 
underlining this essentially asymmetrical relationship between the 
'empty' and the Irealizedl thought: 
0 
Although the identity of an image is determined by our thoughts 
... having the thoughts verbally does not necessarily enable us to 
picture the object ... Similarly, understanding a description of the aspect of an object anot -her person sees does not necessarily 
enable us to see the aspect... at times I find myself unable to 
picLure an object however hard I try although I have various 
thoughts about the object. 28 
Let us now attempt to summarize the picture of the good P-rtg 
teacher that has started to emerge. Clearly he must love his subject, 
for without this, there could be none of the 'loving talk' of which 
Clive Bell speaks, and which is indispensable for warminq pupils to 
the arts. Furthermore, he must be strong on both analyLic i. nd syn- 
thetic approschcs - able to provide the much-needed exegcsis and, at 
the same time, to intimate expressively the unifying and emergent 
'embodied thought' that holds it all together. In fact -a good arts 
lesson, in which the teacher manages to evoke the 'embodied thought' 
for his pupils through the expressiveness, style and qeist of his own 
teaching perforLmance, may even be 3een as itself something like a work 
of art, and to be enj,,.,,,.! ed in much the sa-me kind of way. It should 
also b-e,. and usually is, enjoyed by the teacher himselfg for vjhen lie 
is in full flow, improvising his teaching in the manner of an inspired 
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jazz musician or Bach at the organ, fie is surely experiencing a peak 
as a teacher - not that one could keep this ur, all the tim. -, of 
course. 
Finally, such a teacher should be sersitive tO L'he variety of 
ways in which realization of the 'embodied thought' may come about - 
for it is in this area that aesthetic dogmatism has done some of its 
worst damage. This variety may be seen to range from: (a) states of 
'Apollonian' contemplation at one end of the scale, such as may arise 
from our perception of very tranquil landscapes2 'lingering' melodies 
4 like that in Ravel's Pavane for a Pead Infanta and much h Lghly ab- 
stract art, such as Rothko's huge purple paintings in the Tate 
Gallery; to (b) states of extreme 'Dionysian' excitement at the other 
0 
en d of the scale, such as may be evoked by the 'heroic' finales of 
many symphonies like Dvorak's Eiqhth or Janacek's Sinfonietta, 'hot' 
jazz, dramatic paintings like Breugel's The Triumph of Death arid the 
literary presentation of emotions in extremity, as when Prince 
Muishkin meets Rogozin on the darkened stairs in The Idi-,, t, or when 
Mrs. Verloc learns of the death of Stevie at the end of The Secret 
Aqent. 
Just as even the most exciting work of art must also hRve an 
intellectual content, however, for without this there could be no 
'embodied -thouqht', so equally, even the quietest and mc-st contempl- 
ative work must be seen to contain its ovin kind of qeist or A could 
not be made to live in our imaginations. Sometimesq of course, as has 
been argued by Aristotle for tragedy, and by T. S. Eliot for the 
poetry of Donne, Marvell and their contemporaries29, contemplation and 
excitement may be induced in equal measure, creating a harmonious 
balance of thought and Feeling that tvrit%--. rs like Elioty perhaps over-- 
dogmatically, have taken to consti-i-tute an aesthetic ideal. 
Account also needs to be taken by the teacher of the varied ways 
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in which aesthetic realization may dawn. "t tim 
- fA nes, for eX2MPI, -, it 
may come as an effol--tless epiphany, often striking the rdupil when lie 
least expects it, and by contrast, eluding him a---- soon as he makes a 
conscious effort of the will to retain it. This is particularly true 
of works of art whe re 'atmosphere' has an important role to play. By 
contrast, especially with very obscure, or in other ways demanding 
works of art, the realization of the embodied thought may appear only 
after a long and hard struggle and even then, perhaps, only partially. 
Sometimes, a conscious effort of concentration is needed here to bring 
about the response, as when one tries to 'hold together' all the leit- 
motifs of a piece of music in one synoptic whole, as was discussed 
earlier. As Sartre says oil the reader of literature: 
The work exists only at the exact level of his capacities; while 
he reads and creates lie knows th, --it he can always go further in 
his reading, can always create more profoundly, and thus the vior. -, 4- L. 
seems L-0 him as inexhaustible and opaque as things. 30 
Nonetheless, as has just been pointed out, such effort may at other 
times be quite coun ter- productive - i. e. in those cases where an 
effortless surrender to the .,., ork is more appropriate. Paradoxically, 
it may be as hard for some pupils to cultivate this type of effort- 
lessness, of response as it is for others to make the mental effort to 
which Sartre refers. It is essential, therefore, that over a period 
of time the arts teacher alert.,; '%., he pupJLls to this variety of forms of 
'realization', along with the rewards that all of their, may yield. 
Unfortunately, however, the presence of this very variety of re- 
sponse has itself given rise to a number of dogmatic and distorting 
aesthetic theories, characterized by their elevation of one mode or 
another to a place of supreme importance along with a dismissal of 
4 
Scruton's cwn theory, for exa niple, as we h2ve seen, -s ot. her modes. 
limited in this respect in that it rejects all 'excitement' in aesT-h- 
etic response in favour of high-. 1evel intellectual engagement. 
Equ, -dl y howover, some teachers, perhapS an eye to 'LlIe. COrnl)C'- Jj '-. *'01-1 
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from commercialized 1popular culture', --ttempt to Put across a view of 
aesthetic experience to their pup-JIs as paradigmatically exciting. As 
a result, the kind of calm, contemplative state that one needs to be 
in in order to read a pocm like Wordsworth's Daffodils (or to reach a 
jUSt aesthetic verdict on any work) is lost upon them and the poem is 
dismissed out of hand as 'boring'. Rarely does one find an aesthetic 
theory, with the possible exception of Nietzsche's Dionysian/Apollon- 
ian account of Greek tragedy3l, that does anything like justice to the 
full range of possible types of aesthetic experience - so that it is 
no wonder that pupils often come to distrust their own respon3es and 
grow confused about exactly what it is that arts subjects have to 
of f er. 
Whether an appropriate realization of the work of art is effort- 
less or hard-won, contemplative or excited, however, underlying all 
such experiences, as has been emphasized throughout this thesis, is an 
involuntary element over which, necessarily, neither the pupil nor 
still less the teacher, can ever have fUll control. Thi. s i. s something 
which all lovers of art simply have to live with, for as Ishiguro 
says: 
In the case of seeing imagcs or aspects there is an added element 
of something beyond our control, of being an experience probably 
governed by causal forces w3 do not understand. 
32 
We may speculate a1bOLIt these 'causal forces' of course, for example 
from a psycho-analytic point of view, and there is no doubt that such 
i. nvoluntariness has its origin, at least in part, in the involuntari- 
ness that lics at the root of all eMO-Lional experience. Nonetheless, 
for present purposes, such explanaUons may be 'bracketed off' insofar 
as what we do know 'from experience' is that despite this involuntary 
element, a cappcity for aesthetic realization may still be brought 
about indirectly by the right kind of' teachinq, employing some of' 
the 
means to which I have referred in this chapter. As Ishiguro goes or) 
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to se Y: 
At the same time aspect seeing or image seeing seems to involve 3 
skill. that can be acquired by effo-ut or practice... It is a knack 
that I can acquire by effort - although I cannot explair-, hovi I 
acquired the knack. 33 
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UHAPTER TEN: The ae--thetic curriculum and the unity of tho artS. 
In an article The Unity of Aes_thetic Educatifin, Sparshott Uorgues 
that: 
Grouping the arts together for educaticnal purposes is justified, however many respects there may be in which they differ, provided that there are some common problems which they all pose for teaching and learning-I 
In my previous chapter, and indeed throughout this thesis, I have 
tended to take it for granted that the common educational problems 
posed by the various art forms do indeed outweigh the manifest differ- 
ences that divide them. Yet nowhere is the division between aesthetic 
theory and the practice of aesthetic education more marked than in the 
contrast that vie typically find between their perspectives on the 
unity of the'arts. Thus, on the one hand, there is a natural tendency 
for aesthetic theory to approach the arts as a relatively distinct and 
unified area of human experience. This is reflected in the common 
concern of many aestheticians to ensure that no one major art form is 
favoured as a paradigm of the aesthetic form of life at the expense of 
any other - while at the same time, of course, being sensi: -Ij-ve to the 
differences between music, painting, literature, dance etc. In fact 
most existing aesthetic theories, including Scruton's seem to take 
this principle as read, as we may see in the common practice of 
supporting aesthetic arguments with illustrations drawn In(ýisbcriridn- 
ately from all the maior art forms -a practice triat I have en-- %.. I 
deavoured myself to follow, during the course of this thesis. 
The one notable and influential exception to this practice, of 
course, is that of the 'formalist' aesthetics advanced by writers like 
Be'Ll and Fry (at least in their earlier works), tqhej-ei. n an aesthet- 
L' Ls taken from a position 
that i-cally dismissive view or Ora LUre J 
favours r-he 'Cine qrts'. rcrmah. suil apart, however, even Paul Hirst, 
ML'IS4 C the most itifluential of curriculum theorists, treats literature, 
and the 'fine arts' as a unified area, without a thought to justif-ý I 
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such treatment2. 
On the other ho. -id, it is only too clear that in schools and uni-- 
versities, there is a long-standing division on the curriculum between 
the 'fine arts', music and literature - the first two tending to stand 
apart, respectively, in 'creative arts' and 'performing arts' facul- 
ties (along with drama), while the la. -t is nowadays most commonly to 
be found annexed to the 'humanities', alongside subjects like history, 
sociology and languages, enjoying a relationship with the 'fine arts' 
and music analogous to the currently very uncertain one that exists 
between the social and natural sciences. Such a division is also re- 
flected in the popular conception of 'art', where the word 'art' it- 
self has become virtually synonym, ous with 'painting' -a view power- 
fully echoed at the theoretical level., as has just been pointed out, 
by 'formalist' aestheti. cians. 
There are, of course, many good Ycasons, particularly of a praCt- 
ical nature, why this state of affail. -s should be so in aesthetic educ- 
ati. on. The technical skill-, ard knowledge requi. red by the creati. ve 
and performing side of the arts, such as learning to handle paint, 
playing a musical instrument, mastering the physical skills of dancing 
and the linguistic skills of writing poetry and prose are all de- 
manding of much time, patienu-e and hard-won inspiration, not to 
mention the lengthy 2pprenticeship in appreciation of the chosen art 
form that must accompany all such activities. Often as a result cl 
sI uch engagement, both teachers and PUPAS will tend to feel far more 
'at home' within one of the art forms, to the extent that they may 
take little interest in what is going on in the rest. of the arts -a 
situp-tion clearly parallelled by current specialization in the 
sciences. 
Over and above such practical reasons for the division of aesth- 
etic education, however, there are also the prevailing ideologies rf 
rý 
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the time. Most teachers of liteA rature, for example, nowadays have an 
overriding concern Tfor the moral, sociolog, Jcalj psychological and 
other non-aesthetic associations of their subject - an aspect that I 
myself have been concerned to emphasize in this thesis, especially in 
the argument for the 'ambiguity of the aesthetic' in Chapter Seven. 
Teachers of music and the 'fine arts, on the other hand, are charac- 
teristically far more concernod with the 'inner logic' of aesthetic 
form -a view that, as we saw in Chapter One, gains much support froll-I 
the highly influential 'objectivist' aesthetics of writers jike. 
Osborne, whose main concern, in the tradition of Bell and Fry, is with 
the perceptual arts. 
t Despite the above considerations, I nonetheless wish to question, 
in this closing chapter, t _L -he educational wisdom of such divJsions - 
particularly as regards (a) the too-ready assumption that- literature, 
pt4 because of its obviously far greater articul . on of intellectual. 
a separate area away from content, should therefore be taught a, ) 
'aesthetic education' proper; and (b) the blind-spot which tends to 
exist in the teaching of every art form, for its possible affinities 
with Other art forms. With regard to (a), as has been argued through- 
out this thesis, especially in relation to what I take to be the amb- 
iguous nature of the laesthctic', works of art in all the major forms 
have both an intellectual content and a perceptual /i M2ginati ve/a ff ect- 
ive one. Although the proporý ional importance of both these aspects 46-0 
[nay, of course, vary dramatically among' individual works of art - e. g. 
as between a slight love lyric and a 'novel of ideas', a still-life of 
a bowl. of fruit and painting like Raphael's School of Athens - 
the 
important poj--nt is that such diversity cuts across all art forms, 
rather than marking off literature as being in a special class of 
its 
own. With regard to (b), I shall argue in due course 
that because of 
such aesthetic insularities as we find in Our schools and univers- 
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i-ties, a rich field of aesthetic 'aspect- tCnd s to be 
perceptionlk ignoAed to the educational loss of all concerned. 
The reluctance of arts teachers, as contrasted with aesthpt- 
icians, to give this aesthetic common-ground the attention that it 
deserves has created, I would argue, an unfortunate imbalance between 
approaches to the teaching of the 'fine arts' and music on the one 
hand, and the teaching of 1-iterary studies on the other. Thi. s, i. n 
turn, has led to a fragmented rationale of the different art forms 
which inevitably undermines collective justification of aesthetic 
education as a whole when it is under attack - as it now is with the 
present government's shift of emphasis in our schools towards tech- 
nology and the sciences. 
Such fragmentation, furthermore, may be seen to be reflected not 
only in (a) the manifest ascendancy of analytic, 'cognitive' app- 
roaches withi-n the teaching of literature and 'formalist' approaches 
within the teaching of painting and music, but also (b) in the mutual 
suspicion and mistrust that arise among adherents to these respective 
approaches. Thus, not only are many teachers of literature seemingly 
in ignorance- of those general aesthetic issues that relate their 
subject to the mai-nstream of art, but they are also deeply suspicious 
of what they see as 'aestheticism' in literary response. Leavis, fer 
example, whose influence upon the teaching of literature at all levels 
in this country has been profound, at times seems to regard any 'aes- 
thetic' preoccupation in literary works as a clear indication of 
superficiality of content (see footnote). Of Madame Bovary, for 
example, he says: 
It was James who put his finger on the weakness in Madame Bovary: 
L L, ensity, with the the discrepancy between the... 'aesthetic' int 
Footnote: See the discussion of this issue in my arlticle, 'The Aesth- 
ete and the Philisttine'q British Journal of Aestlictics Vol. 19 
(Autunin 
1979), especially p. 334. 
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'tribution of, ini-erest implied at, L to the subject, and the actual 
moral and human paucity of this subject on any mature valuation. 3 
What we see here, in contrast to Bt-11's contempt for content, is 
a like-minded contempt for aesthetic foirm. Thus we arrive at one lavi 
for literature and another, antithetical one for the 'fine arts'. 
This is not to deny, of course, that on particular occasions, the 
literary critic may be justified in drawing our attention to the way 
that a 'fine style' masks an inner emptiness of thought and feeling, 
so long as this is not an instance of prejudice masquerading as a 
principle. 
Such prejudice, however, is by no ýeans confined to the teacher 
of literature, as has been pointed out. Among teachers of painting 
and music there is to be found a similar lack of awareness concerning 
those broader issues of aesthetics that arise from the non-aesthetic 
significances of their art forms such as have been discussed through- 
out this thesis. This, in turn, is commonly found to be coupled with 
a deep-rooted distrust of the cognitive analysis of content, which 'Ls 
seen inevitably to detract from what they take to be the aesthetic 
purity of unadulterated perceptual awareness, whether visual or aural. 
Thus, for Osborne, in common with such teachers: 
(A work of art's) semantic information invites attention away 
from the properties of the work itself towards that which it de- 
picts, specifies or symbolizes. 4 
Here, once again, we see the distorting infl. uence of an artificial 
dichotomy that too readily divides the arts into perceptual and in- 
tellectual categories, with the 'fine arts' and music subsumed under 
the former, and literature under the latter - an assumption that it 
has been one of the aims of this thesis to question. 
For writers like Clive Bell, for example, as we saw 4,1 Chapter 
1-1 Seven, content in painting is no Mor. - th3r. a peg on wh*L%--i to hang the 
garment of 'significant form' - and as such, whether the peg is 
Guernica cr c bovil of fruit is realJy oF no great consequence. L ike- 
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wise, in the realm of musical theory, we find only too often a similar 
and narrow intent to confine musical education Ito a consideration of 
the purely formal structures of sound arid rhythm. Phenix, for ex- 
ample, in an influential book on curriculum theory, Realms of Meaninq, 
confidently asserli-, s that: 
The meanings of musical composition rest principally on its 
musical ideas, a term referring to those tonal or rhythmic 
patterns that provide the points of departure for the composition 
... Such meanings derive from the cultivation of self-forgetful 
delight 41-n the direct contemplation of the patterns of musical 
statement, contrast, accent, progression, repetition and vari- 
ation that critical analysis describes. 5 
A similar view is expressed by the composer Webern, in The Path to the 
New Music, in which he sets out to provide an apoloqia for the 'new 
music' akin 
I 
to that which writers jike BeI16 and Csborne7 have sought 
to provide for 'modern' painting. Thus, for Webern, th- entire hist- 
ory of Western music from earliest times to the advent of the 'twelve- 
tone' system is seen purely in terms of a formal progression, follow- 
ing the 'natural laws' of sound: 
So, a note is, as you have heard, complex -a comp'L-e,, cf funda- 
mental. and overtones. Nowq there has been a gradual process in 
which music has gone on to exploit each successive stage of this 
complex material. This is the one path-8 
Now clearly there is, of course, a complex and evolutionary 
'inner logic' of musical sound that the composer rightly takes for h-I-s 
own - but what, for example, of the ancient Greek equation between 
the 
various 'modes' and their emotional significances as discussed by 
Plato in The Republic9, or Bach's religious preoccupations as ex- 
pressed, for example, in his linking of certain augmented intervals 
with the crucifixion? What does Webern say to this? 
We know of the Greek modes, then th-- church modes of bygone ages. 
How did these scales come about? They are really 2 manifestation 
of the overtone series. ; 'is you know, the octave comes 
first, 
then fl--, e fifth, then in the next octave the third. 
10 
If this were all there was to the content of music, hoNever, then how 
could an account like that of Wehern's hegin to explain how Western 
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mubic (not to mention the rrlusjc Of Other cultures) has evolved over 
the years a vast and infinitely subtle range of c-xpressiveness that 
link it riot only to such themes as the religious one mentioned above, 
and, in the case of 'tone poems', to the evocation of landscapes, 
regional identities, the seasons etc., but a)so to the emotions in 
general as embodied, for example, in the ancient Greek understanding 
of the different 'modes' or, more recently, in the directives that 
preface m(iny MUsical scores, such as larqo ('slow and maj- 
e-stic'), con fuoco ('with fire'), Eýlocoso ('like a joke') etc.? 
Although such terms may have a primary 'musical' function to indicate 
the tempo, there is hardly one which does not carry with it secondary, 
affective significances. This aspect is underlined by Wittgenstein in 
Culture and Value., when he points out that: 
Tender expression in music... isn't to be characterized in terms 
of degrees of loudness or tempo. Any more th-an a tender facin, 11 
expression can be described in terms of the distribution of 
matter in space. 11 
If, therefore, Scruton's argument about our 'paronymous' USage Of -S. Llch 
terms is accepted, then it is exceedingly diffiCLII-t to sce IIuw they 
can have no significance other than the purely musical one to which 
Phenix and Webern refer. 
Too often, in fact, pupils are put off music precisely because of 
such experiences as having to learn these expression, l-, parroL-fashion, 
as a kind of autonomous sign-system - for example, in order to pass 
Grade V Theory examinations - without any attempt on the part of 
the 
teacher to relate the musical expressiveness that they imply to the 
non-aesthetic significances that they have which relate music so 
interestingly to the world at large. After all, how does a pupil come 
to understand the musica-11- di-r-Iction 11--hat requires h,. m 
to play the 
(I closing mo%, or. ent of a pic. ----- con fu--co k with fire')? 
No set of rules, 
as we have seen, will be Sufficient to convey -the 
'embodied thought' 
that isi ntended by this directi ve, but only a 'paronyii-ious' grasp of 
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'fiery' as extended to include ithe kind ol musical expressiveness that 
the 'edUC2ted' music lover feels to be appropriate to such an aspect. 
As Wittgenstein points out in Culture and Value: 
I can imagi. ne an exci. ting scene in a film accompanied by Beet- 
hoven's or Schubert's music and might gain some sort of under- 
standing of the music (my emphasis) from the film. 12 
However, for Webern, the 'musical ideal (the musical equivalent to 
Bell's 'significant form) is everything, and all non-musical signif- 
icance, an intrusionI3. Not only does such a view of music seem to 
render all such 'aspect-perception' as is implied by terms like con 
fuoco unintelligible, but also, insofar as musical form is here con- 
ceived of exclusively along quasi-mathematical lines deriving from the 
acousq-ic properties of sound, then at best we are left with a type of 
aesthetic 'naturalism' that would certainly prove inadequate to just- 
ify Webern's own description of his account as 'the one path. ' 
The notion that music may signify in any wider sense than a 
purely musical one, is dismissed by Webern in tivo ways: (a) it is dis- 
missed patronizingly, as if all that such a view entailed were a naive 
mimetic perspective: 
So how do people listen to music? How do the broad masses Ii-sten 
to it? Apparently they have to be able to cling to Pictures and 
'moods' of some kind. If. they can't imagine a green field, a 
,ý 
or something of the sort, then they are out of their blue sk 
depth. 1 
b) Significances such as "Wagnerian leitmotifs are treated as simply 
belonging to another art form, in this case drama, and therefore as 
h'aving no musical interest - just as ýell apportions out the 
'anec- 
dotal' element in painting to the 'literary' sphere: 
Wagner's leit motifs are perhaps another matter. For example, if 
the Siegfried motif crops up many times because the drama calls 
for A, there is unity, but only of a dramatic kind, not musical, 
their. 3 tj C. 15 
Lip to a point, of course, the I i-., -st of these dismissal. - m, ay bo 
explained as a justifiable reaction to the elevation of 
the 'tone 
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ou, p em, as the supreme form Of musical expression by an earlier gener- 
ation of composers. From CAn educational point of view, one thinks C' ,f 
the great disservice done to the cause of music here by al-L ' those 
teachers who, because they felt that music ought to mean something in 
the above, literal sense, have attempted to Introduce generations of 
children to the pleasures of music via such hackneyed 'represent- 
ationall pieces as Carnival of the Animals, Peter and the Wolf and 
Fing al's Cave - usually, with little success. Nonetheless, to ignore 
the ways that music, even of the most 'abstract' kind, may express- 
ively evoke (rather than 'represent') ideas, i. mages and emotions, is 
to disregard that feature of musical 'aspect-perception' whi. ch, as was 
argued in Chapter Seven16, is what enables many pupils to take #--. n art 
I 
form like music seriously, as offering some kind of 'comment upon 
life', while at the same time enjoying it as a powerful source of 
aesthetic pleasure. 
Webern's second argument, concerning the separating-out of 
musical and dramatic elements, is not only insensitive to Wagner's own 
brave conception of a 'total' art form, but also leaves us with the 
unsatisfactory concept of such music as something merely tagged on to 
the drama. It is certainly not my aim here, however, to argu-e for a 
djý3solvinq of the obvious differences between the arts of music, 
drama, visual sp-ec tacle etc. Rather, what I would like to argue 
for 
is an aesthetic education that encouraged the development of a 
type of 
-inities 
aesthetic I aspect- perception I that was sensitive 
to the al I 
between such forms, wherever such affiniLlies are seen 
by the catholic 
art-lover to exist. the ability to recognize such affinities - 
similar to the correspondances that 
Baudelaire found in nature 
between: 
les parfums, les couleurs et les sons17 
- may be seen as yet snother and 
very -il mportant 
instance of Scruton's 
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account of the 'paronymous' way in which our descriptions of works of 
art enter the aesthetic langua 
. 
ge game. Thus, for ý., xample, pupils who 
have beer-, fortunate enough to have had the kind of aesthetic education 
wherein they are given acquaintance with & range of S. Art forms, may 
come to recognize many such affinities between the different art forms 
of a stylistic epoch - e. g. as when the descriptiong 'exuberant and 
whirling', dawns as a common aspect to both the fugues of Bach and the 
architecture of the Baroque period, or when the dream-like quality of 
Ravel's music is perceived to echo the poetry of Mallarm6 and the 
later paintings of Monet, i. e. when the aspect of 'Impressionism' 
dawns as a common aspect. Without the presence of such affinities, it 
is, of course, obvious that 'mixed' art forms like singing, opera and 
f 
da nce would be impossible. Their presence may also be seen in the 
cinema's matchdng of the music of a period to its art and architect- 
ure, when these elements seem to qUicken each other in a most remark- 
scores to the able way - as, for example, in the matching of jazz . 
modern urban environment (providing that this does not degý--,; e; --,, t. e into 
a cinematic clich6). 
At the same time, however, such a concept of aesthetic 
education must heed Sp2rshott's fear that: 
teachers and theorists will overstress the common aspects at the 
expense of the unique aspects of the various arts, with a 
resulting vapidity and excessive generality. 
18 
Furthermore, unless the relative autonomy of each art form is pre- 
served within the posited 'emergent' common sensibility, considerable 
confusion May also arise in the pupils' minds. Poetry, for ex2mple, 
is only in a borrowed sense 'musicall and could not literally 
be gov- 
erned by the same structural considefations that, according 
to writers 
like Webern., dictate the general course of music. Here, it is in- 
struc-tive to look at some of the Ljays in which we 
do in fact borrow 
aestheUc terms from one form in order 
to apply them to another in so 
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far as, following Scruton's argument, a'I such 'pai-onymous, uses can 
only be properly said to enter public language on condition that they 
have a natural home in some primary use of the term. For example, if 
the pupils are to be able to see the point of describing a piece of 
music as 'colourfull or 'full of 1-ight and shade' then this must pre- 
suppose a grasp, not only of the musical extension of such terms (i. e. 
through the pupils' capacity for 'aspect-perception'), but also of' 
their primary use which, in this case, lies within the province of 
painting. Similar considerations would apply as when we speak, for 
example, of the 'rhythms' created by the flying buttresses of a cath- 
edral or by Mondrian's Broadway__Booqie-Wooqie, or the 'discordant' 
qualiý-y of Jacobean pootry. As long as the 'paronymous' relationship 
is preserved, then so the relative autonomy of each art form, 
while, at the same time, allowing the pupils to recognize the powerful 
, emergent' affinities between them. 
What follows from this, then, is that teachers of literature and' 
teachers of the 'fine arts' and musi-c have much to learn from each 
other - not least of which is the kind of cross-referencing outliricd 
above. However, ik must be stressed at thi s point, that in arguing 
for a united 'arts faculty' thatt. incorporates all the art forms, I am 
not arguing for an laestheti(Azing' of literature such as does 
Margaret McDonald, in her article, The I.. anquaqe of Fictionl9. Thus, 
while I welcome her suggestion chat: 
Characters, e. g., might for ac (my emphasis), be com @red 
with musical 'themes' rather than with human flesh and blood 
0 
I would be unwilling, for the reasons given above, to underwrite her 
theory-ladpn remark that a work of fiction: 
is more like a picture or a symphony than a theory or report. 
21 
Rather, in line vii-th the general argument advaný--ed in this thes-Ls for 
th-- fundamental ambiguity of the aqsthetic language game, pointing 
Jan-., -, -, -Ij. ke both outwardly towards the. wor-Id at 
large and inviardly 
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towards its own unique; i-rreplaceable 'world', I am suggesti-ng, 
firstly, that the many 'formalist' teachers of music and the 'fine 
arts' would greatly benefit from the literature teacher's concern with 
moral, psychological, historical and other kinds of 'relevance'. In 
this respect, they might even come to see that the evolution of aesth- 
etic form itself may be determined by non-aesthetic considerations, as 
in the following speculative suggestion made by the art historian, 
Wylie Sypher, that: 
The techniques of an abstract art always appear whenever man 
feels himself alien from the natural world; on the contrary, when 
man is at home in nature, the artist uses a naturalistic tech- 
nique. 22 
Secondly, I Pm suggesting that contact with teachers of music and 
painting would lead the teacher of literature and his pupils to a far 
greater awareness of the aestheti-c aspect of their subject - that 
'poetic' state of which Valery speaks, wherein our sensitivity to Ian- 
guage approaches our sensli-tivity to music. As Nietzsche points out, 
in commenting upon the limitations of Aristotle's 'psychologizing' of 
Greek tragedy: 
In order to understand the difficult phenomenon of Dionysiac -art 
directly, we must now attend to the supreme importance of musical 
dissonance. The delight cr-eated by tragic myth has the same 
origin as the delight dissonance in music creates. That primal 
Dionysiac delight, experienced even in the presence of pain, is 
the source common to both 1T-usic and tragic myth. 
23 
Clearjy, a considerable grounding in both music and literature, such 
as Nietzsche himself had, woulO have to be presupposed before such an 
a. spect could dawn for the pupil yet 
kow much he will miss, without 
it! 
As was pointed out at the start, there are formidable practical 
problems to be overcome in the mounting of such a curriculum. 
Qui te 
apart from the sheer amount of time 
Lh. 
At 
it takes to come 
to term- 
with even one art form in any depth, there 
is the problem that insofar 
as al'I pupils of arts subjects L,,, ould be required 
to reflect upon the 
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non-aesthetic significamces of woTks of art, then they vjould Plso need 
an education in such relevant subject areas as history, the socic-1. 
sciences, politics and psychology. Certainly teachers of all the 
major art forms would need to have followed a general course in aesth- 
etics if the currently prevailing insularity of outlook is to be 
broken down. Unfortunately, a detailed consideration of such prac- 
tical consideraLiuns must lie beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nonetheless, for the reasons given, I would argue firstly that no 
curriculum planner of aesthetic education can afford to ignore the 
rich possibilities of extending aesthetic aspect-perception that arise 
from looking at the arts side-by-side and how this may further the 
pupils' understanding of individual art forms -a point that Wittgen- 
I 
stein reiterates on many occasions in Culture and Value as when he 
says, of music, that: 
tenching (the pupil) to understand poetry or painting may con- 
tribute to teaching him what is involved in understanding 
musi C. 24 
Secondly, I WOLI)d argue that neither can the curriculum planner ignore 
those central issues which, as I hope this thesis has shown, are the 
common roperty of all art forms - the most notab-Ile being the issue of 
ho-w the pupil may come to realize the 'embodied thought' of the work, 
whother it be in music, literature, painting, etc., wherein 
the pur- 
suit of aesthetic form and the pursuit of meaning come together 
in an 
eiiiergent, affective unity. The curriculum integration of 
literature 
with music and the 'fine arts' in a way that was 
both cohesive and 
preserved the distinctive characteristics of each art 
form might then 
4 
result in a new flowering of aesthetic education -n our schools. 
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